The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard Mills, District Judge:
"Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in
his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to
commit perjury." Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
225, 91 S.Ct. 643, 645, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971).
In a previous Order, the Court stated that it would reserve ruling on
the issue of whether the Government could use the tape recorded
conversations between Defendant Michael R. Martin and Curtis Fleming for
impeachment purposes until it had been determined that Defendant would
testify on his own behalf. Defendant has now indicated that he will, in
fact, testify on his own behalf. Furthermore, the Government has
indicated that if Defendant's testimony differs from the statements which
he made to Fleming, it intends to introduce the recorded conversations
for impeachment purposes. Accordingly, this issue is now ripe for the
Defendant argues that the Government should not be allowed to use the
tape recorded conversations for impeachment purposes because said
statements were deliberately elicited by the Government in violation of
his Sixth Amendment rights. Defendant asserts that the Government, by
sending Fleming to secretly tape record conversations with him, violated
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Moreover, Defendant claims that the
statements which he made to Fleming were in no way voluntary and,
therefore, cannot be used for impeachment purposes. Defendant asserts
that without a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel which he had
asserted, the use of the tape recorded conversations is impermissible.
Accordingly, Defendant asks the Court to bar the use of the recorded
statements as impeachment material.
The Government argues that the statements were recorded as a result of
a legitimate investigation of Defendant's alleged attempts to obstruct
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and 1512. Although
Defendant's statements could not be used in the Government's
case-in-chief,*fn2 the Government asserts that the statements can be
used for impeachment purposes. The Government claims that Defendant's
statements were voluntarily made and that Defendant should not be able to
hide behind the allegation that the Government illegally elicited his
statements in order to testify untruthfully.*fn3 Accordingly, the
Government asks the Court to deny Defendant Martin's motion.
The key inquiry with respect to the admission of inculpatory statements
for the limited purpose of impeachment is the question of whether the
statements were voluntary and not coerced. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
722, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1220-21, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); United States
ex rel. Adkins v. Greer, 791 F.2d 590, 596 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding
that the key inquiry with respect to the admission of inculpatory
statements as impeachment is the issue of voluntariness). Voluntary
statements are admissible under some circumstances. E.g., Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) (holding
Miranda does not prohibit the use of a defendant's voluntary
statements). However, involuntary statements are not admissible for
any purpose. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292,
1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398, 98
S.Ct. 2408, 2416-17, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978).
"A confession will be found to be voluntary only if the government can
demonstrate that, under the totality of the circumstances and by a
preponderance of the evidence, it was not secured by the government
through psychological or physical intimidation, but rather was the
product of a rational intellect and free will." United States v. D.F.,
115 F.3d 413, 419 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Montgomery,
14 F.3d 1189, 1194 (7th Cir. 1994). Some sort of Governmental coercion is
necessary in order to find that confession is not voluntary. Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 107 S.Ct. 515, 521-22, 93 L.Ed.2d 473
(1986); United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 946 (7th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, there must be an "essential link between coercive activity
of the State, on the one hand, and a resulting confession by a
defendant, on the other." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165, 107 S.Ct. at 521;
D.F., 115 F.3d at 419.
In the "instant case, the Court finds that Defendant's statements were
voluntary. Fleming recorded four separate telephone conversations with
Defendant. of those conversations, Defendant initiated three of them.*fn4
Furthermore, there is no evidence on the tape to indicate that Fleming,
on behalf of the Government, coerced Defendant into making any
statements. Defendant was not under duress, physical intimidation, or
psychological intimidation by the Government when he made the statements
at issue. Accordingly, the Court finds that under the totality of the
circumstances, Defendant's statements were the product of his rational
intellect and free will.
However, the Court's inquiry does not end here. Defendant also argues
that when Fleming tape recorded his conversations for the Government, he
"deliberately elicited" incriminating statements from him in violation of
his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,
173-74, 106 S.Ct. 477, 485-86, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985);
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2186-
87, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206,
84 S.Ct. 1199, 1203, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Defendant asserts that even
though the Government knew that his right to counsel had attached, the
Government, through Fleming, initiated an interrogation without the
presence of his counsel. Therefore, because the Government violated his
"core constitutional right," Defendant states that the Government should
be barred from using his statements for impeachment purposes.
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence." U.S., Const Amend. VI. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated
that the essence of the right to counsel is the opportunity to consult
with an attorney and to have an attorney prepare a defense for trial.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) A
defendant's attorney is to be a "medium" between him and the Government.
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. at 487. "For the fruits of
postindictment interrogations to be admissible in a prosecution's case in
chief, the State must prove a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
relinquishment of the Sixth Amendment right ...