The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hart, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
As of April 12, 1996, plaintiff Mark Benner was incarcerated
at Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet, Illinois and housed
in Unit I, a disciplinary segregation unit. All the defendants
were assigned to Unit I on that date. Defendant Eugene McAdory
was the unit superintendent, defendants James Yarbrough and
Freddie Ray were correctional officers, and defendant Clarence
Wright was a sergeant. Inmate Robert Felton was housed in the
cell next to plaintiffs cell. On that date, Felton scalded
plaintiff with hot water when plaintiff, without an escort,
approached Felton's cell to retrieve his legal papers. Plaintiff
alleges that defendants acted with deliberate indifference in
failing to prevent this assault.*fn1 Presently pending is
defendants' motion for summary judgment.*fn2
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is
considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the
nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the
nonmovant. Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance Co., 200 F.3d 1055,
1057 (7th Cir. 2000); Baron v. City of Highland Park,
195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1999). The burden of establishing a lack
of any
genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Wollin v.
Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1999); Essex v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1997). The
nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish
any essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof
at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106
S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Shank v. William R. Hague,
Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir. 1999); Wintz v. Northrop
Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1997). The movant need not
provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing the
nonexistence of such essential elements. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Also, it is not sufficient to show evidence
of purportedly disputed facts if those facts are not plausible
in light of the entire record. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom
Mid-America, Inc., 45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Covalt
v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th Cir. 1991);
Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476-77
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102
L.Ed.2d 110 (1988). As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:
The moving party bears the initial burden of
directing the district court to the determinative
issues and the available evidence that pertains to
each. "[A] party seeking summary judgment always
bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of `the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); id. at 325, 106
S.Ct. 2548 ("the burden on the moving party may be
discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to
the district court — that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case").
Then, with respect to issues that the non-moving
party will bear the burden of proving at trial, the
non-moving party must come forward with affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories or
admissions and designate specific facts which
establish that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The non-moving party
cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must
designate specific facts in affidavits,
depositions, answers to interrogatories or
admissions that establish that there is a genuine
triable issue. Id. The non-moving party "must do
more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89
L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving
party's] position will be insufficient; there must
be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find
for the [non-moving party]." Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Resolving all genuine factual disputes in plaintiffs favor and
drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor, the facts
assumed to be true for purposes of summary judgment are as
follows. Plaintiff had been incarcerated at Stateville since May
1994. He was originally housed in protective custody. In June
1995, he was assigned to disciplinary segregation in Unit I. On
April 12, 1996, plaintiff was confined in a single cell on the
third floor of Unit I's G Wing ("3-G"). Unit I is the
disciplinary segregation unit, housing inmates
who have been found guilty of serious rule infractions such as
assault, escape, weapons violations, possession of drugs, and
possession of gang literature. There is no protective custody
within Unit I, but the stated procedures for Unit I are more
restrictive than those for protective custody. Also, a person
who was targeted by others could, if possible within Unit I, be
moved away from the persons that threatened him. Also, on
occasion, Unit I inmates facing security risks were transferred
to the Health Care Unit, X-House, or the Special Evaluation
Unit.
As of April 1996, electric immersion heaters ("stingers") were
prohibited in Unit I. However, the ban had been put in place
approximately two months earlier and not all stingers had yet
been seized. Contraband was seized during shakedowns that were
performed approximately every 30 days. However, Felton's cell
had not been searched recently. Also, it was possible for
inmates to smuggle stingers into Unit I.
As of April 1996, Unit I inmates were to be escorted in chains
whenever they were moved to or from their cells. While being
escorted, an inmate's hands were cuffed behind his back.
Occasionally, the mandatory escort policy would not be followed.
Also, on occasion inmates would move without their escorts.
Plaintiff did not have a history of moving without his escort.
Around noontime on April 12, 1996, defendant Yarbrough came to
plaintiffs cell, handcuffed plaintiff, and removed plaintiff to
take him to sick call on the first floor of Unit I. Yarbrough,
however, left plaintiff unescorted in the 3-G dayroom. Benner
continued down to the lower level health unit unescorted. After
being seen with complaints of back and knee pain, no one was
there to escort plaintiff back to his cell. There is evidence
that Yarbrough was on his lunch break from 12:30 p.m. to 1:30
p.m. Neither side points to evidence regarding when plaintiff
left the health unit after his initial appointment. There is
evidence that plaintiff was already being treated for the
scalding when Yarbrough returned from lunch, which would
indicate plaintiff was scalded sometime before 1:30 p.m.
Unescorted, plaintiff walked back to the 3-G dayroom.
Defendant Ray was in the control booth where he could see the
dayroom and other areas. Plaintiff told Ray that two gangs had
hits out for plaintiff and plaintiff requested that Ray escort
him to his cell. Ray looked at plaintiff while plaintiff was
talking, but did not respond to plaintiff. After waiting a few
minutes, plaintiff went down to the second floor central hallway
to look for Yarbrough or another officer to escort him and lock
him into his cell. Plaintiff glanced onto other wings, but found
no officers other than those in the control booth. Plaintiff
returned to the 3-G dayroom, where Ray stared at him from the
control booth. The control booth officer has a clear view of the
wing hallways as well.
Plaintiff waited there for a few minutes and then headed back
down the stairs to look for an officer to escort him. Plaintiff
encountered defendant Wright and told him about the two gang
hits and requested that Wright lock him in his cell. Wright told
plaintiff to go to 3-G and he would send a gallery officer
there. Plaintiff went to the wing, but no officer arrived to
meet him.
After being scalded, plaintiff rushed off the wing in view of
Ray who was still in the control booth. Plaintiff ran to
McAdory's office and thereafter went to the Health Care Unit
where he was treated. Plaintiff was then transferred to the
hospital for further treatment.
After his initial hospital treatment, plaintiff was placed in
X-House. After a second round of hospital treatments, plaintiff
was placed in protective custody in H-House, ...