plaintiffs here, an amount equivalent to the security deposit at the lease's termination. It does not pay any interest on the amount. Defendant carries the amount as a liability on its books, and does not profit directly from the security deposits. Arguably, though, the discount in the amount of the security deposit has an indirect effect on defendant's cash and borrowing position. Defendant has posted a $ 10,000 bond with the Illinois Attorney General's office, as required under CDSA. 815 ILCS 165/1 et seq.
B. Parties' Position
Plaintiffs' complaint is, essentially, that the defendant was required to invest the security deposits in an interest bearing account and then remit the interest earned to plaintiffs at the end of the lease. Plaintiffs trace this requirement to Illinois' UCC and the CSDA. Defendants argue that neither of these provisions applies to obligate them to earn and remit interest on security deposits.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and the admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court does not evaluate the weight of the evidence to determine the truth of a matter, but instead determines whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact as to the matter. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A summary judgment proceeding is not a vehicle for the resolution of factual disputes. Id. at 249-50, 106 S. Ct. at 2511. Neither may the court assume the role of advocate for one side or the other, scouring the record for evidence to support their positions. Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d 1104, 1116 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994); Tatalovich v. City of Superior, 904 F.2d 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing Herman v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989)).
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). If there is a doubt as to the existence of a material fact, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party and summary judgment should be denied. Doe v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). Conversely, summary judgment must be entered against a party who fails to show that the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. The nonmoving party must do more than demonstrate some "metaphysical doubt" as to the existence of a material fact, and a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position will be insufficient. Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). With these concepts in mind, we address the parties' positions in this case.
A. UCC Section 9-207
Plaintiffs bring Count I of their complaint under Section 9-207(2)(c) of Illinois' UCC. The threshold issue the parties present is whether Illinois' UCC applies to security deposits on automobile leases. Section 9-102(1) of the UCC state that it "applies to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures." 810 ILCS 5/9-102(1)(a). The UCC defines a security interest as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." 810 ILCS 5/1-201(37). Plaintiffs argue that their automobile leases are "transactions" in which they deposited money to secure payment of the amounts due under their leases. (Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition, at 4-5). They base their claims on the theory that their security deposits are "security interests," and therefore "collateral" under the UCC. (Id. at 5). As collateral, Plaintiffs argue that the deposits would be subject to section 9-207 of the UCC. That section provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Unless otherwise agreed, when collateral is in the secured party's possession
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