United States District Court, Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division
April 16, 1997
HAROLD B. SMITH, DALLAS C. INGEMUNSON, AL JOURDAN AND THE ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN PARTY, PLAINTIFFS,
KENNETH R. BOYLE, HANNELORE HUISMAN, JUDITH A. JONES, MITCHELL P. KOBELINSKI, DAVID E. MURRAY, LANGDON D. NEAL, THERESA M. PETRONE, WANDA L. REDNOUR, ONLY IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS MEMBERS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, AND GEORGE H. RYAN, ONLY IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, DEFENDANTS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard Mills, District Judge:
In the main, federal courts should stay out of political
matters. Federal judges have no business meddling in uniquely
state questions unless those issues are in direct conflict
with the United States Constitution.
In 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court held that to redress
legislative action, "the people must resort to the polls, not
to the courts."*fn1
The bottom line: This Court concludes that the redistricting
claim here is a nonjusticiable political question that must be
left to the legislative and judicial branches of the State of
In 1970, an Illinois Constitutional Convention convened and
formulated a new state constitution.*fn2 On December 15,
1970, Illinois' electorate ratified this new constitution, and
it became effective on July 1, 1971. Therein, sections 2 and
3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution provide:
§ 2 Judicial Districts
The State is divided into five Judicial
Districts for the selection of Supreme and
Appellate Court Judges. The First Judicial
District consists of Cook County. The remainder
of the State shall be divided by law into four
Judicial Districts of substantially equal
population, each of which shall be compact and
composed of contiguous counties.
§ 3 Supreme Court — Organization
The Supreme Court shall consist of seven
Judges. Three shall be selected from the First
Judicial District and one from each of the other
Judicial Districts. . . .
So went the elections of Illinois' Supreme Court Justices
until the beginning of this year.*fn3
In January, the
Illinois General Assembly
passed Senate Bill 875 entitled "the Judicial Redistricting
Act of 1997". Although under the bill, Cook County still
comprises the entire First Judicial District, the bill
subdivides the First Judicial District into three separate
subdistricts (1A, 1B, and 1C) with each subdistrict to elect
one Supreme Court Justice. On April 7, 1997, the Governor
signed Senate Bill 875 into law.
In this action, the Republican Party argues that sections 2
and 3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution violate the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically,
it claims that said sections violate the Equal Protection
Clause. The Republican Party states that since 1970, no
Republican nominee has ever won an election to the office of
Illinois Supreme Court Justice in the First Judicial District,
and it blames this result on the at-large, multi-member
election scheme employed in the First Judicial District.
Furthermore, the Republican Party argues that if the First
Judicial District were subdivided into three separate
subdistricts, its voting strength would be sufficient to elect
a candidate from at least one of the three subdistricts. It
asserts that the at-large, multi-member method of electing
Illinois Supreme Court Justices impermissibly discriminates
against Cook County Republican voters. The Republican Party
claims that due to the at-large, multi-member election system,
its voting strength has been impermissibly diluted in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, the Complaint asks the Court to declare that
sections 2 and 3 of article VI of the Illinois Constitution
violate the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.
Defendants are the individual members of the Illinois State
Board of Elections, the Illinois State Board of Elections as
an entity, and Secretary of State George Ryan, in his official
capacity, who is responsible for certifying the candidates for
the position of Illinois Supreme Court Justice. Defendants
offer four arguments as to why the Complaint should be
dismissed. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Ingemunson
and Jourdan do not have standing to bring this suit. Second,
Defendants assert that the Illinois State Board of Elections
enjoys immunity from this suit under the Eleventh Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution. Third, Defendants state that
Plaintiffs' claim is nonjusticiable. Finally, Defendants claim
that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a
claim of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Defendants argue that
Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept
well pleaded allegations of the complaint as true. In
addition, the Court must view these allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff." Gomez v. Illinois State Bd.
of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). Although a
complaint is not required to contain a detailed outline of the
claim's basis, it nevertheless "must contain either direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal
theory." Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101,
1106 (7th Cir. 1984). Mere conclusions, without supporting
factual allegations, are insufficient to support a claim for
relief. Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663
(7th Cir. 1978). Dismissal should not be granted "unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99,
102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Before a federal court can consider a cause of action, a
plaintiff must establish that he or she has standing to sue.
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149
, 153, 110 S.Ct. 1717,
1721-22, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990); Doe v.
County of Montgomery, Illinois, 41 F.3d 1156
, 1159 (7th Cir.
1994). In order for a plaintiff to have standing, as an
irreducible constitutional minimum:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an
"injury in fact" — an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) "actual" or "imminent" not
"conjectural" or "hypothetical." Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the
conduct complained of — the injury has to be
"fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of]
the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as
opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury
will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
, 560-61, 112 S.Ct.
