attacking the contract, Dorsey must show that the parties never agreed to
arbitrate their disputes. Colfax, 20 F.3d at 754.
[4, 5] We treat an agreement to arbitrate like any other contract, and
look to state law to determine whether an arbitration clause is
enforceable. Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366-67
(7th Cir. 1999). Dorsey argues that the arbitration clause is void
because it lacks mutuality and is itself unconscionable. Additionally,
she maintains that she, having not read that part of the contract, never
actually agreed to arbitration. This last claim is quickiy disposed of: a
party's failure to read a contract does not invalidate unread contractual
terms or excuse that party's performance under the contract. See Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997); Breckenridge v.
Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246 Ill. App.3d 810, 186 Ill.Dec. 425,
616 N.E.2d 615, 620 (1993).
[6-8] As to mutuality, Dorsey claims that the arbitration clause in
unenforceable because it "is completely one sided, . . . the defendant
has reserved solely to itself the right to go to court for the only claim
it is likely ever to be concerned with — to enforce repayment of
the loan." (Dorsey Resp. at 10.) But Illinois law is quite clear that
contracts need not be reciprocal to be enforceable. In other words,
parties need not undertake identical obligations. Instead, mutuality is
"only required to the extent that both parties to an agreement are
bound. If the requirement of consideration has been met[,] mutuality of
obligation is not essential." S.J. Groves & Sons Co. v. State,
93 Ill.2d 397, 67 Ill.Dec. 92, 444 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1982), overruled on
other grounds by Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims,
109 Ill.2d 72, 92 Ill.Dec. 521, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985) (quotations and
citations omitted); see also Design Benefit Plans, Inc. v. Enright,
940 F. Supp. 200, 205-206 (N.D.Ill. 1996) (applying S.J. Groves in
challenge to an arbitration clause). Clearly, the contract is supported
by consideration on both sides;*fn4 Dorsey does not argue otherwise.
Under Illinois law, that is sufficient. See also Kroll v. Doctor's
Assoc., Inc., 3 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[P]arties can agree to
arbitrate some disputes and not others . . . . [and] not undermine the
mutuality of the . . . arbitration provision."). Dorsey's reliance on
Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (voiding an
arbitration clause for lack of mutuality when one party reserved the
option to judicially resolve a majority of its claims) is fruitless
because the Illinois courts have explicitly (and implicitly) rejected
that approach. See Jacob v. C & M Video, Inc., 248 Ill. App.3d 654, 188
Ill.Dec. 697, 618 N.E.2d 1267, 1271 (1993).
 Dorsey also attacks the arbitration clause itself as unconscionable
because Greentree reserved to itself the power to choose the arbitrator.
But a careful read of the arbitration clause reveals that Dorsey must
consent to Greentree's choice: "All disputes . . . shall be resolved by
one arbitrator selected by us with consent of you."
 Finally, Dorsey asserts that enforcing the arbitration clause
would be against public policy because the cost to her would be
prohibitive. She relies on a slew of cases commenting on Congress intent
to provide a less expensive alternative to litigation. See, e.g.,
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280, 115 S.Ct. 834,
130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995). True as that may be, Congress did not
authorize courts to evaluate plaintiffs arbitration costs on a
case-by-case basis when determining whether to compel arbitration.
"Whatever may be said pro and con about the cost and efficiency of
arbitration . . . is for Congress and the contracting parties to
consider." Hill; 105 F.3d at 1151. Dorsey cannot escape her contractual
obligation to arbitrate her disputes by now complaining about the cost.
Although some of Dorsey's policy arguments are superficially attractive
and we are sympathetic to her unique circumstances, Congress and Illinois
have both implemented a strong policy favoring arbitration agreements.
Perhaps those bodies did not foresee the potential iniquities arising
from that policy — the possibility that individual consumers could
be forced to undertake expenses greater than those imposed by the
respective judicial systems. However, it is not for the courts to rewrite
the policy favoring arbitration in individual cases. Under current case
law and for the reasons stated above, Dorsey must submit her claims
against Greentree and HCP to arbitration. Thus, we grant Greentree's
motion to compel arbitration (5-1) and stay (5-2) this action pending
completion of those proceedings.