was deprived of any protected liberty interest.
Evans alleges that as a result of defendants' conduct, Evans spent 218 days in segregation. In order for an inmate's placement into segregation to constitute deprivation of a protected liberty interest, placement into segregation must impose an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" or "work a major disruption in his environment." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see Bryan v. Duckworth, 88 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1996). To determine whether placement into segregation worked an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate, the court must compare the conditions of segregation to the conditions on the prison's general population and balance the difference in the conditions against the amount of time spent in segregation. See Bryan, 88 F.3d at 433; Terrell v. Godinez, 966 F. Supp. 679, 682 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
In the present case, Evans has simply alleged that he spent 218 days in segregation. Evans has not alleged that the conditions in segregation were atypically or significantly harsher than the conditions imposed on the prison's general population. Further, there are no other allegations from which the court can infer that such a discrepancy existed. Evans' allegations that he was forced to go to visits in cuffs and chains, was subjected to racial abuse, had bodily fluid thrown on him, and suffered mental stress that forced him to attempt suicide do not establish that the conditions were significantly more harsh in segregation than in the general prison population.
Similarly, Evans allegations that he missed a transfer to Illinois River Correctional Center, was put with the general population even though he was listed on protective custody, and was placed on a gallery with no one of the same race as him do not establish that the conditions imposed in segregation were atypical or significantly harsher. Further, as case law establishes, no inmate has a protected liberty interest in being confined in a specific prison or even a specific part of a certain prison. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-85, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995); Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 274 (7th Cir. 1996); Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 308 (7th Cir. 1988).
Finally, none of the alleged harms catalogued by Evans are in and of themselves a protected liberty interest. There is no indication that any of these harms either (1) exceeded Evans' sentence in such an unexpected manner that it gives rise to the Due Process Clause protection of its own force or (2) imposed an atypical and significant hardship on Evans in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Evans' "catalogue of harms [does not] exceed[ ] what one could expect from prison life generally." Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246, 1249 (7th Cir. 1995).
Thus, the court finds that Evans has not sufficiently pled that his placement into segregation constituted a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. However, because Evans may be able to amend his complaint by adding specific allegations that would show that his placement into segregation imposed atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, the court dismisses without prejudice Evans' complaint.
2. Whether Evans was deprived of the protections of due process
In addition to alleging that he had a protected liberty interest, Evans must allege that he was deprived that liberty interest without due process of law. There are two distinct allegations which Evans might argue violated the protections afforded him under due process. These are: (1) that Hunt lied about where the contraband was found and (2) that Allen violated Evans' right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing.
a. Hunt's alleged lie about where the contraband was found
Evans might be alleging that Hunt violated his right to due process by lying about where the contraband was found. However, the filing of false charges alone does not state a claim for violation of an inmate's right to due process. See Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1402 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). Evans simply alleges that Hunt lied about where the contraband was found. Evans does not allege that Hunt lied in retaliation against Evans for having exercised some constitutional right. See Black, 22 F.3d at 1402. Further, Evans does not allege that Allen or anyone else involved in disciplining Evans knew that the charges were false. From the complaint, it appears that Evans was provided a hearing and the opportunity to rebut the charges against him. Thus, the fact that Hunt allegedly lied about where the contraband was found, standing alone, does not give rise to a claim for violation of Evans' right to due process.
Based on the above, the court finds that Evans' complaint does not state a section 1983 claim insofar as it is based only on Hunt's alleged lie. However, in deference to Evans as a pro se litigant, the court will grant Evans leave to amend his complaint in case he can state sufficient facts that would give rise to a due process claim based on Hunt's conduct. Therefore, the court dismisses without prejudice Evans' section 1983 claim insofar as the claim is based only on Hunt's alleged lie.
b. The alleged violation of Evans' due process right to call witnesses
Evans might also be alleging that his due process rights were violated at his disciplinary hearing. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a prisoner be afforded certain minimum procedures in his disciplinary hearing. Black, 22 F.3d at 1402. A prisoner facing a disciplinary hearing is entitled to (1) written notice of the charge against him at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; (2) the right to call witnesses and to present documentary evidence, when to do so will not unduly jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; (3) a written statement of reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (4) the right to appear in person before an impartial hearing body. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1973); Black, 22 F.3d at 1402 n.9. Further, the Due Process Clause also requires that the disciplinary decision be supported by some evidence. Black, 22 F.3d at 1402.
The complaint alleges that Allen refused to call Evans' witnesses at meeting between Allen and Evans. Essentially, it appears that Evans is arguing that his procedural due process rights were violated because Evans was not permitted to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing. Defendants contend that Evans fails to state a cause of action as to denial of his request to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing because Evans made no allegations that the request for witnesses was made in advance of the hearing. (Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter "Defs.' Memo.") at 4.)
The right of an inmate to call a witness at his disciplinary hearing is qualified. Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716, 720 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that the right of an inmate to call witnesses does not entitle a prisoner to wait until the day of his hearing to request to call witnesses. Id. at 719-720. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit has stated:
Prison officials need leeway in operating their institutions in an orderly fashion. An inmate's day-of-hearing request to call witnesses may be a delay tactic ...; it may raise the level of confrontations between the prison staff and the inmate and thereby undermine prison officials' authority; and it may disrupt the institution's disciplinary process and hinder its rehabilitative function. These risks are inherent in day-of-hearing requests, and prison officials are justified in summarily denying such requests.