The opinion of the court was delivered by: BUCKLO
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiffs, St. Charles Riverfront Station, Inc., ("St. Charles"), and Station Casinos, Inc. ("Station"), sued the defendant, Empress Casino Joliet Corporation ("Empress"), for tortious interference of contract. Empress moves to dismiss the claim. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.
St. Charles is a Missouri Corporation with its principal place of business in St. Charles, Missouri. Empress is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Joliet, Illinois. Station is a Nevada corporation.
St. Charles states that two of its employees, Monique Threadgill, Director of Marketing, and Thomas Quinlan, Purchasing Manager, signed three-year contracts of employment. St. Charles alleges that Empress intentionally and unjustifiably interfered with its contractual rights by inducing Ms. Threadgill and Mr. Quinlan to breach their employment contracts. (Comp. PP 7, 10).
The parties dispute which jurisdiction's law should govern the instant dispute. St. Charles argues that Illinois law controls while Empress argues that Missouri law governs.
The law used in a diversity jurisdiction case is determined by looking to the conflict-of-law rules of the state in which the federal court sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 85 L. Ed. 1477, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941). In a tort action, Illinois uses the "most significant contacts" approach of the Second Restatement to resolve choice of law disputes. Abbott Lab. v. NutraMax Products, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 443, 446 (N.D. Ill. 1994)(citation omitted). "This approach requires the court to determine which state possesses the most significant relationship to the issues involved after evaluating the contacts the various states have with the litigation." Id. Among the factors a court should consider are "(1) the place of injury and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (2) the domicile of the parties; (3) the place of incorporation in cases involving incorporation; (4) the place of business of the parties; and (5) the place where the parties' relationship, if any, is centered." Thera-Kinetics, Inc. v. Managed Home Recovery, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15352, No. 95 C 3821, 1997 WL 610305, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1997). The most important factors are the place where the injury occurred and the place of the conduct causing the injury. Id.; Abbott Lab., 844 F. Supp. at 446.
St. Charles is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri. Empress is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. The domicile of the parties, the place of incorporation, the place of business of the parties, and the place of the parties' relationship does not favor either Illinois or Missouri.
St. Charles' principal place of business is Missouri and to the extent it is injured by Empress' alleged tortious interference, it feels that effect in Missouri. Thus, the place of injury favors Missouri law.
St. Charles speculates that the conduct causing the injury occurred in Illinois because Ms. Threadgill and Mr. Quinlan were probably brought to Illinois to interview and were there induced to breach their employment contracts. It is equally probable that representatives of Empress made trips to Missouri to interview and discuss employment with Ms. Threadgill and Mr. Quinlan. The factors in this case are, for the most part, evenly spread among Illinois and Missouri. The most important factor, however, the place of injury, favors Missouri. Accordingly, Missouri law will govern the dispute. See Straka v. Francis, 867 F. Supp. 767, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1994)(finding that where an employment agreement and relationship formed in a state is allegedly interfered with, the "most significant contacts" test favors applying the law of that state).
Tortious Interference with Contract
To prove a claim for tortious interference of contract, St. Charles must show "(1) a contract or a valid business expectancy; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach of the contract or relationship; (4) absence of justification; (5) damages resulting from defendant's conduct." Community Title Co. v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 796 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Mo. 1990)(en banc). Empress argues that St. Charles' complaint should be dismissed because it has not properly pled "absence of justification."
"Absence of justification is the absence of any legal right on the part of the defendant to take the actions about which a plaintiff complains." SSM Health Care, Inc. v. Deen, 890 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). "A defendant is justified in inducing a contract's breach, unless the defendant uses improper means to induce the breach." Schott v. Beussink, 950 S.W.2d 621, 628 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997). "Improper means are those that are independently wrongful, such as threats, violence, trespass, defamation, misrepresentation of fact, restraint of trade, or any other wrongful act recognized by statute or the common law." Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 317 (Mo. 1993)(en banc). Under Missouri law, the "absence of justification" element is an "indispensable" part of tortious interference with contract. Institutional Food Mktg. Associates, Ltd. v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 454 (8th Cir. 1984)(quotation omitted).
St. Charles argues it sufficiently pled "absence of justification" by alleging Empress "unjustifiably interfered" with its contractual rights. (Comp. PP 7, 10). "A complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6)." Palda v. General Dynamics Corp., 47 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 1995). In considering Missouri's interference with contract tort the Eighth Circuit noted
the establishment of a prima facie case requires more than the allegation that the defendant acted without justification. In order to state a cause of action, it is necessary that facts be alleged from which it ...