The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bucklo, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Brooke Simon was hired as a police officer with the City of
Naperville, Illinois (the "City"), in November 1997. During her
training under Officer Glen Gurski, from November 25 to December
4, 1997, she endured a constant stream of uninvited lewd comments
and aggressively suggestive physical contact and gestures.
Officer Gurski withheld her performance evaluations during
training. The stress of the situation caused her emotional
distress, symptoms of which including vomiting before going to
work. She complained to fellow officers, who reported the
misconduct, and was taken out from under Officer Gurski's
supervision. The City ultimately suspended Officer Gurski on
February 2, 1998, and removed him from training duties, but Ms.
Simon was threatened with retaliation. In addition, Officer
Gurski and Ms. Simon were scheduled to work the same beat on a
future date. Ms. Simon quit the police department on February 24,
1998, and after timely filing her EEOC charges, sued the City for
sexual harassment under Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights
Act and for retaliation under both. The City moves for summary
judgment on the sexual harassment claims, and I deny the motion.
The City's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Simon's Illinois
Human Rights Act claim, see 775 ILCS 5/2-102(D), is unsupported
by any argument whatsoever. The entire discussion of this cause
of action in the City's memorandum in support of its motion is
limited to a request that I grant it summary judgment on Ms.
Simon's "pendent state law claim." The City gives me no reason to
grant this request. The motion is therefore denied with respect
to this claim. The City does not request summary judgment on Ms.
Simon's retaliation claims. I now turn to the Title VII claim.
Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1), protects employees against unwelcome sexual
advances that create an offensive or hostile working environment.
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S.Ct.
2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Harassment encompasses all forms of
conduct that unreasonably interfere with an individual's work
performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. Id.; Doe v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co.,
42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Under a hostile environment
theory, the harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
so as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and to
create an abusive working atmosphere. McKenzie v. Illinois Dep't
of Transportation, 92 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). Employees may also sue
on the basis of quid pro quo harassment, which occurs when
tangible employment benefits are conditioned upon compliance with
a harasser's sexual demands. Bryson v. Chicago State Univ.,
96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court has recently
stated that "[t]he terms quid pro quo and hostile work
environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation
between cases in which threats are carried
out and those where they are not or are absent altogether, but
beyond this are of limited utility." Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633
The City argues, first, that Officer Gurski's actions did not
descend to the level of obnoxiousness and pervasiveness required
for a sexual harassment claim. The concept of sexual harassment
is "designed to protect working women from the kind of male
attentions that can make the workplace hellish for women."
Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir.
1995). "Isolated or trivial remarks" of a sexual nature "do not
satisfy the definition of sexual harassment." Rennie v. Dalton,
3 F.3d 1100, 1107 (7th Cir. 1993). Conduct that is "too tepid or
intermittent or equivocal to make a reasonable person believe
that she has been discriminated against on the basis of sex" is
not actionable. Galloway v. General Motors, 78 F.3d 1164, 1168
(7th Cir. 1996). It is not enough that a supervisor fails to
treat a female employee with sensitivity, tact, and delicacy,
uses coarse language, or is a boor. Minor v. Ivy Tech State
College, 174 F.3d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 1999).
In light of this, the City asks me to hold that the following
conduct is not extreme enough to constitute sexual harassment:
1. Officer Gurski would touch Miss Simon and place
his arm around the back of her head and shoulders
2. He spent about 80% of his time with Ms. Simon
asking her about personal matters, including
boyfriends and previous sexual relationships.
3. He would continually tell dirty jokes and sing
songs on duty with perverted words, including
reference to "little girlies" and "she is gay."
4. He would continually comment on how "slutty,
seductive, and easy" other officers were, and remark
on their attire.
5. He discussed how he would feel tempted by other
women police officers, accompanying these statements
by making a gesture with his ...