The opinion of the court was delivered by: Lozano, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss, brought before the Court by Judges Richard D. Cudahy,
Joel M. Flaum, William T. Hart, Michael S. Kanne, Daniel A.
Manion, Richard A. Posner, and Kenneth F. Ripple ("federal
judges") on June 19, 1998; Frederick Sudekum, III and Albert
Motion to Dismiss filed on October 6, 1998; and Querry & Harrow,
Ltd. and T. David Ackerman's Motion for Leave to File Motion to
Dismiss, filed on November 4, 1998, and Motion to Dismiss, filed
on November 4, 1998. For the reasons set forth below, the motions
are GRANTED. The Clerk is ORDERED TO DISMISS this case with
The circumstances surrounding this case begin many years ago in
an Illinois state court. According to Robert Wilson ("Wilson"),
his insurance company did not properly handle his claims after
two of his Illinois properties were damaged. The Vine Street
property was damaged in 1983, and the South Turlington Street
property was damaged in 1984. And so began Wilson's new career.
In 1987, Wilson filed a state suit against his insurance
company improperly denying his claim on the Vine Street property.
Wilson's case was dismissed with prejudice because he failed to
bring the claim within the statute of limitations. (Defs.' Ex. A)
Wilson appealed the decision to the Illinois appellate level, and
lost again. (Defs.' Ex. B) He petitioned the Illinois Supreme
Court for leave to appeal and was denied. (Defs.' Ex. C) He then
petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
and again was denied. (Defs.' Ex. D) Not to be discouraged,
Wilson filed a new case in the Northern District of Illinois
based on the same incident, this time alleging due process and
equal protection violations, and lost. (Defs.' Ex. E) He lost
again on appeal, and was denied certiorari once more. See
Wilson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 94-2646 (7th Cir.
Sept. 13, 1995) (unpublished order). (Defs.' Exs. F, H, I)
In 1994, Wilson filed suit against the two attorneys who
represented his insurance company in the prior cases, namely
Defendants, Michael Resis and Frederick Sudekum. (Defs.' Ex. K)
He claimed that the Vine Street property had been properly
insured and that these Defendants had committed various torts and
civil rights violations against Wilson during the prior
litigation relating to the Vine Street property. The federal
court dismissed this case with prejudice, (Defs.' Ex. L), and it
seems Wilson did not appeal.
In 1996, Wilson filed suit against Defendants Resis, Sudekum,
Albert DeVito, Richard Corrigan, T. David Ackerman, Gary Ravitz,
and Querrey & Harrow, Ltd. in state court, again claiming that
they had committed various torts against him during the Vine
Street property litigation. (Defs.' Ex. M) The state court
dismissed this case with prejudice. (Defs.' Ex. N)
According to Defendants, Wilson filed a complaint in state
court relating to the South Turlington Street property against
Sudekum, DeVito, and the insurance company claiming that they
used the courts to deny Wilson his lawful right of payment. The
state court also dismissed this case with prejudice. (See Defs.'
Wilson filed the instant claim against several federal district
and appellate judges who ruled against him in his first federal
suit against his insurance company as well as the Defendants from
the federal and state cases. His allegations against the federal
judges consist of abuse of power, fraud, conspiracy, lies, and
breach of judicial oath. Wilson's claims against the other
Defendants seems to be a compilation of misconduct, perjury,
conspiracy, violation of Illinois Code of Professional
Responsibility, abuse of power, fraud, violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the violation of federal laws. Wilson
requests a significant sum of money from each Defendant.
Regarding the judges, he insists that the Court overturn the
other courts' prior rulings. Having withdrawn his motion for
appointment of counsel, Wilson proceeds before the Court pro se.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint should
state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a). All of
the facts and inferences within the complaint should be treated
as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Baxter v. Vigo County School Corp., 26 F.3d 728,
734 (7th Cir. 1994); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318,
322 (7th Cir. 1996). A complaint should not be dismissed "if the
plaintiff could prevail `under any set of facts that could be
proved consistent with the allegations.'" Luckett v.
Rent-A-Center, Inc., 53 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81
L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)). However, plaintiffs "may not avoid dismissal
. . . simply by attaching bare legal conclusions to narrated
facts which fail to outline the bases of their claims." Perkins
v. Silverstein 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The Court
"will not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiffs
which are not contained within the complaint." G.L. Indus. of
Mich., Inc. v. Forstmann-Little, 800 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.Ind.
1991) (citing Coates v. Ill. St. Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 445,
447 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Judges are absolutely immune from suit for money damages.
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9
(1991). Judicial immunity is immunity from suit, not just from
assessment of damages. Id. at 10, 112 S.Ct. 286. Immunity is
overcome in two instances: (1) a judge is not immune for
nonjudicial actions, and (2) a judge is not immune for judicial
action taken in the absence of all jurisdiction. Id. (citing
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98
L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)). To determine whether a judge's act is
"judicial", the court looks at "the nature of the act itself,
i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and
to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with
the judge in his judicial capacity." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11,
112 S.Ct. 286 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362, 98
S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). Wilson's complaint claims
that the federal judges' decisions against him were improper. A
judge's decision in a case before him or her is considered a
judicial action. Therefore, the alleged actions by the federal
judges in this case were judicial.
If the matter upon which a judge acts is clearly outside the
subject matter jurisdiction of the court over which the judge
presides, the act is done in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction. Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1441 (6th Cir.
1997); John v. Barron, 897 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir. 1990);
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en
banc). To explain the difference between acting ...