determination that they acted intentionally, recklessly, or negligently.
The court finds that none of these policies or procedures implicates a
substantive due process right. In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
719-21 (1997), the Supreme Court stated that the substantive component of
the due process clause "provides heightened protection against
governmental interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty
interests," including things like the right to marry, to have children,
to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital
privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, and to choose an
abortion. See id., cited in Dunn v. Fairfield Community High Sch. Dist.
No. 225, 158 F.3d 962, 964-965 (7th Cir. 1998). Even more recently, the
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed the fundamental right to familial integrity.
See Brokaw, 235 F.3d at 1018 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
753 (1982)). Familial integrity, however, or any other fundamental right
for that matter, is not impinged when either: (1) a foster care parent is
not allowed to receive an additional foster child into his or her home;
(2) an individual child care employee is indicated without a
determination by DCFS that the particular individual was responsible for
abuse or neglect; or (3) an indicated report is maintained in the SCR
without a determination that an individual acted intentionally,
recklessly, or negligently. The only one of the four policies cited by
Plaintiffs that might possibly implicate a fundamental right to familial
integrity is the imposition of protective plans whereby, for example, a
teenage son, such as A.D., must leave his mother's home day care during
the period of the day when children are present. As the court has already
discussed in the previous section, see supra Discussion, Section
A(1)(b)(iv), though, it does not consider a child care employee's
voluntary agreement to such a plan to be constitutionally impermissible.
Accordingly, the court does not find these special policies to violate
Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights.
C. Irreparable Harm/Balancing of Harm/Public Interest
The remaining factors of the preliminary injunction analysis have
already been covered within the court's due process discussion. To
repeat, the court recognizes, and does not wish to minimize, the public's
interest in the protection of children from abuse and neglect. This
interest, however, does not outweigh the irreparable harm (1) to those
individuals who, while included as a perpetrator in the SCR, are unable
to find any work in their chosen occupation, see Stull, 239 Ill. App.3d
at 335, 606 N.E.2d at 793 ("The consequences of being listed on the State
central register as a child abuser are grave. . . ."), as well as (2) the
children of Illinois who find their relatively stable environments upset
and, worse, may be exposed to an actual perpetrator over looked during
the investigative process. The court hopes that the 60 day deadline it
imposes herein will prompt a relatively speedy resolution to these
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction is granted. The parties have sixty (60) days to develop
constitutionally adequate procedures. If the parties cannot agree on such
procedures, the court will entertain a request that a mediator be
appointed to assist them in this process.