2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations and footnote
omitted); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464
, 471-72, 102
S.Ct. 752, 757-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); Sanner v. Bd. of
Trade of City of Chicago, 62 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1995).
In the instant case, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs
Ingemunson and Jourdan lack standing to sue because they have
not alleged an injury to themselves, and the Court agrees.
Nowhere in their Complaint do Ingemunson or Jourdan allege
that they have suffered anything more than a generalized
injury as a result of Illinois' at-large, multi-member
election system in the First Judicial District. A would-be
plaintiff must base his or her standing on something more than
a generalized injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576, 112 S.Ct. at
2144-45; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 160, 110 S.Ct. at 1725-26; Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205-06, 45
L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Family & Children's Ctr., Inc. v. School
City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir. 1994).
In United States v. Hays, ___ U.S ___, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132
L.Ed.2d 635 (1995), the U.S. Supreme Court held that plaintiffs
who did not live in the district which was the alleged subject
of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering did not have standing
to sue. Id. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2436. The U.S. Supreme Court
opined that because the plaintiffs did not live in the
district, they had not suffered an injury in fact. Here,
according to the Illinois State Bar Association's amicus curie
brief, neither Ingemunson nor Jourdan reside in Cook County.
Therefore, because both Ingemunson and Jourdan have alleged
only a generalized injury rather than an injury in fact, the
Court finds that they lack standing to bring this suit.
However, Plaintiff Harold B. Smith does have standing to
sue.*fn4 In contrast to Ingemunson and Jourdan, Smith resides
in Cook County. Smith is also the Chairman of the Illinois
Republican Party. Thus, pursuant to Hays, Smith has suffered an
injury in fact and not simply a generalized injury. Second,
Smith's injury is fairly traceable to Defendants' challenged
conduct. Finally, if Smith is victorious in this case, his
injury is likely to be redressed. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Smith has met the three irreducible constitutional
minimums set forth in Lujan, and therefore, Smith has standing
to bring the present suit.*fn5
Likewise, the Illinois Republican Party has standing to
bring this suit. The Illinois Republican Party is a
statutorily recognized political party. See 10 ILCS 5/10-2
(1996). "[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf
of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have
standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interest it seeks
to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97
S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977); Northeastern Florida
Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, Florida, 508 U.S. 656, 666-67, 113 S.Ct. 2297,
2303-04, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993).
As discussed above, the Illinois Republican Party's members
in Cook County would have standing to sue. Second, the
Illinois Republican Party's purpose is to elect their
candidates to office; therefore, the interest which it seeks
to protect is germane to the organization's purpose. Finally,
the claim asserted by the Illinois Republican Party does not
require the participation of the individual members.
Accordingly, because the Illinois Republican Party is an
identifiable group and has met the standards set forth in
Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 991 F.2d 1202 (4th
Cir. 1993), the Court finds that it has associational standing.
See Republican Party of North Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943,
956 n. 23 (4th Cir. 1992); Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30, 56, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 2769, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986); Cf. Davis
v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2810, 92
L.Ed.2d 85 (1986).
B. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution "prohibits
federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties
against States and their agencies." Alabama v. Pugh,
438 U.S. 781, 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978). "This
jurisdictional bar applies regardless of the nature of the
relief sought." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67
(1984)(emphasis added). Thus, Plaintiffs' argument that the
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to the case at bar because
they are seeking injunctive, rather than monetary, relief is
not persuasive. The Illinois State Board of Elections is an
agency of the State of Illinois,*fn6 and therefore, it is
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has held that the proper defendants to a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an election statute are
the individual members of the Illinois State Board of
Elections and not the Board as an entity. Stevenson v. State
Bd. of Elections, 794 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Gleason v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 792 F.2d 76, 79
(7th Cir. 1986); but see Donohue v. Bd. of Elections of State
of New York, 435 F. Supp. 957, 964 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Accordingly,
Plaintiffs' suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Like all courts before us which have considered the issue of
whether a claim is a nonjusticiable political question, we
begin our analysis with Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
, 82 S.Ct.
691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). In Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court
established that the political question doctrine applies to
those matters involving:
a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to coordinate political
department; or lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. Since its holding in Baker, the
U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that racial gerrymandering
presents a justiciable issue under the Equal Protection
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has also affirmed
lower court decisions which have held that purely political
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.*fn8
In the instant case, the Court has been asked to determine
whether the at-large, multi-member election system employed by
Illinois to elect its Supreme Court Justices violates the
Equal Protection Clause. Three U.S. Supreme Court cases shed
considerable light upon that issue.
First, in Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095, 93 S.Ct. 904, 34
L.Ed.2d 679 (1973) summarily aff'g 347 F. Supp. 453 (M.D.La.
1972), the U.S. Supreme Court established that the one person,
one vote principle*fn9 does not apply to the judicial branch.
