of her academic instruction duties and behavior management of her
students was satisfactory, plaintiffs tardiness and lack of
improvement in her professional image "indicated an increasing
difficulty in meeting the professional expectations of Challenger
Day School." Def. Memo., Exhibit E. Plaintiffs employment
contract was not renewed, and, consequently, she was terminated
on August 27, 1996. The reasons Challenger gave for her
termination were chronic tardiness and lack of professionalism.
Lindblom believed that at all times she was meeting Challenger's
reasonable expectations and performing her responsibilities as a
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." This standard is
applied with "added vigor in employment discrimination cases, in
which intent and credibility are crucial issues." Drake v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 134 F.3d 878, 883 (7th Cir. 1998).
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
(1986). In ruling on the motion, the court will not resolve
factual disputes or weigh conflicting evidence. Sweat v. Peabody
Coal Co., 94 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1996). The evidence is
considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and all
justifiable inferences are resolved in the nonmovant's favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct.
2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, the nonmovant "must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538
(1986). Rather, the nonmovant must produce "specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P.
Challenger seeks dismissal of plaintiffs Count I, Sexual
Harassment, contending that her complaint goes beyond the scope
of her EEOC charge and that she fails to submit evidence that
could support a finding of a hostile work environment.
A. Procedural Requirements — The Scope of the EEOC Charge
Plaintiff seeks to charge Challenger with repeated instances of
sexual harassment over a one-year period. To facilitate EEOC
investigations and to give notice to defendants of the charged
conduct, Title VII required Lindblom to file an EEOC charge that
encompassed all the claims she plans to raise in her complaint
to the district court. Cheek v. Western and So. Life Ins.,
31 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1994). Lindblom's EEOC charge, in toto,
Challenger and Bridgeview Schools have, through
Executive Director-Agent Eleanor Flynn and
Educational [sic] Christopher Raspante, sexually
discriminated aand [sic] retaliated respecting the
terms and conditions of my employment with Respondent
Schools. At all times while I worked with Respondent
I performed my job in keeping with and exceeding
Respondent's legitimate expectations.
In August 1995 I was sexually touched and fondled
against my will by Robert Salmons (off premises) who
was assigned by Flynn and Raspante to be my
co-teacher. I reported this incident to Raspante in
October 1995 and requested that Salmon [sic] or I be
transferred so I would not have to experience this
sexual related treatment again, I asked Raspante
again in March 1996 and then again in May 1996 for
the above transfer, but he refused. In May 1996 I
pointed out that there was a job for which I was
qualified in the sister school, Bridgeview, to which
accept a transfer to escape the hostile environment
sexually where I was with Salmon [sic], but at
Raspante's specific direction I contacted Flynn. In a
meeting in her office on 8.8.96 she acknowledged
awareness of my complainte [sic] against Salmon
[sic], but stated that any such treatment was my
fault for being prooocative [sic] and encouraging of
sex discrimination by males and that I could not have
a transfer to run-away-from-my-problems. I was
retaliated against further by being discharged on or
about 8.13.96. At that time, Flynn told me to not
disclose the above events or I would not get a
favorable reference from future inquiring employers.
Further Flynn and Raspante have refused to pay me a
bonus and profit-sharing distribution which is due,
because I complained about the sexual harassment.
The court must determine whether the charge provides sufficient
notice to defendants of the kind of conduct being charged.
Cheek, 31 F.3d at 500. Defendants contend that it does not
because the charge focuses on only one incident, the off-site
party. In determining whether a Title VII complaint is within the
scope of the EEOC charge, a court must determine whether the
complaint "is like or reasonably related to the allegations of
the charge and growing out of such allegations." Jenkins v. Blue
Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc.,