Furthermore, with respect to Naguib's § 1985 claim against Pecaro, Naguib fails to allege any discriminatory animus behind Pecaro's actions, which is an essential element. See Majeske, 94 F.3d at 311. In fact, Naguib asserts that Pecaro acted the way he did because he was jealous of Naguib's remarkable performance. As a result, Naguib has plead himself out of court under his § 1985 claim against Pecaro. See Soo Line R.R. Co., 125 F.3d at 483. Therefore, Naguib's § 1983 and § 1985 claims against Pecaro are dismissed.
Jeddeloh is an attorney, sued in his personal capacity. Naguib alleges that Jeddeloh conspired with the Department and several of the other Defendants to deprive him of his civil rights. According to Naguib, he hired Jeddeloh as an attorney to represent his interests and rights. However, Naguib asserts that Jeddeloh inadequately represented his interests in several ways, including (1) failure to inform him of agencies such as the EEOC and the IDHR; (2) misguiding him with false information; (3) employing delay tactics; and (4) producing an incomplete file. Naguib concludes that Jeddeloh participated in the massive conspiracy because he discovered that Jeddeloh was previously employed by Illinois University Hospital, Westlake, Gottlieb, and several managed care organizations, and that Jeddeloh has good connections with the Department.
Jeddeloh moves to dismiss Naguib's § 1983 and § 1985 claims for failure to allege that Jeddeloh was involved in any state action, or that Jeddeloh was a participant in a conspiracy to deprive Naguib of any civil rights. Even assuming Naguib's factual allegations are true, the court cannot reasonably infer that Jeddeloh conspired with the Department or any other person to deprive Naguib of his civil rights. At best, Naguib's allegations indicate that Jeddeloh might have inadequately represented Naguib. Inadequate representation, however, does not equate to participation in a conspiracy. Thus, Naguib's allegations of Jeddeloh's participation in a massive conspiracy because of his discriminatory animus is nothing more than conclusory. A complaint inadequately alleges conspiracy and discriminatory animus if its factual allegations are vague and conclusory. See Ahmed, 124 F.3d 203, 1997 WL 471335, at *3; Bombliss, 23 F.3d 410, 1994 WL 117910, at *3; Copeland, 964 F. Supp. at 1235; Thomas, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12210, 1997 WL 473917, at *2. Accordingly, Naguib fails to state either a § 1983 or a § 1985 claim against Jeddeloh, and his Complaint against Jeddeloh must be dismissed.
Simon is an attorney, sued in his personal capacity. Naguib hired Simon to represent him against the Department's allegations. Naguib claims that it was evident to him that Simon had joined the massive conspiracy because of the following facts: (1) Simon refused to audio-tape the meetings with the Department, and was furious when he learned that Naguib hired a company to do so; (2) Simon promised that a person would impartially transcribe the meeting with the Department which was untrue; (3) Simon cordially communicated with Vold, who was a fraternity friend; (4) Simon relied on Vold's information which was completely false and unreliable; (5) Simon refused to disclose "AFFIDAVIT OF A CLINICAL DATA MANAGER AND A [SURGEON/DENTIST]" to the Department; (6) Simon sat during the meetings with the Department and did nothing; (7) Simon walked backwards and stared at Naguib in a strange manner while Naguib said good-bye to him; (8) Simon failed to refer Naguib to an experienced attorney; (9) Simon failed to adequately defend him against the Department's allegations; and (10) Simon initiated some "documented material" from Naguib's liability insurance.
Simon moves to dismiss Naguib's Complaint as merely containing confusing and conclusory allegations, which fail to give rise to any claim. Other than the fact that Simon cordially communicated with Vold, one of the Department's agents, Simon allegedly acted alone. Merely communicating with Vold is not enough to show a "meeting of the minds." See Ahmed, 124 F.3d 203, 1997 WL 471335, at *3; see also Copeland, 964 F. Supp. at 1235. Further, Naguib fails to allege that Simon acted with any person other than Vold, or to allege that Simon acted with any discriminatory animus. See Majeske, 94 F.3d at 311. Naguib's conclusory and speculative allegation that it was apparent to him that Simon joined the massive conspiracy is simply not enough. See Ahmed, 124 F.3d 203, 1997 WL 471335, at *3; Bombliss, 23 F.3d 410, 1994 WL 117910, at *3; Copeland, 964 F. Supp. at 1235; Thomas, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12210, 1997 WL 473917, at *2. Thus, because Naguib fails to state either a § 1983 or § 1985 claim against Simon, the court grants Simon's motion to dismiss.
