The opinion of the court was delivered by: Keys, United States Magistrate Judge.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' Petition for
Attorneys Fees and Costs, and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Petition
for Attorneys Fees and Costs. For the following reasons, this
Court grants in part, and denies in part, the two petitions.
Thus, this Court enters, in favor of Plaintiffs and against
Defendants, an award of attorneys' fees and costs totalling
This case stems from the August 6, 1993 arrest of Plaintiff
Crystal Ingram, following a traffic stop outside of her home in
Bellwood, Illinois. Her minor children, Plaintiffs Carlos and
Monique Ingram, were present during the arrest. Ms. Ingram was
charged with several traffic violations, along with misdemeanor
charges of battery and resisting arrest. On June 17, 1994, those
charges were dismissed on the prosecutor's motion. On May 2,
1995, Plaintiffs filed the instant civil rights claim in federal
The First Amended Complaint*fn1 included the following seven
counts: False Arrest;
Excessive Force During Arrest; Sexual Harassment; Conspiracy; and
IIED as to each of the three Plaintiffs. Judge Nordberg dismissed
the Village as a Defendant and dismissed all counts against the
remaining Defendants, in their official capacities. Ingram v.
Jones, No. 95 C 2631, 1996 WL 355365, at *5 (N.D.Ill. June 21,
1996). Judge Nordberg also dismissed the Conspiracy count in its
entirety, and granted summary judgment to Defendants Johnson,
Davis, Perez, and Mangano on the False Arrest, Excessive Force,
Sexual Harassment, and IIED counts.*fn2 Ingram v. Jones, 1996
WL 355365, at *5.
After discovery progressed, on October 22, 1996, Plaintiffs
moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of the conspiracy and
malicious prosecution counts of their (original) Complaint (and
for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint adding these counts
back in since they were not included in the First Amended
Complaint). Judge Nordberg denied the motion and found that parts
of the motion "misstate[d]" the law and made "frivolous"
arguments. Ingram v. Jones, No. 95 C 2631, 1997 WL 323538, at
*2-3 (N.D.Ill. June 9, 1997).*fn3
In April of 1997, the case settled for a total of $57,500:
$40,000 for Crystal Ingram; $10,000 for Carlos Ingram; and $7,500
for Monique Ingram. This settlement was then the subject of
further disagreement between the parties. A motion to enforce
settlement was presented by Plaintiffs on September 10, 1997, and
was ultimately denied by Judge Nordberg on January 8, 1998.
Further settlement discussions were held by this Court, and final
settlement was eventually reached as to the damages claims. The
parties then consented to this Court's jurisdiction with respect
to the attorneys' fees and costs sought by Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs
(combining the initial petition and the supplemental one) seek a
total of $192,521.83 for fees and costs.*fn4
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (" § 1988") provides, in relevant part,
that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
section . . . 1983 . . . of this title . . ., the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs." In order for a party to
collect attorneys' fees under § 1988 the party must show: (1)
that it has prevailed; and (2) that its fee request is
reasonable. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 109-14, 113 S.Ct.
566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992).
A. Legal Standard to Determine Prevailing Party Status
Generally, plaintiffs are considered to be prevailing parties
"if they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which
achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the
suit." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933,
76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); Estate of Borst v. O'Brien, 979 F.2d 511,
515 (7th Cir. 1992). However, even where the plaintiffs do not
"win" on a significant issue in the litigation, if they obtain
some of the relief originally sought by bringing the lawsuit,
they may be prevailing parties. See Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 65 L.Ed.2d 653, (1980).
Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1039 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96
L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)). Thus, a two-part test is applied to
determine whether plaintiffs have "prevailed through settlement
prior to a full litigation on the merits" (such that attorneys'
fees may be available): 1) the plaintiffs' "lawsuit must be
causally linked to the achievement of the relief obtained"; and
2) the defendant "must not have acted wholly gratuitously, i.e.,
the plaintiffs' claims, if pressed, cannot have been frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless." Nanetti v. University of Ill. at
Chicago, 867 F.2d 990, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1989).
Here, it is evident that the litigation was a causal link to
the achievement of the relief obtained,*fn5 and that Defendants
did not act wholly gratuitously. The Court also finds that,
despite Defendants obligatory arguments to ...