that the precise language of the alleged libels must be pleaded
and that it has not been, that the allegations of who to whom,
when and where, are insufficient, and that the special damages
have not been specified as they must be if plaintiffs are
claiming defamation per quod.
We think the allegations respecting the housing litigation
defamations are sufficient. Loren-Maltese certainly should have
no difficulty in responding to those claims. See
Vantassell-Matin v. Nelson, 741 F. Supp. 698 (N.D.Ill. 1990). We
agree, though, that the allegations respecting reports in The
Cicero Observer and the Loren-Maltese accusation against Hanania
require more specificity than "in 1997," "printed false
statements," and "falsely accused." We dismiss paragraphs 151,
152 and 153, but with leave to amend. Further, we dismiss the
reference in paragraph 155 to special damages. Such damages must
be specifically stated. Fed. R.Civ.P. 9(g); King v. Armstrong,
623 F. Supp. 487 (N.D.Ill. 1985).
Defendants also contend that the references to Judge Zagel's
opinion were substantially true, and they furnish a copy.
Plaintiffs object to consideration of the opinion, contending
that it converts the motion to one for summary judgment. We
disagree, since plaintiffs reference the opinion in their
allegations. They are on sounder ground in contending that the
references are not a substantially true characterization of the
opinion. We deny the motion to dismiss based on the claim the
gist of the statements is substantially true. Haynes v. Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993), or that they
are a fair summary, Emery v. Kimball Hill, Inc., 112 Ill. App.3d 109,
67 Ill.Dec. 767, 445 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ill.App.2d 1983).
The motion to dismiss Count IX is denied. Plaintiffs do not
suggest that the Town of Cicero would not honor its statutory
indemnification obligations if compensatory damages judgments
were entered against its employees. The circumstances here are,
therefore, somewhat different from those in Wilson v. City of
Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997), but not different enough.
What was done there is what has been done here, the invocation of
ancillary jurisdiction to bring "a prejudgment collection
proceeding, an effort to bring into the case a solvent party to
pay the judgment against an insolvent one." Id. at 684.
Obviously Count IX comes into play only if a judgment is entered
against an employee to whom the municipality has an
indemnification obligation, but, according to Wilson,
plaintiffs need not wait until judgment is entered.
Defendants seek to strike the punitive damages claims in Counts
I and II because the Town of Cicero cannot be liable for punitive
damages. That is true enough and, accordingly, we strike them
insofar as they relate to the municipality. They remain as
damages claims against the individual defendants.
Finally, defendants complain that plaintiffs have alleged much
that is unnecessary, argumentative and unanswerable; they include
a number of such comments in an appendix; and they ask that they
be stricken. They are right about most of them but not about the
allegations that Loren-Maltese controls the content of The Cicero
Town News and appoints all trustees. And there are other
irrelevant allegations as well, one mentioned before. Other
examples are the references to alleged pending investigations in
subparagraphs 36(d) and 36(e), 36(j) and 36(l). We could direct
the plaintiffs to amend, so as to drop out the editorializing,
but we do not think that worth the effort. Rather, we ask the
defendants to answer all relevant allegations (and the great bulk
of them are relevant to plaintiffs' claims). We recognize that
the jury does not see the pleadings and the real issues are
generally not fully crystalized until the final pretrial order.
For now, we deny the Rule 12(f) motion to strike.
The motion of the Cicero defendants to dismiss Count I is
denied. The motion of the Torshen defendants to dismiss Count II
is granted, but the motion of the Cicero defendants to dismiss
that count is denied. The motion of the Torshen defendants for
Rule 11 sanctions is denied. Their motion to dismiss Counts VI
and VII and to dismiss them from Count II, Count V and Count IX
is granted. Count IV is dismissed. We deny the motion of the
Cicero defendants to dismiss Count III and Count V. The motion of
the Town of Cicero to dismiss Count VIII is granted. The motion
of the Cicero defendants to dismiss Count VIII is granted in part
and denied in part. The motion of the Cicero defendants to
dismiss Count IX is denied. The motion of the Town of Cicero to
strike the punitive damages claims against it in Counts I and II
is granted. We conditionally deny the Rule 12(f) motion to