Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

SAMUEL v. CITY OF CHICAGO

March 17, 1999

ROBERT SAMUEL AND AUGUSTINE SAMUEL, PLAINTIFFS,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, MICHAEL CALLAHAN, BERNARD KELLY, MICHAEL MULLEN AND JOHN DOE, DEFENDANTS.



The opinion of the court was delivered by: Levin, United States Magistrate Judge.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is Defendant City of Chicago's ("City") Motion to Dismiss Count III of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at Law, containing a § 1983 "official policy" claim against the City. The City's motion is filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons stated below, the City's Motion is granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND*fn1

On or about June 7, 1997, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Plaintiff Robert Samuel was feeling ill and stopped to rest in his parked car at the Amoco gas station located at the corner of 103rd Street and Torrence Avenue in the City of Chicago. (Am.Compl. ¶ 9.) Approximately one hour later, while Samuel was resting in his car, Defendants Michael Callahan and Michael Mullen, both Chicago police officers, approached and entered Plaintiff's car, allegedly kicked and punched Samuel on various parts of his body, and removed him from his car without provocation, need or explanation. (Am.Compl. ¶ 10.) Defendants Callahan and Mullen subsequently took Samuel from the gas station parking area, informed him that he was under arrest, handcuffed him, and transported him to the Fourth District Police Station. (Am.Compl. ¶ 11.) Samuel was held and detained for approximately 11 hours, until approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 8, 1997. (Am.Compl. ¶ 14.)

During the 11 hours that Samuel was detained, he repeatedly informed the officer on duty, Defendant John Doe, that he required insulin due to his diabetic condition. Samuel was not permitted access to insulin by the officers on duty at the Fourth District Police Station, and eventually, at 3:00 a.m. on June 8, 1997, Plaintiff was transported by the police to EHS Trinity Hospital. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17.)

Samuel allegedly suffered an aggravation of his pre-existing heart condition and diabetic condition as a result of Defendants' actions, as well as contusions, lacerations and other injuries about his legs, abdomen, chest and head. He remained at EHS Trinity Hospital for three weeks until he was transferred to Michael Reese Hospital, where he remained for another three weeks. (Am.Compl. ¶¶ 16, 17.)

ANALYSIS

I. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the court takes all of the well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed on a motion to dismiss unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief. Id. A complaint need not set forth all relevant facts or recite the law. All that is required is a short and plain statement showing that the party is entitled to relief. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff in a suit in federal court need not plead facts. Conclusions may be pleaded as long as the defendant has at least minimal notice of the claim. FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2); Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995).

The Seventh Circuit has recently held:

  Under the federal rule of notice pleading, "`all the
  Rules require is a short and plain statement of the
  claim that will give the defendant fair notice of
  what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
  which it rests.'" Leatherman v. Tarrant County
  Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit,
  507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).
  (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78
  S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (footnote and citation
  omitted)) (emphasis added). For fair notice to be
  given, "a complaint must at least `include the
  operative facts upon which a plaintiff bases his
  claim.'" Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168
  (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing
  Service, Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 198 (7th Cir. 1985)). A
  plaintiff "need not plead facts; he can plead
  conclusions. [However,] the conclusions must provide
  the defendant with at least minimal notice of the
  claim." Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151,
  153-54 (7th Cir. 1995). The issue we review is
  whether "sufficient facts [have been] pleaded to
  allow the district court to understand the gravamen
  of the plaintiff's complaint." Doherty v. City of
  Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 326 (7th Cir. 1996).

Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998); See also Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998).

II. PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 1983 POLICY CLAIM

Count III of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at Law alleges that the City is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maintaining a policy or custom of failing to "instruct, supervise, control and discipline" on a continuing basis defendant police officers in their duties to refrain from unlawfully and maliciously harassing citizens, arresting, imprisoning and prosecuting citizens, assaulting and beating citizens, conspiring to violate citizens' rights and otherwise depriving citizens of their constitutional and statutory rights. (Am.Compl. ยง 25.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs, while using vague conclusions and ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.