Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable Sidney A. Jones, III and Wayne D. Rhine, Judges Presiding.
Released for Publication December 5, 1997.
Presiding Justice Hartman delivered the opinion of the court. Hoffman and South, JJ., concur.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hartman
PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant Dilaram Sharma appeals the circuit court's orders requiring the parties to participate in a second mandatory arbitration hearing, barring Sharma from rejecting the second arbitration award, and entering judgment in favor of plaintiff, Bernard Akpan. For reasons which follow, we reverse and remand.
Akpan sued Sharma after the car he was driving on November 1, 1992, was struck by a car owned and operated by Sharma, causing his injuries and damages. Akpan filed suit against Sharma two months later, on January 8, 1993. Sharma filed his answer, affirmative defense, production requests, interrogatories, and notice of deposition on February 4, 1993. The written discovery was to be completed within 28 days. Two Supreme Court Rule 201(k) (143 Ill. 2d R. 201(k)) requests were made by Sharma; Akpan failed to respond. In an order dated May 3, 1993 (May 3 order), the circuit court ordered Akpan to comply with the discovery requests within 14 days, or "be barred from testifying at trial or arbitration." Akpan failed to comply with the May 3 order. In addition, according to an affidavit contained in the record, Akpan twice failed to appear for his deposition, the first of which was scheduled for June 2, 1993, and the second July 22, 1993.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to arbitration. Both parties personally appeared at the hearing, held on October 21, 1993. Although Akpan was awarded $2,300, he did not testify pursuant to the May 3 order barring him from doing so. Sharma subsequently rejected the award, and the case was scheduled for trial on four different dates: June 10, 1994; November 7, 1994; March 13, 1995; and January 11, 1996. Two and one-half years after entry of the May 3 order, on October 12, 1995, during the period the case was being set and reset for trial, Akpan sought to have the May 3 order reconsidered. Akpan ignored his own notices for hearing on his reconsideration motion three times; it was stricken twice and reset for hearing a third time in Akpan's absence. Finally, on December 14, 1995, Akpan's counsel claimed they could not comply with the May 3 order because Akpan moved during that time without giving counsel his new address and telephone number. Akpan filed this latter motion before a judge different than the one that issued the May 3 order. Although the record does not contain the order resolving this motion, the court apparently granted the motion because it then scheduled a second arbitration hearing, and enabled Akpan to testify. On February 23, 1996, the second arbitration hearing was held. Sharma's attorney attended the hearing on his behalf. The arbitrators entered an award in favor of Akpan in the amount of $3,500.
Akpan moved for judgment in his favor in the amount of the second arbitration award, arguing that Sharma should be barred from rejecting the award because he did not appear personally at the second arbitration proceeding. The basis for this contention was that Akpan served Sharma with a Supreme Court Rule 237 notice to be present at the first arbitration, with which he complied. Nothing in the record, however, shows that any order was sought by Akpan or entered by the circuit court to have the previous notice stand for the second arbitration hearing or that a subsequent notice was ever filed. The court denied Sharma's request for time to file a written response to the motion, granted Akpan's motion, and entered judgment in favor of Akpan in the amount of $3,500. Sharma unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration of the order and judgment. He appeals.
Sharma first asserts that the circuit court was not authorized to order the second arbitration hearing. The record does not contain this order, now allowing Akpan to testify, nor is any reason shown for effectuating this change. Although it is the duty of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review by the appellate court, if the record provided is sufficient to disclose any errors of which the appellant complains, and the issues can be resolved on the record as it stands, the propriety of the circuit court's order can be considered on appeal. Landau & Associates, P.C. v. Kennedy, 262 Ill. App. 3d 89, 92, 634 N.E.2d 373, 199 Ill. Dec. 534 (1994). Here, the record contains the arbitration panels' decisions from both proceedings, and provides other documentation in the record sufficient for review.
The Supreme Court Rules relating to mandatory arbitration were promulgated pursuant to section 2-1001A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1001A (West 1994). The introductory comments to these Rules (134 Ill. 2d Rs. 86, 87, Introductory Comments) explain that such proceedings are intended to provide a "feasible vehicle for an early, economical, and fair resolution of monetary disputes." Moreover, the committee comments to Rule 86 (155 Ill. 2d R. 86, Committee Comments) state that when parties use arbitration proceedings to resolve some civil disputes, "considerable cost savings could be achieved if such matters could be resolved at a two or three hour hearing as compared to a two- or three-day trial to a jury." Rule 86(e) also makes applicable the Code of Civil Procedure and the rules of the Supreme Court to arbitration proceedings. 155 Ill. 2d R. 86(e).
Rule 89 authorizes discovery in arbitration cases in accordance with established rules which "shall be completed prior to the hearing in arbitration," and shall comport with the requirements of Rule 222. 143 Ill. 2d R. 89. Rule 222(a) makes the provisions of that rule applicable to mandatory arbitration proceedings. 155 Ill. 2d R. 222(a). Rule 219 sets forth the authority of the circuit court to enter sanctions for failure to comply with the rules or orders relating to discovery. 143 Ill. 2d R. 219.
Rule 92 (155 Ill. 2d R. 92) provides that at the close of the arbitration hearing, the panel presiding over the hearing shall issue an award and "dispose of all claims for relief." Under Rule 93 (145 Ill. 2d R. 93), any party present at the arbitration hearing, either in person or through counsel, may file a written notice of rejection of the award and request that the case proceed to trial.
These rules were modelled, in part, on compulsory arbitration laws enacted in the state of Pennsylvania. 134 Ill. 2d at 88-90. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may challenge an arbitration award by filing a notice of appeal to the trial court. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. R. 1308 (1994). Under the Pennsylvania Rules, "if any party is dissatisfied with any aspect of the award, the sole remedy is an appeal for a trial de novo." 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. R. 1307, Explanatory Note (1994). A rules committee note to Rule 1308 (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. R. 1308, Rules Committee Note (1994)) states that previously, parties could also petition to set aside an arbitration award in specific circumstances, but an amendment to Rule 1308 eliminated that procedure, because a "trial de novo is preferable since it expedites the proceedings," and "hearings or depositions on the petition proceedings could delay the proceedings."
Two Pennsylvania decisions interpreting the mandatory arbitration rules reinforced the principle that the only way to attack an arbitration award is to appeal the award and request a trial. Lough v. Spring, 383 Pa. Super. 85, 556 A.2d 441 (1989); Wilk v. Girard Bank, 342 Pa. Super. 488, 493 A.2d 695 (1985). In Lough, plaintiffs moved to strike an arbitration award, intending to seek a second arbitration hearing. The court determined that this motion did not comply with stated procedures for appealing a compulsory arbitration award, explaining that plaintiffs should have requested a trial instead of a second hearing. Lough, 556 A.2d at 442. ...