3. Constitutional Deprivation
Even assuming that Glass has sued the proper parties, and could demonstrate an unconstitutional governmental policy or custom to state an official capacity claim and personal responsibility to state an individual capacity claim, Glass' § 1983 claim must fail. Here, Glass claims that Cermak and its personnel under Fairman's direction denied him his constitutional right to adequate medical treatment. "Prison officials violate the Eight Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates 'deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners." Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976).
It is difficult to articulate what medical conditions constitute a serious medical need. See Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1372. The Seventh Circuit has adopted several approaches. Id. Under these approaches (1) a condition that a physician has diagnosed as mandating medical treatment; (2) a condition that even a lay person can easily recognize as requiring medical treatment; or (3) a condition that could result in further significant injury or unnecessary pain if not treated qualify as a serious medical need. Id. at 1373 (citations omitted). Here, the parties do not dispute that Glass had a serious medical need, severe burns. Accordingly, the court turns to determine whether Glass can demonstrate "deliberate indifference" to his medical needs.
Deliberate indifference is a standard higher than negligence. See Freeman, 916 F. Supp. at 791. "Negligence, even gross negligence, does not amount to deliberate indifference." Johnson v. Raba, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14827, No. 93 C 2285, 1997 WL 610403, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 1997). In order to demonstrate deliberate indifference, plaintiff must allege facts from which a reasonable inference could be drawn that defendant "intended to harm plaintiff or knew of a risk of harm so significant that an intent to harm could be inferred." McMillen, 1997 WL 603853, at *2. "The dissatisfaction or disagreement with the method of treatment or inability to effect a final cure does not suggest that those who treat an inmate exhibited deliberate indifference." Id.; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107 (Allegations that "more should have been done by way of diagnosis and treatment" does not state a constitutional deprivation.).
After suffering severe burns, Glass was transported to Loyola University Medical Center Burn Unit where he underwent surgery and received treatment for severe burns. (Pl.'s Second Am. Compl. at P 10.) Thereafter, Glass was taken into custody and transported to CCDOC. Id. at P 13. At the direction of Fairman, Glass was transported from CCDOC to Cermak for follow-up medical treatment for his burns. Id. While at Cermak, Glass alleges that Cermak and its personnel under Fairman's direction failed to provide medication for his severe pain, and failed to clean or change his dressings. Id.
Based on these factual allegations, no reasonable inference can be drawn that Cermak and Fairman displayed deliberate indifference to Glass' severe burns. See Soo Line R.R. Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co., 125 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) ("plaintiff can 'plead himself out of court by alleging facts which show that he has no claim, even though he was not required to allege those facts.'"). The fact that Glass was treated "'generally defeats a claim of deliberate indifference.'" Roberts v. Peters, 129 F.3d 119 (Table), 1997 WL 657016, at *1 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997) (quoting Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1264 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Holland v. Cooper, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13217, No. 92 C 2743, 1995 WL 549947, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1995). At most, Glass alleges negligent medical treatment. "Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; see also McMillen, 1997 WL 603853, at *2 (deliberate indifference can only inferred from improper medical treatment if the medical personnel's decision is a "substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards."). As such, Glass cannot prove any set of facts consistent with his allegations to demonstrate a constitutional deprivation. See Albiero, 122 F.3d at 419. Accordingly, even if the proper defendants were before the court, Glass could not withstand a motion to dismiss.
B. State Claims
Glass also purports to invoke state common law in his claim against Cermak and Fairman. (Pl.'s Second Amended Compl. at P 13.) Under Illinois law, "no civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued." 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/8-101. It is unclear from the record before the court when Glass' alleged injury accrued. As such, the court cannot determine whether Glass' state claims are time-barred. However, since the court dismisses Glass' federal claims, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glass' state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also City of Chicago v. Intern. College of Surgeons, 139 L. Ed. 2d 525, 118 S. Ct. 523, 533 (1997) (stating that pendent jurisdiction is a matter of discretion); Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1354 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting presumption against retention of supplemental state law claims).
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. The case is terminated.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court