Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

04/10/97 JERRY CHABOWSKI v. VACATION VILLAGE

April 10, 1997

JERRY CHABOWSKI, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
VACATION VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, ROBERT DEPAUW, AND FRANK HAUSER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.



Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County. No. 94--L--1604. Honorable Bernard E. Drew, Jr., Judge, Presiding.

Rule 23 Order Redesignated Opinion and Ordered Published April 10, 1997.

The Honorable Justice Rathje delivered the opinion of the court. Inglis and Bowman, JJ., concur.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Rathje

The Honorable Justice RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Jerry Chabowski, appeals the dismissal with prejudice of his complaint against defendants, Vacation Village Association, Robert DePauw, and Frank Hauser. Plaintiff raises the following issues for our consideration: (1) whether the court committed procedural error by not specifying the reasons for the dismissal; (2) whether the dismissal was an abuse of discretion; and (3) whether the court erred in awarding defendants attorney fees of $375. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, alleging breach of an employment contract, lost wages, libel, slander, and intentional interference with contractual relations. On April 11, 1995, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. Plaintiff then filed a "motion to vacate default judgment," although no default judgment had been entered. The court struck plaintiff's motion when neither plaintiff nor his attorney appeared at the hearing on the motion. Plaintiff then refined his still incorrectly titled motion. On June 5, 1995, the court granted the motion and vacated the dismissal order.

On November 8, 1995, defendants filed a motion to compel plaintiff's deposition within seven days. In the motion, defendants stated that plaintiff's deposition had been scheduled for October 27, but that plaintiff's attorney, Robert Emery, cancelled it the day before. The 'parties agreed to reschedule the deposition for November 2, but on that day defendants' attorneys contacted Emery and found out that plaintiff would again not be appearing. Emery failed to contact defendants' attorneys to reschedule, and defendants asked the court to compel plaintiff to give his deposition within seven days. The court ordered plaintiff to give the deposition within 19 days.

On December 5, 1995, defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice plaintiff's complaint because of plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery. In the motion, defendants pointed out that plaintiff had twice again failed to show up for his deposition within the court's 19-day deadline. Defendants argued that, when plaintiff failed to show up on November 22, their attorneys called Emery's office and found out that plaintiff would not be appearing and that Emery had faxed a cancellation letter the night before. Defendants then rescheduled the deposition for December 4, the nineteenth day, but gave Emery the option of suggesting a different date if that one was not satisfactory. Plaintiff failed to appear for his deposition on December 4. Defendants asked the court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as a sanction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 219(c)(v) (Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 20 (September 27, 1995), R. 219(c)(v), eff. January 1, 1996).

Neither plaintiff nor Emery appeared at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, and the court granted the motion. Plaintiff then filed a motion to vacate, arguing that he had arrived 15 minutes too late for the hearing. The court granted the motion, but awarded defendants $375 in attorney fees. The court gave plaintiff 14 days to respond to the motion to dismiss, gave defendants 7 days to reply, and set the matter for hearing on March 18, 1996. The hearing was continued to March 27, at which time the court granted defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice.

On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the court committed procedural error by not indicating in writing the reasons for its decision. Plaintiff points out that a recent amendment to Rule 219 provides in part:

"Where a sanction is imposed under this paragraph (c), the judge shall set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction so imposed either in the judgment order itself or in a separate written order." Official Reports Advance Sheet No. 20 (September 27, 1995), R. 219(c), eff. January 1, 1996.

This requirement became effective approximately three months before the judge entered the dismissal order. However, case law has imposed a similar requirement. Plaintiff cites Spiegel v. Hollywood Towers Condominium Ass'n, 283 Ill. App. 3d 992, 219 Ill. Dec. 436, 671 N.E.2d 350 (1996), Walton v. Throgmorton, 273 Ill. App. 3d 353, 210 Ill. Dec. 1, 652 N.E.2d 803 (1995), and Martinez v. Pfizer Laboratories Division, 216 Ill. App. 3d 360, 159 Ill. Dec. 642, 576 N.E.2d 311 (1991), for the proposition that, when a court dismisses a cause of action as a discovery sanction, it must specify the grounds upon which it is basing the dismissal.

Spiegel involved monetary sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), not a dismissal pursuant to Rule 219(c). The court did not reverse the sanctions, finding that the transcript showedthat the trial judge had articulated the basis for the sanctions. In Walton, the court dismissed a cause of action as a discovery sanction, but the defendant had not asked it to do so. The appellate court could not find sufficient support in the record for the decision and therefore reversed. In Martinez, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint as a discovery sanction, and the appellate court reversed, finding the trial judge's decision was not supported by the record. The court stated that "a trial court cannot choose the more drastic path of dismissing a claim without giving specific reasons subject to review." Martinez, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 374-75.

Here, the trial court did not state reasons for the dismissal, but the dismissal order was entered pursuant to a written motion by defendants. Thus, we can assume that the reasons for the dismissal are those set out in defendants' motion. Further, the dilatory conduct of plaintiff's counsel is apparent from the record. Plaintiff chose not to file any reports of proceedings or to prepare a bystander's report, and therefore we cannot determine if the trial judge discussed the reasons for its decision at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. The appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and, in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 76 Ill. Dec. 823, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984). Any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. Although we recognize that Rule 219(c) requires the court to ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.