The opinion of the court was delivered by: ALESIA
The complaint alleges the following facts which, for the purpose of deciding this motion, are taken as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984). From 1988 until June 2, 1992, plaintiff Larry McLaughlin ("McLaughlin") worked for defendant Cook County Department of Corrections ("the DOC") as a corrections officer. On June 2, 1992, the Cook County Department of Corrections terminated McLaughlin. On September 24, 1993, the Merit Board ruled that McLaughlin was officially terminated from the DOC effective June 16, 1992.
On July 31, 1997, McLaughlin filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"). The EEOC sent McLaughlin a right-to-sue letter on August 15, 1997. On November 12, 1997, McLaughlin filed a pro se complaint in this court, alleging that the DOC terminated him on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1988 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).
On December 1, 1997, the DOC filed this motion to dismiss McLaughlin's complaint. The DOC argues that McLaughlin's complaint should be dismissed because (1) McLaughlin's claims are time barred; (2) the DOC is not a suable entity; and (3) the DOC does not have the authority to terminate its employees.
On December 9, 1997, the court set a briefing schedule, ordering McLaughlin to file his response brief by December 23, 1997, and advising him that the court would rule on the motion without benefit of his views if he did not respond to the DOC's motion to dismiss. As of January 30, 1998, McLaughlin had not filed the required response brief. Therefore, the court ruled on the DOC's motion to dismiss without benefit of McLaughlin's input. In so doing, the court was careful to give McLaughlin's complaint fair and meaningful consideration. Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d 548, 555-59 (7th Cir. 1996).
A. Standard for deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Cromley v. Board of Educ. of Lockport, 699 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (N.D. Ill. 1988). If, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must dismiss the case. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). However, the court may dismiss the complaint only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957).
Even under the liberal notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, a complaint must include either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of the claims asserted. Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). Bare legal conclusions attached to narrated facts will not suffice. Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 1985). Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must employ standards less stringent than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. Donald, 95 F.3d at 555.
B. McLaughlin's claims are time barred
The DOC argues that all of McLaughlin's claims are time barred. First, the DOC argues that McLaughlin's section 1981 and section 1983 claims are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Second, the DOC argues that McLaughlin's Title VII claim is barred because McLaughlin did not file his EEOC charge within 300 days after the ...