The opinion of the court was delivered by: John W. Darrah, Judge, United States District Court
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance Co. and Chicago Roll
Company ("Plaintiffs") have filed a complaint against Defendants David
Moore, Larry Moore, Linda Moore, and Oak Brook Bank ("Defendants") for
reimbursement under an employee benefit plan covered by the Employment
Retirement Security Act ("ERISA"). Plaintiffs have moved for summary
judgment pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 56. For the reasons that follow, the
Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there remains no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor
Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). "One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of
factually unsupported claims or defenses . . ." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Thus, although the moving party on a
motion for summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the Court
why there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must
go beyond the face of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file to demonstrate through specific
evidence that there remains a genuine issue of material fact and show
that a rational jury could return a verdict in the non-moving party's
favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-27; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 254-56 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); Waldridge v. American Hoechst
Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).
Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the
suit. First Int'l Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1992).
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all
inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the
opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48; Popovits v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 185 F.3d 726, 731 (7th Cir. 1999). However, a metaphysical
doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If the evidence is
merely colorable or is not significantly probative or is no more than a
scintilla, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
The undisputed facts taken from the parties' Local Rule 56.1(a) & (b)
statements of material facts (referred to herein as "Pl.'s 56.1" and
"Def.'s 56.1") and exhibits are as follows.
Defendant David Moore is a minor. He was born on November 12, 1988.
Defendant Linda Moore is David's mother. She has had sole legal custody
of David throughout the events which form the basis of this lawsuit
On May 8, 1998, David Moore was struck by a motor vehicle while
crossing the intersection of County Farm Road and Deforest in Hanover
Park, Illinois. David's medical expenses arising from the accident exceed
$150,000. On April 5, 1999, David Moore, through his mother, settled his
claim against the driver of the motor vehicle for the sum of $100,000.
This settlement represented the monetary limit of the driver's insurance
coverage; $25,000 of this amount went to pay David's attorney. This
settlement represents David's
only legal recovery from the accident.
As Linda Moore's son, David Moore was a covered person in the Health
and Welfare Plan for Employees and Dependents of Chicago Roll Company
("the Plan"). The Plan is covered by ERISA., 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et
seq. In connection with the injuries David suffered from the accident,
the Plan paid medical benefits on behalf of David in the amount of
$71,464.31. This money was paid prior to January 1, 1999. At the time of
this payment, the Plan included a provision entitled, "Provision for
Subrogation and Right of Recovery." Defendants have contended that the
plan in effect at the time of the payment did not include a subrogation
provision. In statement 5 of Plaintiffs "Separate Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts," Plaintiff stated that the Plan included the provisions
referenced here. Defendant has not denied this statement. The relevant
provisions are as follows:
An Other Party may be liable or legally responsible to
pay expenses, compensation and/or damages in relation
to an illness, a sickness, or a bodily injury incurred
by you or one of your covered Dependents (a "covered
An Other Party is defined to include, but is not
limited to, any of the following:
• the party or parties who caused the illness,
sickness or bodily injury;
• the insurer or other indemnifier of the party
or parties who caused the illness, ...