Second, in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 92
L.Ed.2d 85 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a claim
based upon political gerrymandering in state legislative
elections, like racial gerrymandering, is a justiciable claim
under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, in Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 111 S.Ct. 2354, 115 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991),
the U.S. Supreme Court found that judicial elections are
covered under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended.
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs rely heavily upon
Bandemer and attempt to distinguish Wells. Plaintiffs argue
that Wells is inapposite here because their claim is not based
upon the concept of one person, one vote; rather, their claim
is premised upon a claim of vote dilution. However, the Court
fails to see how a claim of vote dilution can be divorced from
the one person, one vote concept. The Court concurs with
Justice Scalia's statements in his dissent in Chisom:
And it so happens — more than coincidentally, I
think — that in every case in which, prior to the
amendment of § 2, we recognized the possibility of
a vote dilution claim, the principle of "one
person, one vote" was applicable. Indeed, it is the
principle of "one person, one vote" that gives
meaning to the concept of "dilution." . . . "[O]ne
person, one vote" has been the premise and the
necessary condition of a vote dilution claim, since
it establishes the baseline for computing the
voting strength that the minority bloc ought to
have. . . . If Congress was (through use of the
extremely inapt word "representatives") making vote
dilution claims available with respect to the
election of judges, it was, for the first time,
extending that remedy to a context in which "one
person, one vote" did not apply. . . . I frankly
find it very difficult to conceive how it is to be
determined whether "dilution" has occurred, once
one has eliminated both the requirement of actual
intent to disfavor, minorities, and the principle
that 10,000 nonminority votes throughout the State
should have as much practical "electability" effect
as 10,000 nonminority votes. . . . But my point is
that "one person, one vote" is inherent in the
normal concept of "vote dilution," and was
an essential element of the pre-existing,
judicially crafted definition under § 2. . . .
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 414-15, 111 S.Ct. at 2374-75 (Scalia, J.
dissenting). Thus, the Court finds it logically inconsistent to
say that having one's vote denied equal weight to that of all
other voters is a nonjusticiable constitutional claim while at
the same time saying that having a political group's voting
power diluted by political gerrymandering is a justiciable
Furthermore, Bandemer dealt with the election of state
legislators. Thus, in our opinion, Bandemer created a narrow
exception for the election of state legislators which if
extended to the judiciary would likely open Pandora's box.
While judicial officers, either by convenience or necessity,
may perform some administrative and legislative functions, a
judge's duties are vastly different from that of a legislator.
Legislators represent the people; judges represent and uphold
the law.*fn10 Chisom, 501 U.S. at 411, 111 S.Ct. at 2372
(Scalia, J. dissenting). Thus, the Court finds that Bandemer is
distinguishable from the case at bar because Bandemer involved
the election of state legislators while the case at bar
involves the election of state judicial officers.
In the only case decided subsequent to Bandemer which deals
with a claim of vote dilution brought by a political party in a
state judicial election, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth District held that such a claim was justiciable
under the Equal Protection Clause. Republican Party of North
Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1992). Subsequently,
the defendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc. The
Fourth Circuit denied that petition but not without a scathing
dissent. In comparing the two views, the Court finds that Judge
Phillips' dissent from the denial of the rehearing en banc is
the better reasoned of the two opinions.
To our view, Bandemer limits the justiciability of political
gerrymandering claims to the election of legislative officials.
See Republican Party of North Carolina v. Hunt, 991 F.2d 1202,
1204 (4th Cir. 1993) (Phillips, J. dissenting). In both
Bandemer and Chisom, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed Wells
without overturning it. Therefore, it is clear and established
law that the one person, one vote principle is not applicable
to judicial elections. Wells, 409 U.S. at 1095, 93 S.Ct. at
904; Hunt, 991 F.2d at 1204 (Phillips, J. dissenting). It is
our interpretation that "the Bandemer holding . . . is limited
by its rationale, by its tone, and by the precedent upon which
it relies, to claims respecting legislative elections." Id. at
Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in
Chisom took pains to disclaim any relevance of the broad
analysis employed under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to
the more narrow analysis used under the Equal Protection
Clause. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 390, 111 S.Ct. at 2361. A proper
reading of Wells, Bandemer, and Chisom reveals that the only
group voting rights claims which are justiciable are those
based upon race or color and those brought by political parties
regarding gerrymandering claims in legislative elections. These
cases stretch the concept of justiciability to its ends, and
therefore, we decline to extend it any farther.
Furthermore, the Court can think of no better example than
the instant case in which to invoke the "political question
doctrine." For purposes of the case at bar, two of the factors
in Baker leap from the page: (1) lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards and (2) the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly reserved for nonjudicial discretion. Baker, 369 U.S. at
217, 82 S.Ct. at 710. The Court fails to see how the federal
can establish any sort of manageable standards for resolving
claims of vote dilution brought by political parties pursuant
to the election of state judges.*fn11
Simply put, it is a quagmire. Three separate U.S. Supreme
Court Justices recognized and warned the U.S. Supreme Court
against entering into this "thickest of thickets."*fn12 The
Seventh Circuit recognized the folly in the "prospect of
judicial management of a process that is necessarily
political." La Porte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of County of La Porte, 43 F.3d 1126, 1130 (7th Cir.