The only remaining issue is whether Naguib's claims should be dismissed with prejudice. Although a pro-se litigant should be given every opportunity to state a claim cognizable in federal court, courts are not obligated to "provide a carte blanche for unlimited successive complaint amendments." Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204, 1208 (7th Cir. 1980). When it is apparent that further opportunities to amend the complaint is futile, the complaint's "adequacy to withstand a motion to dismiss should be determined as it stands." Id.; see also Garcia, 24 F.3d at 970 (The district court may deny plaintiff leave to amend if the amended complaint sought to be filed would be futile.)
In this case, Naguib has filed three amended complaints without alleging any facts to suggest the meeting of minds necessary to state a § 1983 or a § 1985 claim. See Ahmed, 124 F.3d 203, 1997 WL 471335, at *3 (citation omitted); see also Copeland, 964 F. Supp. at 1235. In order to state a § 1983 claim, Naguib is required to allege sufficient facts to show that each private individual conspired with the Department. See Vickery, 100 F.3d 1334 at 1343-44; Csoka, 94 F.3d 647, 1996 WL 467654, at *3; Starnes, 39 F.3d at 1397; see also Tarkowski, 644 F.2d at 1208 ("A private person does not conspire with a state official merely by invoking an exercise of the state official's authority."). Furthermore, under § 1985, Naguib is required to allege sufficient facts to show that two or more persons conspired, and that discriminatory animus was behind the conspirators' action. See Majeske, 94 F.3d at 311. Merely speculative or conclusory allegations of a massive conspiracy is not enough to state either a § 1983 or a § 1985 claim. See Ahmed, 124 F.3d 203, 1997 WL 471335, at *3; Bombliss, 23 F.3d 410, 1994 WL 117910, at *3; Copeland, 964 F. Supp. at 1235; Thomas, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12210, 1997 WL 473917, at *2.
Naguib has not given the court any reason to believe that he can state a cognizable claim in federal court. Thus, the court could dismiss all motions granted in the foregoing with prejudice. See Tarkowski, 644 F.2d at 1208; Garcia, 24 F.3d at 970. However, since Naguib is a pro-se litigant, the court grants the foregoing motions to dismiss without prejudice, unless explicitly stated otherwise. See Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1369; Donald, 95 F.3d at 555.
For the foregoing reasons, the court dismisses Naguib's Second Amended Complaint with prejudice against the following Defendants: (1) Zollar; (2) Benden; (3) Sirefman; (4) Lowery; (5) Reynolds; (6) Vold; (7) O'Sullivan; and (8) Hinsdale. Naguib's Second Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice against the following Defendants: (1) Glassford; (2) Nathan; (3) Zeck; (4) Beatty; (5) Pecaro; (6) Jeddeloh; and (7) Simon. Further, Naguib's § 1983 claim is dismissed without prejudice against Malnak.
Therefore, all that remains of Naguib's Second Amended Complaint is his § 1985 claim against Malnak, and his § 1983 and § 1985 claims against M. Sanders, S. Sanders, Choukas, Locker, and the State's Attorney's Office. If Malnak, M. Sanders, S. Sanders, Choukas, Locker, and the State's Attorney's Office intend to file a new motion to dismiss Naguib's Second Amended Complaint, they shall file their motions on or before December 15, 1997. If they file such motions, Naguib shall file his response to their motions on or before December 22, 1997, and Malnak, M. Sanders, S. Sanders, Choukas, Locker, and the State's Attorney's Office shall file their reply on or before December 30, 1997.
Finally, because most Defendants are dismissed without prejudice, Naguib may amend his Second Amended Complaint. However, since the court has set forth a briefing schedule for Malnak, M. Sanders, S. Sanders, Choukas, Locker, and the State's Attorney's Office to file a new motion to dismiss Naguib's Second Amended Complaint, Naguib should not amend his Second Amended Complaint until after the court has ruled on all forthcoming motions. Thus, if Naguib chooses to file another amended complaint, he shall do so no sooner than within 21 days after all matters are finally resolved with respect to his Second Amended Complaint. Before filing another amended complaint, Naguib is advised to carefully review this opinion, and proceed only if he has a good faith basis to do so.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court