The opinion of the court was delivered by: Kennelly, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marcos Medina alleges that on the night of September 21,
1999, he was accosted, physically attacked, and choked by two
plain-clothes Chicago police officers while running from his car to return
a videotape to a Blockbuster video store. He was searched and eventually
released without being charged with a crime. Medina says he was later
treated at a hospital for blurred vision and facial contusions. He did
not learn the officers' names but did get the license number from their
car. Medina then filed an action against the City of Chicago and "two
unknown Chicago police officers" and then, after obtaining some initial
discovery, amended the
complaint to name John Madden and Gregory Barnes as the officers who
allegedly assaulted him.
Medina's claim against the City is that the officers' allegedly
unjustified and excessive use of force "was undertaken pursuant to a
policy and practice of the Chicago Police Department, to wit, the
Department's failure to properly train, supervise, and discipline the
officers which the Department assigns to investigate narcotics
infractions. In particular, the Department sends certain police officers
"into the streets of Chicago with instructions no more specific than to
interdict narcotics traffic. Because the Defendant City of Chicago does
not properly train and/or supervise said officers, nor adequately
discipline them when they commit abuses, in practice, the policy of the
Defendant City of Chicago fails to deter and otherwise encourages the
type of abuse sustained by Plaintiff." Amended Complaint ¶¶ 18-19.
The City, joined orally by Madden and Barnes, has moved pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) for a separate trial of the claim
against the City, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)
to stay discovery as to that claim until the claims against the officers
have been determined. Medina objects to defendants' request.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court
held that a local government can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
only "when execution of a government's policy or custom ... inflicts the
injury." Id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. When the local government's failure
to train or discipline its police officers constitutes deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into
contact and causes a deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the
local government is liable to that person for his injuries. E.g., Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)
(failure to train); Sledd v. Lindsay, 102 F.3d 282, 288-89 (7th Cir.
1996) (failure to discipline).
A Monell claim obviously entails elements of proof that are not
involved when the plaintiff sues only the officers claimed to have been
directly involved in the deprivation of his rights. In an excessive force
case against a police officer, the plaintiff prevails if he proves that
the force used by the officer was objectively unreasonable in light of
the facts and circumstances confronting the officer. See Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). Such a
claim is focused on the specific incident involving the plaintiff and
does not involve, at least in the usual case, inquiry into how the police
department trains its officers, whether other officers shown to have used
excessive force have been disciplined appropriately, and the like. In
short, the decision of a plaintiff to pursue a Monell claim carries with
it a heavy burden of discovery and proof.
There is no question that a district court has the discretion to sever
a Monell claim against a municipality from claims against individual
police officers and stay litigation of the Monell claim until the rest of
the case is resolved. See Treece v. Hochstetler, 213 F.3d 360, 364 (7th
Cir. 2000); Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d
Cir. 1999); Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 356 (9th Cir.
1996). A number of district judges in this district and elsewhere have
exercised that discretion in favor of bifurcation. See, e.g., Rockett v.
City of Chicago, No. 98 C 8228 (N.D.Ill. May 27, 1999) (Castillo, J.;
oral ruling); Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 98 C 5418, 1999 WL 160228
(N.D.Ill. Mar.10, 1999) (Kocoras, J.); Farvar v. Davis, No. 97 C 6433,
1998 WL 142368 (N.D.Ill. Mar.19, 1998) (Plunkett, J.; oral ruling);
Daniels v. Loizzo, 178 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Mcintosh v.
District of Columbia, No. 96-0200, 1997 WL 785624 (D.D.C. Dec.9, 1997);
Estate of Keys v. City of Harvey, No. 92 C 2177, 1996 WL 34422 (N.D.Ill.
Jan.26, 1996) (Nordberg, J.); Myatt v. City of Chicago, 816 F. Supp. 1259
(N.D.Ill. 1992) (Aspen, J.). Nothing in these cases, however, requires
bifurcation in every case. The issue is whether this Court should
exercise its discretion to bifurcate the claims in this particular case.
