why they failed to execute and process plaintiffs adjustment of status.
Defendants moved to vacate the court's September 25, 1998 order,
contending that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider
plaintiffs request. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction and
denied defendants motion to vacate. The court also denied plaintiffs'
petition for a rule to show cause, stating that the relief plaintiff
requested could not be granted on the limited record before the court.
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs once again ask the court to order defendants to complete the
processing of plaintiffs' adjustment of status. Plaintiffs also argue in
their motion that the court has the authority to direct defendants to
adjust their status and issue them visas. Defendants renew their argument
that the court does not have jurisdiction over the instant matter, and
also contend that plaintiffs have not sustained their burden to invoke
 Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that this action arises under
8 U.S.C. § 1329, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.*fn1
In their cross-motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that the
court does not have jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendants
reiterate the argument they made in their motion to vacate that various
sections of the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (g) and §
1252(a)(2)(B), deprive the court of jurisdiction. Defendants also argue that
plaintiffs have not made a showing sufficient to allow the court to assume
jurisdiction under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
A. Section 1252(g)
 The court once again rejects defendants argument that §
1252(g) applies in the instant case. As the court explained in its order
denying defendants motion to vacate, the Supreme Court in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct.
936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) ("AADC"), held that § 1252(g) applies
narrowly to the Attorney General's decision to "commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." If "[i]t is implausible
that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation
was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation
proceedings," id. 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. at 943, it is even less
plausible that the mention of these discrete events was a shorthand way of
referring to all claims brought in immigration matters. Because this case
does not involve any of the "specific steps in the deportation process,"
id. 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. at 944 n. 9, or any aspect of the deportation
process at all, § 1252(g) does not apply. See Russell v. INS, 1999 WL
675255, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 24, 1999) ("This case challenges denial of a
visa petition, and the INS is not trying to deport Plaintiff; thus, this
case does not fall under the ambit of the IIRIRA.").
B. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)
 The remainder of defendants jurisdictional arguments rest primarily
on an issue the court has already decided in plaintiffs favor. In its
March 15, 1999, order, the court held that plaintiffs request a
ministerial, rather than a discretionary, decision. Defendants continue
to contend, however, that the relief requested in the instant case
implicates the Attorney General's discretion. Defendants argue that
plaintiffs are complaining about the Attorney General's "decision" not to
adjudicate an application for adjustment of status. Defendants suggest
that this "decision" was made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255, which
governs adjustments of status, and argue that therefore, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) deprives this court of jurisdiction.
Section 1252(a)(2)(B) is entitled "Denials of discretionary relief."
Subsection (i) of this section reads, "no court shall have jurisdiction
to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under . .
. § 1255." 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(i). Defendants contend that
the broad language "any judgment" means that this court does not have
jurisdiction to "review" the Attorney General's refusal to entertain
plaintiffs applications. This argument is flawed in several respects.
Subsection (i) clearly falls under a section of the statute that
discusses denials of relief. Were plaintiffs contending that they had
been denied relief, this court likely would not have jurisdiction over
their claims. See, e, g., Diallo v. Reno, 61 F. Supp.2d 1361, 1367
(N.D.Ga. 1999) (" 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(i) precludes judicial
review of a § 1255 denial of adjustment of status"); Cruz v. INS,
871 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (N.D.Ill. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff was
not entitled to judicial review of a denial of adjustment of status)
(citing Massignani v. INS,