The opinion of the court was delivered by: Levin, United States Magistrate Judge.
At issue before the court is Defendants', Michael F. Sheahan
("Sheahan"), Sheriff of Cook County, James W. Fairman
("Fairman"), Former Executive Director of the Cook County
Department of Corrections, Ernesto Velasco ("Velasco"), Executive
Director of the Cook County Department of Corrections, and Marcus
Lyles' ("Lyles"), Assistant Executive Director of the Cook County
Department of Corrections (collectively referred to as
"Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.
On April 8, 1994, Plaintiff Terrance Love ("Love") entered the
Cook County Jail as a pre-trial detainee charged with murder.
(Am.Compl. ¶ 14.) Love was originally assigned housing as part of
the general population in Division 1, Tier H. On April 1, 1995,
Love was moved to Tier B of Division 1 of the general population.
Twenty-seven inmates were initially interviewed regarding the
death of Allen Fields. Seven of these inmates were removed from
Tier B, inspected and interviewed by detectives and employees of
the Cook County Jail. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Five of the seven inmates
removed from Tier B had blood stains on their clothing and shoes.
Of these five inmates, four were Hispanic and believed to be
associated with the Disciples. During their interviews with the
investigators, these five inmates claimed that Terrance Love and
three other individuals were responsible for killing Allen
Fields. (Id. at ¶ 19.)
Based on the accusations by the five aforementioned prisoners,
on May 29, 1995, Love was transferred from Tier B to the Division
10 segregation unit of the Cook County Jail. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Love was confined to a cell, which was ten square feet with
concrete walls and no windows to the outside. The cell's metal
door had a six-inch square window which looked into the interior
corridor. Love was kept in this cell for periods of 23
consecutive hours, sometimes longer. He was allowed a maximum of
one hour each day out of his cell, during which time he was
shackled and prohibited from talking to other inmates or
pre-trial detainees. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Love's confinement in the
Division 10 segregation unit of the Cook County Jail lasted for
more than two and one-half years.
Subsequent to Love's confinement, the five prisoners who
allegedly identified Love as one of the men connected to the
killing of Allen Fields recanted their statements implicating
Love. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Both Love and his attorney filed
grievances and wrote letters to each of the Defendants seeking an
explanation of his detention and seeking release into the general
population at the Cook County Jail. However, they did not receive
any response to the inquiries. (Id. at ¶ 29-30.) Love never
received a hearing at any time during his segregation.
On February 20, 1998, Love and the three other inmates charged
with Allen Fields' murder were brought to trial on those charges.
The trial judge dismissed all charges against Love and his
co-defendants. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Love was released from
segregation at that time.
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Essentially:
Defendants move to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's Amended
Complaint in its entirety as to Defendants in their official and
individual capacities, for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and/or for failure to state a claim for which relief can
On a motion to dismiss, the court takes all of the well-pleaded
factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 93 F.3d 397, 401
(7th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed on a motion to
dismiss unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle
him or her to relief. Id. A complaint need not set forth all
relevant facts or recite the law. All that is required is a short
and plain statement showing that the party is entitled to relief.
FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322
(7th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff in a suit in federal court need not
plead facts. Conclusions may be pleaded as long as the defendant
has at least minimal notice of the claim. FED. R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2);
Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995).
The Seventh Circuit has recently held:
Under the federal rule of notice pleading, "`all the
Rules require is a short and plain statement of the
claim that will give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.'" Leatherman v. Tarrant County
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2
L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote and citation omitted))
(emphasis added). For fair notice to be given, "a
complaint must at least `include the operative facts
upon which a plaintiff bases his claim.'" Lucien v.
Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 1992)
(quoting Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc.,
771 F.2d 194, 198 (7th Cir. 1985)). A plaintiff "need
not plead facts; he can plead conclusions. [However,]
the conclusions must provide the defendant with at
least minimal notice of the claim." Jackson v.
Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995).
The issue we review is whether "sufficient facts
[have been] pleaded to allow the district court to
understand the gravamen of the plaintiff's
complaint." Doherty v. City of Chicago,
75 F.3d 318, 326 (7th Cir. 1996).
Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir.
1998); See also Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 ...