for the Chicago far north suburban area in the yellow pages under
"skylights," while Skys was listed. (Plaintiffs' 12(M), ¶ 84 &
"Summary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Schroeder v. Copley Newspaper,
879 F.2d 266, 268 (7th Cir. 1989). The moving party bears the
burden of specifying "those portions of the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes
demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). In
response, the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e). This requires more than merely showing "there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Summary judgment motions must be considered in light of both
substantive law and the question of whether a reasonable jury
could render a verdict in the non-movant's favor on that basis.
Board of Trustees of the Chicago Plastering Institute Pension
Trust Fund v. William A. Duguid Co., 761 F. Supp. 1345, 1348
(N.D.Ill. 1991). "Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,
there is no genuine issue for trial." Matsushita at 587, 106
S.Ct. 1348. "That the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment does not mean that genuine issues of material
fact necessarily do not exist." William A. Duguid Co. at 1348.
Because the parties are signatories to a collective bargaining
agreement, the issue in this case is governed by 29 U.S.C. ¶
1001, et seq., the Employee Retirement Income Security Act.
("ERISA"). The only issue presented in this motion is whether
Skys is the alter ego of Contractors, and is thereby bound to
fulfill Contractor's obligations under the terms of the two
collective bargaining agreements entered into by Contractors and
The Alter Ego Doctrine
"The alter ego doctrine (i.e., treating two nominally separate
business entities as if they were a single, continuous employer)
is applied to `prevent an employer from gaining an unearned
advantage in his labor activities simply by altering his
corporate form.'" N.L.R.B. v. Dane County Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313,
1321 (7th Cir. 1986). While used most commonly to root out "`a
disguised continuance of a former business entity,'"
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150 v. Centor
Contractors, Inc., 831 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1987), the
doctrine is equally applicable to situations in which the entity
allegedly seeking to avoid its obligations exists side-by-side
with its alleged alter ego. See Central States, Southeast &
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Sloan, 902 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.
"The alter ego analysis is heavily fact-laden." Id. An alter
ego relationship is usually found when two entities share
"substantially identical: (1) management and supervision; (2)
business purposes and customers; (3) operations; (4) equipment;
(5) ownership." — Chicago District Council of Carpenters Pension
Fund v. Vacala Masonry, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 612, 617 (N.D.Ill.
1996). In addition, there must be an intent to avoid collective
bargaining agreement obligations.
This Circuit discussed the alter ego doctrine in
Esmark, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., stating that [t]he
Board's "alter ego" doctrine is similar [to the
single employer doctrine]: generally, one corporation
is the alter ego of another where the factors
necessary to support a "single employer" finding are
met and, in addition,
the Board finds that the second corporation is a
"disguised continuance" of the employing enterprise,
resulting in evasion of the employer's obligations
under the labor laws. 887 F.2d 739, 754 (7th Cir.
Trustees of Pension Funds of Local 701 v. Favia Elec.,