1994). There, the Seventh Circuit opined:
Attempting to banish thoughts of political
advantage from the minds of incumbents would (if
taken seriously) move all redistricting to the
judiciary, where mortals wearing robes would
indulge their own political views to some extent
no matter how hard they sought to put such
matters out of mind. No wonder the Court has
insisted that political decisions be left in the
main to the political (elected) branches of
government rather than to the judiciary, even
when the political decisions affect elections.
Id. (citations omitted). Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's
views expressed in Martin, the federal judiciary is by no means
well-suited to establish manageable standards with which to
decide political gerrymandering cases for judicial elections.
Moreover, how can one say that a federal court can determine
the constituency of a state's supreme court based upon a claim
of political gerrymandering without first making a policy
determination of the kind clearly left for nonjudicial
discretion? E.g. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct.
2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). The Court would be hard pressed to
find a stopping point if justiciability is extended to include
vote dilution claims by political parties in judicial
elections. It appears to the Court that involvement in the
apportionment of districts at the behest of one political party
(and obviously to the detriment of another political party)
would undoubtedly involve the Court's involvement in future
requests to examine district lines by a second, a third, or
perhaps numerous political parties. It is not for the Court to
decide which political party should be in power during any
given election year.
Finally, concerns of federalism and separation of powers
call upon the Court to find that Plaintiffs' claim is
nonjusticiable. "[F]ederalism and the slim judicial competence
to draw district lines weigh heavily against judicial
intervention in apportionment decisions; as a rule, the task
should remain within the domain of state legislatures."
Miller v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 2475, 2500, 132
L.Ed.2d 762 (1995) (Ginsburg, J. concurring). As Justice Thomas
Principles of federalism and separation of powers
impose stringent limitations on the equitable
power of federal courts. When these principles
are accorded their proper respect, Article III
cannot be understood to authorize the federal
judiciary to take control of core state
institutions like prisons, schools, and
hospitals, and assume responsibility for making
the difficult policy judgments that state
officials are both constitutionally entitled and
uniquely qualified to make.
Lewis v. Casey, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2197, 135
L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (Thomas, J. concurring). Accordingly, if
federalism dictates that a federal court should abstain from
seizing control of prisons, schools, and hospitals, how much
more should federalism mandate that we abstain
from telling Illinois how it can elect its Supreme Court
Unquestionably, the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of
the land,*fn13 and all statutes, regulations, and even state
constitutional provisions which conflict with it should be
struck down. However, the constituency of a state's judiciary
is a "decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign
entity." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct.
2395, 2400, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). We find Justice O'Connor's
remarks in Gregory to be controlling on the issue sub judice:
The present case concerns a state constitutional
provision through which the people of Missouri
establish a qualification for those who sit as
their judges. This provision goes beyond an area
traditionally regulated by the States; it is a
decision of the most fundamental sort for a
sovereign entity. Through the structure of its
government, and the character of those who
exercise government authority, a State defines
itself as a sovereign. "It is obviously essential
to the independence of the States and to their
peace and tranquility, that their power to
prescribe the qualifications of their own
officers . . . should be exclusive, and free from
external interference, except so far as plainly
provided by the Constitution of the United
Id. at 460, 111 S.Ct. at 2400 quoting Taylor v. Beckham,
178 U.S. 548
, 570-71, 20 S.Ct. 890, 898 (1900). Like state imposed
qualifications for judges, states should be allowed to
determine how its judges are elected without outside
interference. Thus, the Court finds that this issue is one best
suited to be determined by the Illinois General Assembly and
the Illinois court system — the State's legislative and
Accordingly, while the U.S. Supreme Court has found (for
better or for worse) that political gerrymandering claims in
legislative elections are justiciable, the Court can find no
valid reason to extend justiciability to include political
gerrymandering claims in judicial elections.
On the other hand, the Court can think of a host of reasons
why we should not extend justiciability to include such a
claim. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' Complaint
states a nonjusticiable political question. Fed. R. Civ. Pro.
12(b)(1); Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710.
D. RULE 12(b)(6)
Because the Court has found that Plaintiffs' Complaint
raises a nonjusticiable claim, the Court declines to address
the merits of Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs have failed
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Ingemunson and
Jourdan lack standing to bring this suit.
The Court also finds that Defendant Illinois State Board of
Elections is immune from this suit pursuant to the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claim is a
nonjusticiable political question.
Ergo, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (d/e 21) is ALLOWED. This
case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to all Defendants.