The opinion of the court was delivered by: Alesia, District Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is defendant Austeel Lemont Company,
Incorporated's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). For the following reasons, the
court grants defendant's motion.
Plaintiff Dominic Quigley ("Quigley") worked for the defendant
Austeel Lemont Company, Incorporated ("Austeel") from January 17,
1994 to September 2, 1997 in its plant located in Lemont,
Illinois. Austeel is a Delaware corporation engaged in the
production and sale of steel products.
Austeel originally hired Quigley as a material handler. On
February 21, 1994, Quigley became a caster. About six months
later, on September 5, 1994, Austeel promoted Quigley to the
position of Team Leader Casting. A little over a month later,
Austeel gave Quigley another promotion. This promotion was to the
position of Casting Supervisor. As Casting Supervisor, Quigley
oversaw employees in the melt shop, coordinated with the furnace
side of the melt shop, kept time sheets for the employees who did
not punch a time clock, determined whether employee absences were
excusable and payable, and disciplined employees.
Following this, Quigley completed a self-appraisal form. In his
self-appraisal, Quigley stated that he needed (1) "training on
how to develop a better understanding about situations with
employees" and (2) stress management courses. (D.Ex. F at 3.)
As a supervisor, Austeel required Quigley to attend supervisor
training classes. At these classes, Austeel provided information
on being an effective supervisor and on interacting and
communicating with subordinates. Out of ten classes, Quigley
attended only six. Based upon Quigley's attendance, Wayne Dawson
("Dawson"), Quigley's supervisor, issued a written warning to
Quigley on July 9, 1997. This warning noted Quigley's lack of
attendance and also his inappropriate behavior of drinking beer
by Austeel's gate and of contradicting other Austeel officials in
front of employees. Despite this warning, Quigley missed another
class on August 1st.
On August 3rd and 4th of 1997, Quigley failed to come to work.
Dawson documented this in an Employee Contact Report on August
8th. This report states that on August 4th, Mrs. Quigley,
Quigley's wife, called Rich and informed him that Quigley was in
the hospital, but she did not know when he would be released. The
parties dispute whether Mrs. Quigley informed Rich of the reasons
for Quigley's hospitalization — severe depression and chemical
dependency — at this time.
Also, on August 8, 1997, Quigley called Gregg Lawson
("Lawson"), Human Resource Supervisor. The parties, however,
dispute the subject matter of this telephone conversation.
Quigley alleges that the call was to inform Austeel of his
inpatient treatment at BroMenn Healthcare for drug abuse. (Pl.'s
12(N) Statement at 7, ¶¶ 40-42.) However, Austeel asserts that
during the call Quigley did not mention the reason for his
hospitalization; his concern was over the status of his job.
(D.'s 12(M) Statement at 11, ¶¶ 40-42.)
On this same day, Dawson, Rich and Lawson decided to
temporarily promote another employee to Quigley's supervisory
position. Austeel alleges that the bases for this decision were
Quigley's interpersonal problems with other employees, Quigley's
failure to attend the supervisor classes, and Quigley's inability
to perform his supervisory functions. (Id. at 12, ¶ 44.)
Furthermore, Austeel contends that Quigley's supervisors were
unaware of Quigley's enrollment in a drug treatment program at
the time of this decision. (Id. at 12, ¶ 45.) Quigley, however,
asserts that the basis for the decision to promote another
employee to Quigley's supervisory position was his admission to
BroMenn Healthcare for in-patient treatment. (Pl.'s 12(N)
Statement at 8, ¶ 45.)
Quigley returned to work on August 25, 1997 and provided
documentation of his inpatient treatment and his aftercare
program. Following Quigley's return, Austeel issued a warning to
Quigley after he drove down the plant road at a high speed and
recklessly passed other vehicles.*fn2 Although, he admits to
receiving a warning, Quigley contends that he was never involved
in any driving incidents. (Pl.'s Dep. at 143, ¶¶ 12-23.) Austeel
also alleges that after his return, "Quigley did not perform his
assigned tasks, but instead wandered around the plant complaining
about his perceived mistreatment at the hands of the Company."
(D.'s 12(M) Statement at 20, ¶ 80.) According to Austeel, it
terminated Quigley's employment based upon the above incidents
and Quigley's prior disciplinary history. (Id. at 21, ¶ 81.)
On February 23, 1999, Quigley moved to amend his complaint. The
court granted this motion and Quigley filed his Amended Complaint
on March 18, 1999. The Amended Complaint consists of three
counts. Both Count I and Count II are claims for disability
discrimination under the ADA and Count III is a claim for breach
of contract pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Count I alleges that
Austeel violated the ADA by terminating Quigley's employment
because of his status as a recovering drug addict.*fn3 Count II
alleges that Austeel violated the ADA by terminating Quigley's
employment because of ...