to make contributions on behalf of those employees. Additionally,
Quality Beers contests the propriety of considering the Taylor
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The
moving party does not need to produce evidence demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but can be
discharged by pointing out the absence of evidence to support the
nonmovant's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets
its burden of production, then the nonmovant "may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial" in order to avoid summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e). A genuine issue for trial exists if "the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party" under the applicable substantive evidentiary standards.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 255, 106
S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In making this determination,
all evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor
Serv., 40 F.3d 146, 150 (7th Cir. 1994), and all reasonable
inferences are drawn in the nonmovant's favor, Kirk v. Federal
Property Mgmt. Corp. 22 F.3d 135, 138 (7th Cir. 1994).
"Summary judgment is particularly appropriate in cases
involving interpretation of written contracts." See ICEBU v.
Hyster-Yale Materials Handling, Inc., 83 F.3d 930, 932-33 (7th
Cir. 1996), citing Ryan v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598,
602 (7th Cir. 1989). If a collective bargaining agreement is
unambiguous, then the court should determine its meaning as a
matter of law. See, e.g., Murphy v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co.,
61 F.3d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1995); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc.,
102 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996). A contract is unambiguous if it is
susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. Illinois
Conference of Teamsters and Employers Welfare Fund v. Mrowicki,
44 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 1994). Put another way, a contract is
ambiguous if the parties' differing interpretations of the
contract are both reasonable. Murphy, 61 F.3d at 565.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE CBA
"`A collective bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract
for the purchase of goods and services, nor is it governed by the
same old common-law concepts which control such private
contracts.'" Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 138 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.
1997), quoting Transportation-Communication Employees Union v.
Union Pac. R.R., 385 U.S. 157, 160-161, 87 S.Ct. 369, 17 L.Ed.2d
264 (1966). Unlike traditional contracts, collective bargaining
agreements must be interpreted with the understanding that they
are "`a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate.'" Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 491 U.S. 299, 311-312, 109
S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250 (1989), quoting United Steelworkers
of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578,
80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960). As a generalized code,
collective bargaining agreements create a common law for a
particular industry or plant. See Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at
578-579, 80 S.Ct. 1347. In order to best interpret the common law
of a CBA, courts should "foster industrial peace and stability"
by reading it "with sensitivity to considerations of national
labor policy." Merk v. Jewel
Food Stores, 945 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1991).
In analyzing the relevant labor policy, we begin with the
language of § 515 of ERISA:
Every employer who is obligated to make contributions
to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan
or under the terms of a collectively bargained
agreement shall, to the extent not inconsistent with
the law, make such contributions in accordance with
the terms and conditions of such plan or such
29 U.S.C. § 1145.