The opinion of the court was delivered by: Bucklo, District Judge.
This case concerns whether a forty-year old Osco management trainee was
terminated in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The plaintiff claims that the general manager
of the store where she was to be trained discriminated against her by
failing to adequately train her and terminating her based on her age. The
defendant moves for summary judgment, which I deny.
On August 19, 1996, Denise Nesbitt was hired by American Drug Stores
("Osco") as a management trainee for Osco Drug Stores. At the time, Ms.
Nesbitt was forty years old. On August 20, 1996, Ms. Nesbitt began her
training. Osco's management trainee program provides trainees with the
opportunity to develop the skills necessary to move into store management
in a "home store," while simultaneously providing Osco with the
opportunity to assess the trainee's competence. During the first sixteen
weeks of employment, trainees participate in a formal
training program consisting of lectures/classroom instruction, structured
rotation training in various departments in different Osco stores, and
orientation and on-the-job training in a "home store." After completing
the sixteen week program, Ms. Nesbitt continued to be assigned to her
home store for perfection of skills and additional on-the-job training.
Mr. Woods, the store's general manager, was the person responsible for
training Ms. Nesbitt at the home store after her training rotation. Mr.
Woods had made several comments to Ms. Nesbitt which she took to be
age-related and reflective of his fixation upon and dislike of her age.
In January, Ms. Nesbitt asked Mr. Woods for further training on the
"front-end" of the store and in cash reports. Mr. Woods did not honor
this request. During the next two months, she was given only two
opportunities to open the store on her own and a single day of cash report
training. In contrast, Ms. Rawls, a new supervisor in her twenties hired
by Mr. Woods, was provided with 14 days of cash report training and was
offered the opportunity to open the store on several occasions. Ms.
Nesbitt claims that her own training was halted when Ms. Rawis arrived.
Ms. Green, another supervisor in her twenties hired by Mr. Woods, was
also given days to open the store.
On March 19, 1997, Ms. Nesbitt was working late with a number of
employees to prepare for an inventory scheduled for the following day.
She was assigned the task of counting down the money in the vault. Midway
through this task, Ms. Nesbitt was called away by an Osco manager. When
she returned, she was "short" in her count and was having trouble
reconciling the contents of the safe, so she sought assistance from a
supervisor, Irma Zamudio. When Ms. Zamudio was able to quickly locate the
problem, which she showed to Ms. Nesbitt, Ms. Nesbitt felt ridiculed, and
objected that she had counted the money earlier that was the source of
the error. As a result, Ms. Nesbitt believed that she was deliberately
being set up or "tested" — which she claims Mr. Woods had also done
on a previous occasion. She told Ms. Zamudio to stop "playing with my
damn intelligence" and that she "was no damn fool." As Mr. Woods
approached, Ms. Nesbitt declared that she was leaving, to which Mr. Woods
responded that she was not leaving. Ms. Nesbitt states that she checked
with the operating manager Chris Campbell about her duties that night and
asked Loss Prevention to check her purse. Having worked the full shift
for which she was scheduled, Ms. Nesbitt gathered her belongings and left
After an investigation, which included the procurement of statements
from each of the parties involved, Osco determined that Ms. Nesbitt's
conduct constituted a violation of company policies prohibiting abusive
and obscene language to co-workers and prohibiting insubordination. On
March 25, 1997, she was terminated.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Since American Drug Stores moves for
summary judgment, all evidence and inferences must be construed in the
light most favorable to Ms. Nesbitt. See Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock
Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 1997). Moreover, "intent
and credibility are crucial issues in employment discrimination cases,
and therefore, the summary judgment standard is applied with added rigor
in such cases." Miller v. Borden, Inc., 168 F.3d 308, 312 (7th Cir.
III. Discriminatory Discharge
Under the ADEA, employers are prohibited from discriminating on the
basis of age against employees who are at least forty years old. See
29 U.S.C. § 623 (a), 631(a). The plaintiff's case is most
effectively presented using direct evidence supported by circumstantial
evidence. See Huff v. UARCO, Inc., 122 F.3d 374, 380 (7th Cir. 1997)
 The direct evidence includes the following statements made by Mr.
Woods. When Ms. Nesbitt reported to Mr. Woods on her first day of
training, he immediately asked her, allegedly in a demeaning tone and
with full knowledge of the answer: "Who hired . . . you?" A week after
she started work, Mr. Woods was training Ms. Nesbitt on the cash
register. As she provided Mr. Woods with her cash register code number,
31, she commented that the number was the same as her mother's birth
year. In response, Mr. Woods stated: "Are you sure that's not your birth
year?" (emphasis added). On another occasion, Ms. Nesbitt was conversing
with a co-worker, who asked whether "WIC," a 25-year old government
program that provides family assistance, was around at the time she had
her children;' Although Mr. Woods was not engaged in the conversation, he
overhead the discussion as he walked by and stated: "Probably not."
Osco argues that the comments by Mr. Woods made five months before the
plaintiffs termination are innocuous, stray remarks insufficient to
constitute an acknowledgment of discriminatory intent. See Randle v.
LaSalle Telecommunications, Inc, 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 1989)
(inappropriate but isolated comments that amount to no more than "stray
remarks" in the workplace do not meet the threshold of direct evidence);
but see Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997)
(remarks and other evidence that reflect a propensity by the decision
maker to evaluate employees based on illegal criteria will suffice as
direct evidence of discrimination even if the evidence stops short of a
virtual admission of liability). However, I do not examine these
statements in a vacuum but in the context of the surrounding
circumstances. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th
Cir. 1994) (circumstantial evidence alone can create a triable issue and
provide a basis for drawing an inference of intentional discrimination).
 A plaintiff may introduce three types of circumstantial evidence,
each of which may be sufficient by itself, or used together, to defeat
summary judgment. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736. The first type consists of
"suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior toward
or comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and other
bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be
drawn." Id. The second, is a showing that other employees, similarly
situated other than in the characteristic on which an employer is
forbidden to base a difference in treatment, received systematically
better treatment. Id. The third is evidence that the plaintiff was
qualified for the job in question but ...