The opinion of the court was delivered by: Ruben Castillo, United States District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Gloria J. Hudson, proceeding pro se,*fn1 brings this action
against Defendant West Harvey/Dixmoor School District No. 147, alleging
violations of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). For the reasons stated
below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on both counts
of Hudson's Complaint.
I. Hudson's Failure to File a Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) Statement
Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires Defendant, the moving party, to submit a
statement of undisputed facts complete with citations to the record.
Hudson, the nonmoving party, is required, under Local Rule 56.1(b)(3), to
respond to each numbered paragraph in the Defendant's statement of
undisputed facts with the reason for her disagreement with each fact, if
any, and provide supporting references to the record. The consequence of
not adhering to Local Rule 56.1(b)(3) is that "[a]ll material facts set
forth in the statement required of the moving party will be deemed to be
admitted." Local Rule 56.1(b)(3)(B). In this case, because Hudson failed
to file a 56.1(b)(3) statement disputing Defendant's facts, we deem
Defendant's facts admitted. See Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. Home Ins. Co.,
225 F.3d 868, 871 (7th Cir. 2000) (upholding strict application of Local
Rule 56.1); Hill v. Human Rights Comm'n, 762 F. Supp. 196, 198 (N.D.Ill.
1991) (failure of pro se plaintiff to respond to defendant's 12(m)
statement of material facts rendered those facts admitted for purposes of
summary judgment motion).*fn2 We recognize the difficulties a pro se
litigant may face, but "pro se status does not absolve [a litigant] of
the obligation to at least attempt to comply with Local Rule [56.1]."
Henderson v. Canteen Corp., No. 92 C 3873, 1993 WL 276725, at *3 n. 1
(N.D.Ill. July 22, 1993).*fn3
II. Undisputed Material Facts
Hudson had been a teacher at various schools in the Chicago Public
School system ("CPS" system) from 1969 to 1995. In 1992 and 1994, Hudson
filed charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the Illinois Department of Human Rights ("IDHR")
against the assistant principal of a Chicago Public School at which she
had been teaching. In 1995, Hudson was discharged from her employment
with the CPS system for insubordination.
After leaving the CPS system, Hudson applied for both full-time and
substitute teacher positions in the West Harvey/Dixmoor school district.
She was hired as a substitute teacher and began working in October 1995.
On a number of occasions after the 1995-1996 school year, Hudson applied
for full-time teaching positions in the Defendant school district but was
denied each time. On October 7, 1998, Hudson filed a charge of
discrimination against Defendant with the EEOC and the IDHR, alleging
Title VII violations. On May 27, 1999, Hudson filed another charge of
discrimination against Defendant, alleging that she was denied employment
as a fulltime teacher because of her age and in retaliation for her
previous EEOC charges while employed in the CPS system. Defendant contends
that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Hudson's claims of
retaliation and age discrimination in view of Hudson's noncompliance with
Local Rule 56.1 and failure to establish a genuine issue of material fact
with respect to Defendant's decision not to hire her. We agree and grant
Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue for trial exists only
when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248(1986). A plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations of a claim without
any probative evidence supporting his complaint. Id at 249. The
non-moving party is required to go beyond the pleadings and designate
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324(1986). The Court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Crim v. Board of Educ. of Cairo
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 147 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). However, if the
evidence is merely colorable, is not significantly probative, or merely
raises "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," summary
judgment may be granted. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 261.
Hudson contends that Defendant retaliated against her for filing
charges of discrimination against an assistant principal in the CPS
system by failing to hire her for a full-time teaching position. Title
VII prohibits retaliation against an employee who has engaged in activity
protected by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima
facie case of retaliation, Hudson must show that: (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and
the adverse action. Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc.,
163 F.3d 1027, 1038 (7th Cir. 1998). If she establishes these elements,
Defendant has the burden to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its actions. Once this reason is produced, Hudson must prove
that the reason is pretextual. Id. at 1039.
In this case, as a preliminary matter, although Hudson alleges that
Defendant wrongfully failed to hire her on a number of occasions spanning
many years, we may consider only Hudson's allegations that fall within
the 300-day period prior to the filing of her EEOC charges. Filipovic v.
K&R Express Sys., Inc., 176 F.3d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1999) ("In Illinois,
a complainant must file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory act and failure to do so renders the charge
untimely.") Thus, any alleged discrimination ...