There are a number of advantages to bifurcation. In many if not most
cases, disposition of the individual claims will either legally or
practically end the litigation. If the plaintiff fails to prove that he
suffered a constitutional injury at the hands of an officer, the officer
will prevail at trial, and the finding will (under ordinary
circumstances) bar the individual's claim against the municipality. See
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89
L.Ed.2d 806 (1986). If the plaintiff prevails against the officer on his
§ 1983 claim, he is likely not to want or need to proceed any
further, at least in this district and state. An Illinois statute directs
local governments to pay tort judgments for compensatory damages for
which its employees are liable, see 745 ILCS 10/9-102; the Seventh
Circuit has held that this statute permits the § 1983 plaintiff to
bring a claim directly against the municipality and obtain a judgment
requiring the municipality to pay the amount due to the plaintiff from
the officer. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir.
1997).*fn1 The municipality is free to dispute whether the officer acted
within the scope of his employment-a prerequisite to coverage under the
terms of section 9-102-but Wilson has interpreted that term broadly with
respect to claims of police misconduct, including excessive force, see
id. at 685, and municipalities ordinarily do not contest liability for
verdicts against their police officers.*fn2
Bifurcation, as a general rule, is likely to bring about an earlier end
to the litigation against the individual officers, which as described
above is likely to end the litigation altogether. The primary reason for
the shorter disposition time is that bifurcation permits a bypass of
discovery relating to the municipality's policies and practices, which
(depending on the size of the police department) can add significant
time, effort, and complications to the discovery process. The trial of
the claims against the individual officers is also likely to be shorter,
and perhaps significantly shorter, than a trial also involving Monell
claims. Bifurcation also avoids claims by the individual officers that
they are unfairly prejudiced at trial by the admission of "policy"
evidence that involves, for example, how the municipality has dealt with
other claims of police misconduct.
With all of these advantages, it is perhaps no surprise that so many
district judges have opted in favor of bifurcation. And presumably for
many of the same reasons, many (if not most) plaintiffs in § 1983
cases filed in this district involving claims of excessive force by
police officers-at least those involving the Chicago Police Department,
where the burdens of Monell discovery and proof are greater due to the
department's size-elect not to shoulder the burden of pursuing a Monell
policy claim. They do so because they do not believe the extra burdens
involved in prosecuting such a claim are justified by the benefits they
may obtain. The upshot of the combination of 9-102 and Wilson's
interpretation of that statute is that from
an economic standpoint, a prevailing plaintiff in a § 1983 excessive
force case against police officers in Illinois gets nothing more from
suing the municipality under Monell than he would get from suing just the
officers. (Punitive damages are not recoverable under 9-102, but they are
not recoverable against a municipality under § 1983 either. City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d
616 (1981)). As a result, plaintiffs generally choose to forego the more
difficult route of seeking to hold the municipality liable under Monell,
even if they start out by pleading such a claim. See Jones v. City of
Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988) (policy claim against City of
Chicago "has little, probably no, practical consequence" when considering
damages because the City indemnifies its employees for torts committed
within the scope of their employment).
In the present case, defendants argue that there is nothing practical
to gain and a lot to lose by failing to bifurcate the case. The evidence
likely to be offered at trial against the City on the Monell
claim-involving the manner in which the City has trained officers and has
dealt with claims of excessive force-likely would not be admitted as to
the claims against the individual officers, and defendants claim that the
officers will be unfairly prejudiced by that evidence. The trial is
likely to be longer, and to no good end, defendants maintain, for the
reasons already discussed. And the discovery that will he required with
regard to the Monell claim will be highly burdensome.
All of these are, no doubt, good reasons to grant defendants' motion.
But bifurcation is not a win-win solution. First, there is at least one
situation in which a § 1983 plaintiff who loses his claim against the
officer may still be able to prevail against the municipality under
Monell. Individual public employees are entitled, where applicable, to
the defense of qualified immunity, see generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), but municipalities
are not. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63
L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). Thus when a plaintiff loses his claim against a
police officer based on qualified immunity, he can still recover against
the municipality if he can prove a constitutional deprivation caused by a
municipal policy or custom. In this situation, bifurcation will not avoid
a second trial, and that second trial (of the Monell claim) is guaranteed
to be in significant part duplicative of the trial of the claims against
the individual officers.
Second, there is no guarantee that the municipality, after a verdict
against the officer in a bifurcated trial, will concede 9-102 liability.
If 9-102 liability is contested, the plaintiff may be forced to spend
significant time litigating the issue. This delays his ultimate recovery
and, perhaps just as importantly, effectively reduces the recovery, ...