Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 98--CF--115 Honorable Christopher C. Starck, Judge, Presiding.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Justice Rapp
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Randy Stork, appeals from his conviction of unlawful entry of school property by a child sex offender under former section 11--9.2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/11--9.2 (West Supp. 1997)) (the Act). *fn1 Following a stipulated bench proceeding, defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 24-months' probation. On appeal, defendant argues that section 11--9.3 is unconstitutional in that it (1) violates his right to procedural due process; (2) violates substantive due process by punishing innocent conduct; (3) is unconstitutionally vague; (4) criminalizes the status of being a former child sex offender, in violation of the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII); and (5) violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §11). We affirm.
Initially, we must remark upon the inexcusable poor quality of the briefs filed by both parties. They exhibit a lack of compliance with our supreme court rules. Defendant's brief contains a statement of facts without any citations to the record. The argument sections of both parties' briefs contain irrelevant arguments and misstatements of law.
Additionally, we note that the State's brief fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 6. 145 Ill. 2d R. 6. Rule 6 requires citation of cases to be to the official reports and to include the page of the volume where the case begins and the pages upon which the pertinent matter appears. Many of the cases cited by the State lack references to the official reports' volume and page numbers upon which the pertinent matters appear.
The court is "entitled to have briefs submitted that present an organized and cohesive legal argument in accordance with Supreme Court Rules." Harvey v. Carponelli, 117 Ill. App. 3d 448, 450 (1983). Strict adherence to the supreme court rules is necessary to expedite and facilitate the administration of Justice. See Harvey, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 450. We admonish both parties for failing to comply with the supreme court rules.
In approximately 1989, in the State of Arizona, defendant was accused of inappropriate contact with his live-in girfriend's 15-year-old child. Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted violation of a child, a Class 3 felony, and was sentenced to probation. Defendant subsequently relocated to Illinois.
On January 12, 1998, defendant drove to Twin Groves Junior High School in Buffalo Grove. Defendant parked in the school parking lot and proceeded directly to the school's front office, where he asked the school administrator for permission to distribute some of his business literature for "Rock 'N Rebel Productions." Defendant's business was an entertainment disk jockey service providing music for private parties, school functions, and other occasions.
No signs were posted at the school forbidding entry to either the general public or those persons designated as former sex offenders. The school doors were open and unlocked. Defendant was not asked to leave the school or denied permission to be in the building.
After seeking permission of the school administrator to distribute business literature, defendant promptly left the school and drove away. Defendant did not speak to any student, nor did he linger on the school grounds.
Defendant was charged by indictment with unlawful entry on school property by a child sex offender. Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on constitutional grounds, a motion that was denied by the trial court. Defendant was then tried in a stipulated bench proceeding, found guilty, and sentenced to 24-months' probation.
Defendant timely appealed, arguing that section 11--9.3 is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of section 11--9.3 has not previously been challenged.
II. REVIEW OF SECTION 11--9.3 PRESENCE WITHIN SCHOOL ZONE BY CHILD SEX OFFENDERS PROHIBITED
On July 28, 1997, the Governor signed into law Public Act 90--234 (Pub. Act 90--234, eff. January 1, 1998 (adding 720 ILCS 5/11--9.2 (West Supp. 1997), which was renumbered to 720 ILCS 5/11--9.3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1999) by Public Act 90--655 (Pub. Act 90--655, §160, eff. July 30, 1998))). Public Act 90--234 made it unlawful for a child sex offender knowingly to be present on school property or knowingly to loiter on a public way within 500 feet of school property while persons under the age of 18 are present, unless the offender is a parent or guardian of a student present on the school property, or the offender has permission to be present from the school principal, administrator, or school board. 720 ILCS Ann. 5/11--9.3(a), (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1999). A person who violates section 11--9.3 is guilty of a Class 4 felony. 720 ILCS Ann. 5/11--9.3(3)(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1999).
The category of child sex offenders includes any person who is convicted of a sex offense, as defined by section 11--9.3(c)(2) (720 ILCS Ann. 11/9.3 (c) (2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1999)), or who is certified as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1996)). 720 ILCS Ann. 5/11--9.3(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1999)
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Defendant contends that he has been deprived of his right to procedural due process because section 11--9.3 does not provide for prior notice to former child sex offenders that previously lawful conduct has been criminalized. In order to trigger the protections of the due process clause, defendant must show that the statute at issue deprives him of a protected liberty or property interest. Lanni v. ...