The court need not go any further than Avondale's own evidence and arguments to conclude that there is no imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the environment. Avondale states that it seeks an order compelling Amoco to remediate at its expense "contamination that may in the future cause danger serious enough to require abatement." Id. There is no evidence to show that there exists any solid or hazardous waste that causes endangerment to human health or the environment now. See Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1255 (citing Price, 39 F.3d at 1019).
This conclusion is further supported by IEPA's issuance of a "No Further Remediation Letter." The IEPA Letter states that its issuance "signifies a release from further responsibilities under the [Illinois Environment Protection] Act in performing the approved remedial action and shall be considered prima facie evidence that the remediation site [the Property] . . . does not constitute a threat to human health and the environment and does not require further remediation under the Act." (Def.'s 12(M) Stmt. at Ex. C.)
Therefore, the court grants Amoco's motion for summary judgment to the extent that Avondale seeks an order compelling Amoco to remediate some future endangerment Amoco allegedly caused. See also Foster v. United States, 922 F. Supp. 642, 662 (D.D.C. 1996) ("While there can be no question that the levels of contamination present at the Site may warrant future response action, the plaintiff cannot establish either a current risk of 'substantial or serious' threatened harm, or 'some necessity for action.'").
B. State Common Law Claims
Although the court concludes that RCRA does not authorize the recovery of cleanup costs incurred after properly invoking RCRA's statutory process, "RCRA does not prevent a private party from recovering its cleanup costs under other federal or state laws." Meghrig, 116 S. Ct. at 1256. However, having granted summary judgment for Amoco on Avondale's RCRA claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Avondale's state common law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also City of Chicago v. Intern. College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525, 118 S. Ct. 523, 533 (1997) (stating that pendent jurisdiction is a matter of discretion); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting presumption against retention of supplemental state law claims); Khan v. State Oil, 93 F.3d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), vacated on other grounds 522 U.S. 3, 118 S. Ct. 275, 139 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1997); Vukadinovich v. Bd. of School Trustees of Michigan, 978 F.2d 403, 415 (7th Cir. 1992) ("It is well established that if federal claims are dismissed before trial, the federal district courts should generally dismiss the state law claims as well."); Wright v. Associated Ins. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (7th Cir. 1994) (same, but noting three exceptions). Therefore, the court dismisses Counts III and IV, and denies Amoco's motion for summary judgment as to these counts.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Amoco's motion for summary judgment as to Counts I and II, and dismisses Counts III and IV. Case is terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE - MAR 24 1998 DOCKETED
Decision by Court. This action came to trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have been tried or heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant, Amoco Corporation and against plaintiff, Federal Savings Bank on Counts I and II and Count III and IV are hearby dismissed.