The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gettleman, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Albert Brown has filed a four-count complaint against
defendant Ford Motor Company, alleging race discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that: (1) defendant terminated him on the
basis of age; (2) defendant discriminated against him on the basis of
race by terminating him, denying him overtime, requiring him to pay twice
as much money in union dues as white employees, and paying him less than
white employees; (3) defendant terminated him in retaliation for
complaining about race discrimination; and (4) defendant refused to hire
him to the position of Head of Security on the basis of lace and age, and
hired a younger, less qualified white person instead. Defendant has filed
a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the
following reasons, defendant's motion is granted.
As an initial matter, plaintiff failed to file a Local Rule ("L.R.")
56.1(b)(3)(A) response to defendant's L.R. 56.1(a) statement of facts.
The local rule reads: "Each party opposing a Rule 56 motion shall serve
and file, [inter alia,] . . . a concise response to the movant's
statement that shall contain: (A) a response to each numbered paragraph
in the moving party's statement, including, in the case of any
disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, parts of the
record, and other supporting materials relied upon. . . . All material
facts set forth in the statement required of the moving party will be
deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the statement of the
opposing party." L.R. 56.1(b)(3). In short, the Local Rule "requires both
denial and support for that denial." Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd.,
965 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1992).
"An answer that does not deny the allegations in the numbered paragraph
with citations to supporting evidence in the record constitutes an
admission." McGuire v. United Parcel Service, 152 F.3d 673, 675 (7th
Cir. 1998). Because plaintiff did not even attempt to adhere to the Local
Rule, the facts set forth in defendant's statement of facts are deemed
admitted. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 536
(7th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts may deem a defendant's
facts admitted when the plaintiff does not properly admit or deny those
facts in a statement pursuant to L.R. 56.1(b)(3), then numbered L.R.
12(N)). Moreover, although plaintiff filed an additional statement of
facts pursuant to L.R. 56.1(b)(3)(B), plaintiff did not provide record
support for certain of these statements. The court disregards these
unsupported statements. See, e.g., Brasic v. Heinemann's Inc.,
121 F.3d 281, 284 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to consider the plaintiffs
additional facts where not supported by specific references to the
Plaintiff, a 56-year-old black male, was hired by defendant as a
Flexible Service or Auxiliary Guard ("Flex Guard"). Under an agreement
with the plant union, the Plant Protection Association ("PPAN"),
defendant was authorized to hire Flex Guards to temporarily supplement
the regular workforce. Plaintiff began working for defendant at its
Chicago Assembly Plant ("the plant") on April 24, 1998. On June 4, 1998,
consistent with defendant's policy, plaintiff completed an Application
for Employment and paid union dues of $500 to PPAN.
In August 1998, plaintiff informed defendant that he needed to take
time off to care for his sister in Memphis, Tennessee. Under defendant's
policy for Flex Guards, plaintiff was not required to submit a formal
vacation request or fill out any paperwork concerning his forthcoming
absence. When plaintiff returned from Tennessee in September 1998. he
called George Hartigan ("Hartigan"), the acting Head of Security, and
informed Hartigan that he was available to work. Hartigan told plaintiff
that he could not return to work because he was a temporary employee and
no Flex work was available at the time. In October 1998, Hartigan
contacted plaintiff and asked if he were available to fill in for a forty
hour assignment. Plaintiff declined the request. In February 1999,
defendant's new Head of Security contacted plaintiff and again asked if
he would be willing to fill in for several shifts. Plaintiff again
declined the request. Plaintiff now contends that Hartigan's exchange
with him in September 1998 constituted a termination.
In September 1998, the Head of Security at the plant was terminated.
Soon thereafter, defendant launched a campaign to find a replacement. The
campaign was headed by James Brown ("Brown"), defendant's Head of Human
Resources at the plant, and was overseen by Randy Griffin, Plant
Manager. Jay Stanwich ("Stanwich"), defendant's Supervisor of Salaried
Personnel, who is white, aided Brown and Griffin, both of whom are
black, in their search for a replacement. Plaintiff applied for the
position, but on October 14, 1998, defendant selected Steve Knaak
("Knaak"), a white male, for the job. Plaintiff alleges that he was not
hired as Head of Security because he is black.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 when the moving
papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
8 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir. 1993). Once a moving party has met its
burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107,
110 (7th Cir. 1990). The court considers the record as a whole and draws
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. See Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc.,
979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7th Cir. 1992).
A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir.
1993). This standard is applied with added rigor in employment
discrimination cases, where issues of intent and credibility often
dominate. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7th
Cir. 1993). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will
be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252,
106 S.Ct. 2505.
To state a claim for intentional discrimination under Title VII and the
ADEA, a plaintiff has two options: he may satisfy his burden of proof by
offering direct evidence of discriminatory intent; or he may demonstrate
such intent indirectly by following the McDonnell Donglas
burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Because plaintiff
does not present any direct evidence of discrimination, the court assumes
he is relying on the McDonnell Douglas formula. Under this framework, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by a preponderance of
the evidence. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505, 113
S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the plaintiff succeeds in
establishing a prima facie case, he creates a rebuttable presumption of
discrimination and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the
employer is successful, the presumption of discrimination dissolves, and
the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's
proffered reasons are a pretext for ...