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People v. Ciesler

May 13, 1999


Appeal from the Circuit Court of Du Page County. No. 97--DT--2527 Honorable Cary B. Pierce, Judge, Presiding.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Colwell


Defendant, Raymond E. Ciesler, was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(2) (West 1996)) and illegal transportation of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-- 502(a) (West 1996)). The trial court determined that defendant's arrest was an invalid extraterritorial arrest and granted defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The State appealed. We reverse and remand.

Suzanne Berry, an Elmhurst police officer, arrested defendant at about 1:45 a.m. on June 25, 1997. When Officer Berry first approached defendant, he was slumped over the steering wheel of a truck that was parked on the shoulder of a ramp leading from Lake Street to Route 83. It is undisputed that the truck was safely parked in an unincorporated area of Du Page County, i.e., the truck was outside Elmhurst's territoral limits.

Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. At a hearing on his motion, defendant testified that on June 24, 1997, he was employed as a truck driver. Defendant began work that day at 8 a.m. and worked until 10 p.m. when he parked the truck in the spot where he was arrested. Defendant testified that he parked the truck to do some paperwork and read a newspaper and that after reading the paper he dozed off. Defendant was awakened by a police officer who asked him what he was doing and told him to step out of the truck.

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that when the officer approached the truck the window of the truck was down, that he was sitting on the driver's seat of the truck sleeping, that his head was lying on his right arm which was on the steering wheel, that his left hand was out the window, and that the officer came up and asked him how he was doing. Defendant denied that the truck's motor was running.

Defendant called Officer Berry as a witness at the hearing. Officer Berry's testimony included the following. Officer Berry was driving her squad car when she first observed defendant's truck. The truck was parked next to a ramp leading to Route 83. Officer Berry pulled her squad car next to the truck and observed defendant "slumped over the wheel." Defendant appeared to be sleeping, and Officer Berry was not aware of any crimes being committed by defendant. At no point during her encounter with defendant did Officer Berry notify the county sheriff of the encounter.

During cross-examination by the State, Officer Berry testified as follows. When Officer Berry first observed defendant's parked truck, the engine was running. Officer Berry did not know defendant's condition and approached the truck with the intent to do a "motorist assist." As she stepped up to the truck's cab, the window was open and Officer Berry detected a moderate odor of alcohol emanating from the cab. Officer Berry then asked defendant, the individual sitting in the truck, for his driver's license. Officer Berry noticed that defendant's eyes were extremely bloodshot and that his speech was mumbled and thick- tongued. Officer Berry took defendant's driver's license to her squad car and ran a check on the license. While in her squad car, Officer Berry also called for another police officer as backup.

After checking defendant's license and calling for backup, Officer Berry returned to the truck cab and asked defendant to step out of the truck. Defendant got out of the truck. Outside the truck, defendant performed field sobriety tests. Officer Berry then arrested defendant. The trial court asked Officer Berry what police department she called when she called for backup. Officer Berry responded that she called the Elmhurst police department.

Prior to the hearing, the attorneys for both sides had agreed that the issue to be resolved was whether Officer Berry's arrest of defendant was a proper extraterritorial arrest under section 107--4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/107--4 (West 1996)). Section 107--4(a--3) allowed a police officer who was on duty to make an extraterritorial arrest if the officer became "personally aware of the immediate commission of a felony or misdemeanor violation of the laws of this State." 725 ILCS 5/107--4(a--3) (West 1996). Section 107--4(a--7) also required an officer who made such an arrest to immediately notify the local law enforcement agency of the arrest. 725 ILCS 5/107--4(a--7) (West 1996).

After reviewing section 107--4, the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. The State subsequently filed a motion to reconsider. In its motion to reconsider, the State argued that Officer Berry's arrest of defendant was proper under both section 107--4 of the Code and under section 107--3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/107--3 (West 1996)). Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the State's motion to reconsider. The State's timely notice of appeal followed.

While the State's appeal was pending, this court held that Public Act 89--404 (Pub. Act 89--404, eff. August 20, 1995) was unconstitutional because it violated the single subject rule. People v. Reedy, 295 Ill. App. 3d 34, 44 (1998). The decision in Reedy was relevant to the State's appeal in this case because the subsections of section 107--4 of the Code that the parties agreed were at issue in this case, subsections (a--3) and (a--7), were first added to section 107--4 in Public Act 89--404.

When an act is determined to be unconstitutional because it violates the single subject rule, the effect is to render invalid each and every provision of the unconstitutional act regardless of whether the individual provisions in the act could pass constitutional muster. Johnson v. Edgar, 176 Ill. 2d 499, 512 (1997). Thus, the effect of the determination in Reedy that Public Act 89--404 violated the single subject rule was to render invalid section 107--4 as amended by Public Act 89--404.

In a supplemental appellate brief, the State first argued that we should not follow Reedy because it was wrongly decided. However, that issue was settled when our supreme court affirmed Reedy. People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1 (1999) (modified upon denial of rehearing). Accordingly, the State's argument that defendant's arrest was proper under section 107--4, as amended by ...

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