June 15, 1999
KYLE TAYLOR, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
COUNTY OF PEORIA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the 10th Judicial Circuit Peoria County, Illinois No. 98-MR-184 Honorable Judge Presiding Bruce W. Black
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff, Kyle Taylor, filed a class action against the County of Peoria (Peoria), alleging that a fee imposed by the sheriff of Peoria for the taking of bail was not authorized by statute. 55 ILCS 5/4-5001 (West 1996)). Peoria moved to dismiss Taylor's claim. The trial court denied Peoria's motion and certified a question of law for review. This court granted Peoria's petition for leave to appeal. We hold that bail on criminal process is within the exclusive province of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code of Criminal Procedure)(725 ILCS 5/110-7 through 110-15 (West 1996)).
In October 1996, Peoria enacted an ordinance requiring persons posting bond to pay the sheriff a fifteen dollar fee before being released from custody. In September 1997, Taylor was arrested in Peoria. Taylor was released after he posted bond and paid the fifteen dollars.
Taylor subsequently filed this class action on behalf of all persons who paid the fifteen dollar fee to the sheriff of Peoria as a prerequisite of release. Taylor alleged that the fee was illegal as it was not authorized by statute. Peoria moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court denied the motion and certified the following question of law to this court: "Are the Sheriff's of counties of the first and second class in the State of Illinois authorized by the Counties Code 55 ILCS 5/4001 to impose and collect a fee for taking all bonds on criminal process *** [o]r are the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure *** exclusive to the extent that the Sheriff's fee statute can not be interpreted to authorize a fee for taking all bonds on criminal process." We granted Peoria's petition for leave to appeal.
The sole issue before us is whether a county can require a person posting bond to pay an additional fee for processing as a prerequisite to being released from custody.
Peoria argues that because the Code of Criminal Procedure contains no provision for sheriff's fees in the case of taking bail on criminal process, a fee is justified pursuant to section 4-5001 of the Counties Code. Peoria claims that the term "all bonds" in section 4-5001 of the Counties Code includes bail bonds, and the term "legal process" includes criminal process.Taylor responds that bail for criminal process is within the exclusive province of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which does not authorize any sheriff's fee and thus improperly compensates the sheriff.
The primary goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the language and intent of the legislature. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d 218, 222, 647 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1995). Statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Hicks, 164 Ill.2d at 222, 647 N.E.2d at 259. Where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without relying on other aids for construction. People v. Davis, 296 Ill. App.3d 923, 926, 695 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (1998).
Section 110-7(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically addresses "bail bond" in criminal proceedings; it states that "[t]he person for whom bail has been set shall execute the bail bond and deposit with the clerk of the court before which the proceeding is pending a sum of money equal to 10% of the bail." 725 ILCS 5/110- 7(a)(West 1996). Section 110-7(b) states that "[u]pon depositing this sum the person shall be released from custody." 725 ILCS 5/110- 7(b)(West 1996). Section 110-7(b) does not allow for any additional fees or costs.
Furthermore, section 110-15 provides that "[t]he provisions of Sections 110-7 and 110-8 of this Code are exclusive of other provisions of law for the giving, taking, or enforcement of bail." 725 ILCS 5/110- 15 (West 1996). Thus, section 110-15 precludes section 110-7 from being construed in conjunction with any other provisions of law, including the Counties Code. Interpreting the Counties Code to allow for added fees to a defendant's bond compromises the legislative intent that only sections 110-7 and 8 apply to the "taking *** of bail." See 725 ILCS 5/110-15 (West 1996). Any attempt to circumvent the effect of section 110-15 must fail.
For the above stated reasons, the trial court properly denied Peoria's motion to dismiss. The certified question of the circuit court of Peoria County is answered.
Certified question answered.
HOLDRIDGE, P.J., and SLATER, J., concur.