In March 1995, Harris states that she complained to the City's mayor. (Pl. 12(n) Add. Facts PP 29, 53.) In May or June 1995, the City transferred Harris back to the Streets Department as a street maintenance worker. (Pl. 12(n) Add. Facts P 55; City 12(n) Resp. P 55.) Although Harris sought her driver job back, she did not get it. (Pl. 12(n) Add. Facts PP 57-58.)
On September 6, 1995, the City placed Harris on administrative leave without pay. (Pl. 12(n) Add. Facts P 59; City 12(n) Resp. P 59.) Harris never returned to work. The City terminated Plaintiff's employment on December 14, 1995. (Pl. 12(n) Add. Facts P 60; City 12(n) Resp. P 60.)
Plaintiff filed this suit against the City for sexual discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and for violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). Once the moving party has produced evidence to show that it is entitled to summary judgment, the party seeking to avoid such judgment must affirmatively demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial. LINC Fin. Corp. v. Onwuteaka, 129 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 1997).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Nevertheless, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See also LINC, 129 F.3d at 920. A genuine issue of material fact is not shown by the mere existence of "some alleged factual dispute between the parties," Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247, or by "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Rather, a genuine issue of material fact exists only if "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT.
Title VII prohibits "discrimination . . . against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). There are two types of sexual harassment: (1) quid pro quo and (2) hostile work environment. Plaintiff argues that both types of sexual harassment have occurred here.
A. QUID PRO QUO HARASSMENT.
Quid pro quo harassment occurs in situations "where submission to a supervisor's sexual demands is made a condition of tangible employment benefits." Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997). See also Bryson v. Chicago State University, 96 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 1996). The E.E.O.C.'s Guidelines on Sexual Harassment describe quid pro quo harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when 1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment . . . [or] 2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual.