The opinion of the court was delivered by: Gettleman, District Judge.
On September 23, 1998, plaintiffs Teodor and Lelia Paunescu filed a
complaint for mandamus and declaratory judgment against the Immigration &
Naturalization Service, District Director Brian Perryman and the United
States of America seeking to compel defendants to immediately issue all
appropriate documents and take all appropriate action to execute and
process plaintiffs' applications under the 1998 Diversity Immigrant Visa
Program, and to grant plaintiffs legal permanent residence through an
adjustment of status. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary
Teodor entered the United States in August 1995 on an F-1 Student Visa
as a student at the University of Illinois. On August 19, 1997, he was
appointed to the position of Graduate Teaching Assistant for the 1997-98
term. Lelia entered the United States on July 10, 1997, as a derivative
spouse of Teodor. On July 29, 1997, Teodor was selected as a winner under
the Fiscal Year 1998 Diversity Visa Lottery Program. Pursuant to
instructions with the notification, plaintiffs applied for visas.
Enclosed with those applications were the required fingerprint cards. The
Department of Justice received plaintiffs applications on November 5,
1997. The INS then scheduled plaintiffs visa interviews on February 23,
1998. At that interview Teodor was told that his fingerprint card had
been rejected by the FBI and that he was to go to an INS application
support center to resubmit his fingerprints. He alleges that he was also
told that absent the fingerprint problem his application would have been
approved. That very same day Teodor delivered a new set of fingerprints
via express mail to the interviewing officer. Five months later, on July
24, 1998, Teodor received a form letter informing him that his
fingerprints had not yet cleared, without specifying any reason. The form
letter contained the box to check if new fingerprints were required to be
submitted. That box was not checked.
On September 18, 1998, just twelve days before the fiscal year ended,
the INS directed plaintiffs to go to its office in Chicago. Teodor did so
on September 21, 1998, and was informed that he had to submit a third set
of prints. He immediately traveled to the INS support site in Hammond,
Indiana and submitted his third set of fingerprints.
By September 23, 1998, plaintiffs, still without visa numbers, filed
the instant action and moved for preliminary injunctive relief. On
September 25, 1998, after a hearing, the court ordered defendants to
"immediately complete adjudication of the applications for adjustment
status" for both plaintiffs, without delay and by no later than September
30, 1998. The court order acknowledged, however, that the INS's ability
to comply was contingent upon a favorable return of Teodor's fingerprints
from the FBI and the final processing and issuance of visa numbers to
plaintiffs by the Department of State on or before September 30, 1998.
The parties subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs once again ask the court to order defendants to complete the
processing of plaintiffs' adjustment of status. Plaintiffs also argue in
their motion that the court has the authority to direct defendants to
adjust their status and issue them visas. Defendants renew their argument
that the court does not have jurisdiction over the instant matter, and
also contend that plaintiffs have not sustained their burden to invoke
 Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that this action arises under
8 U.S.C. § 1329, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and 28 U.S.C. § 1361.*fn1
In their cross-motion for summary judgment, defendants argue that the
court does not have jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendants
reiterate the argument they made in their motion to vacate that various
sections of the INA, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (g) and §
1252(a)(2)(B), deprive the court of jurisdiction. Defendants also argue that
plaintiffs have not made a showing sufficient to allow the court to assume
jurisdiction under the mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
 The court once again rejects defendants argument that §
1252(g) applies in the instant case. As the court explained in its order
denying defendants motion to vacate, the Supreme Court in Reno v.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct.
936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) ("AADC"), held that § 1252(g) applies
narrowly to the Attorney General's decision to "commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." If "[i]t is implausible
that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation
was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation
proceedings," id. 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. at 943, it is even less
plausible that the mention of these discrete events was a shorthand way of
referring to all claims brought in immigration matters. Because this case
does not involve any of the "specific steps in the deportation process,"
id. 525 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. at 944 n. 9, or any aspect of the deportation
process at all, § 1252(g) does not apply. See Russell v. INS, 1999 WL
675255, at *2 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 24, 1999) ("This case challenges denial of a
visa petition, and the INS is not trying to deport Plaintiff; thus, this
case does not fall under the ambit of the IIRIRA.").
 The remainder of defendants jurisdictional arguments rest primarily
on an issue the court has already decided in plaintiffs favor. In its
March 15, 1999, order, the court held that plaintiffs request a
ministerial, rather than a discretionary, decision. Defendants continue
to contend, however, that the relief requested in the instant case
implicates the Attorney General's discretion. Defendants argue that
plaintiffs are complaining about the Attorney General's "decision" not to
adjudicate an application for adjustment of status. Defendants suggest
that this "decision" was made pursuant to 8 ...