The opinion of the court was delivered by: BUCKLO
The plaintiff, Donald Teall, filed suit against the defendant, the City of Chicago ("City"), under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Mr. Teall claims he was fired from his job in the Chicago Police Department due to his age. The City moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion is denied.
For twenty years, Mr. Teall was employed by the City of Chicago's Department of Streets and Sanitation. In the Summer of 1994, at age 46, Mr. Teall resigned from the Department of Streets and Sanitation to become a probationary police officer with the Chicago Police Department. After approximately six months of academic and firearm training, Mr. Teall began his field training in January, 1995, at the Sixteenth Police District. Field training consists of at least ten weeks of training as an active police officer on patrol. A probationary police officer ("PPO") is trained and evaluated by either a patrol specialist or other experienced officer. PPOs receive written evaluations, titled Probationary Police Officer Performance Evaluations ("PPOPE"), every two weeks beginning at the end of their fourth week of training. The PPOPE summarizes the performance of the PPO in eleven areas.
Mr. Teall was evaluated by three separate officers during his tenure as a probationary police officer. The first officer, Stephen Sodergren, evaluated Mr. Teall after his fourth and sixth weeks of training. Officer Sodergren's evaluations of Mr. Teall were poor. Mr. Teall blames these evaluations on Officer Sodergren's alleged age bias. According to Mr. Teall, Officer Sodergren constantly made comments indicating he thought Mr. Teall was taking a job away from younger individuals. Mr. Teall, feeling harassed by Officer Sodergren, requested a different training officer. Officer Leroy Ladendorf was assigned as Mr. Teall's training officer and completed an evaluation of Mr. Teall after his eighth week. Although Officer Ladendorf did not field qualify Mr. Teall, his PPOPE indicates Mr. Teall is intelligent and will make a good police officer.
Mr. Teall's fourth PPOPE was completed by Officer William Vick after ten weeks of field training. While Officer Vick also did not field qualify Mr. Teall, his PPOPE indicates Mr. Teall will be a good police officer with further training. At the end of his tenth week of training, the Sixteenth District Commander recommended additional field training for Mr. Teall. This training was supervised by Officer Ladendorf. According to Mr. Teall, at the end of his twelfth week of training, Officer Ladendorf informed him that he was field qualified. The numerical listing on Mr. Teall's fifth PPOPE indicated he was field qualified in some areas. Mr. Teall signed the PPOPE. Mr. Teall states that at the time he signed the PPOPE it did not include the final written page of comments currently attached, which indicates Mr. Teall needs further training.
Based upon a review of Mr. Teall's PPOPE forms and interviews with individuals in the Sixteenth District, Patrol Specialist Liaison Daniel Guiney recommended that Mr. Teall's performance be reviewed by the Field Evaluation Review Board. The Review Board consists of supervisors from the Training Division and Personnel Division, a patrol specialist, and a patrol specialist liaison. The Review Board make recommendations regarding a PPO as to whether further training is warranted, counseling is necessary, or termination is appropriate. In addition to looking at Mr. Teall's relevant written materials, the Review Board interviewed Officer Peter Wenger, a Sergeant in the Sixteenth District, Officer Sodergren, Officer Ladendorf, Officer Vick, and Mr. Teall. After listening to all of the testimony and reviewing all of the forms, the Review Board decided Mr. Teall should be separated from the Chicago Police Department. This recommendation was accepted by Superintendent Matt L. Rodriguez and Mr. Teall was discharged on June 21, 1995. This suit followed.
The City moves to strike portions of Mr. Teall's Rule 12(N) response, statement of additional facts, affidavits, and response memorandum. Local District Rule 12(N) requires a concise response to a movant's statement of facts including, in the case of denials, "specific references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon." The Seventh Circuit has upheld the strict application of Rule 12(N). Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1992). Part of Mr. Teall's Rule 12(N) statement is invalid since it includes mere denials without reference to supporting materials. Accordingly, paragraphs 57, 58, 59, 67, 68, 76f, 80g, 80i, 80q, and 103 will be struck and the information in the City's Rule 12(M) statement is deemed admitted.
The City moves to strike other portions of Mr. Teall's Rule 12(N) response as either unsupported by the evidence cited or argumentative. In many of the paragraphs the City finds objectionable, Mr. Teall admits particular comments were made, but denies their truth. This is not an improper response to a Rule 12(M) statement of facts. Still, some of Mr. Teall's responses are argumentative. Arguments should be reserved for memoranda. Accordingly, the argumentative material in response paragraphs 5, 20, 28, 31, 32, 52, 65, and 66 will be struck. The City also argues that Mr. Teall's Rule 12(N) statement of additional facts and corresponding affidavits includes inadmissible hearsay statements. However, the substantive statement the City finds objectionable is admissible as an admission of a party's agent, and thus, is proper. Whether Mr. Teall's statement to his wife is admissible under another exception to the hearsay rule need not be determined at this point.
Finally, the City moves to strike portions of Mr. Teall's response brief because Mr. Teall cites to direct references to deposition transcripts and exhibits instead of citing to his Rule 12(N) statement. I do not believe this indiscretion warrants the City's request to strike numerous portions of Mr. Teall's memorandum. Accordingly, it is denied.
Mr. Teall, in his response to the City's motion for summary judgment, raises for the first time a claim that the City created a hostile working environment in violation of the ADEA. Mr. Teall did not raise this claim in his complaint and has not amended his complaint to include a hostile work environment claim. He also did not include a hostile work environment claim in his EEOC complaint. (Def. 12(M) Reply, Ex. 8). It is well settled in the Seventh Circuit that a plaintiff cannot amend his complaint with a later filed brief. Auston v. Schubnell, 116 F.3d 251, 255 (7th Cir. 1997); ...