The opinion of the court was delivered by: GETTLEMAN
Walter Kyle has sued certain officers of the Harvey, Illinois, Police Department, alleging that on July 19, 1993 he was arrested without probable cause by the defendants and detained for three days before being brought before a judge and informed of the charges against him. Proceeding pro se, Kyle was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Defendants initially moved for summary judgment on Kyle's claim that he was arrested without probable cause. Defendants offered an excerpt of the transcript of a hearing on Kyle's motion to quash his arrest, showing that on September 21, 1995, Judge Wasilewski of the Circuit Court of Cook County had found that the police had probable cause to arrest Kyle. Because the denial of the motion was not a final judgment, a prerequisite for collateral estoppel, this court denied defendants' motion as premature.
Defendants responded with proof of Kyle's conviction and renewed their motion. The motion was again denied, because, although Kyle had initially litigated the issue of probable cause, he ultimately pleaded guilty. His guilty plea foreclosed appellate review of the determination of probable cause, and under Illinois law the trial court's finding of probable cause finding would not be given collateral effect.
Defendants have brought a third motion for summary judgment, this time offering the sworn testimony upon which Judge Wasilewski based his ruling. Defendants' motion also addresses the issue of Kyle's prolonged detention before he was charged. Defendants contend that (a) they are not to be blamed for the length of Kyle's detention, because they were waiting for the Assistant State's Attorney to prepare the charges against him, and (b) Kyle suffered no prejudice as a result of his extended detention.
Summary Judgment Procedure
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The court must consider the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and any doubts as to whether a genuine factual dispute exists must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1477 (7th Cir. 1990). However, once the movant has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has the burden of coming forward with evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue to be tried to the factfinder. Id. A fact is genuinely in dispute when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
Local Rules 12(m) and 12(n) of this court provide that a party moving for summary judgment must submit a statement listing the material facts it believes to be undisputed and which, taken together, entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. The other party must then respond specifically to these allegations, and, where it denies that a fact is undisputed, it must come forward with references to the record that support a contrary finding. Defendants have not complied with the rule, simply calling the factual exposition at the beginning of their brief a "Rule 12M Statement Of Facts" without separating the narrative into numbered paragraphs.
A. Arrest Without Probable Cause
Kyle does not dispute the defendants' account of the events leading to his arrest as set forth in testimony before Judge Wasilewski on August 10 and 30, 1995, Def. Exhs. A and B. Defendant Patterson, then a sergeant on the Harvey Police force, testified that on the afternoon of July 15, 1993, at 15235 South Page in Harvey, Illinois, a young man was shot in the stomach. He died later that evening. Patterson interviewed two witnesses to the shooting, Karen Alexander and Roselyn Hynes, who told him that they recognized the assailant as Walter Wheat, Jr. Def. Exh. A at 9-11.
Ronald Cross, a dispatcher for the Harvey Police Department, testified that he had lived in Harvey since 1971 and had known Kyle since late 1971 or early 1972. Cross knew that Kyle was also known as Walter Wheat. On July 15, 1993, while visiting his in-laws, Cross heard Kyle, who was on the sidewalk, declare in a "boisterous" tone of voice that he had "popped a m f up on 152nd and Page Street." Def. Exh. B at 10. Cross did not take it seriously at the time, but the next day at work he learned there had been a shooting on Page Street the day before. Cross spoke to defendant Sergeant Patterson about what he had heard. Told that the police were looking for a Walter Wheat, Jr., Cross told Patterson that Wheat's real name was Walter Kyle. Id. at 10-11.
Patterson put together a collection of photographs, including Kyle's, and showed them to Karen Alexander, who identified Kyle as the assailant. Patterson then composed a flyer with Kyle's picture on it and had it distributed. Def. Exh. A at 12-16.
On July 19, 1993, defendant Officer Bell was on patrol near 147th and Page in Harvey when he saw Kyle riding in a van with another man. Recognizing Kyle from the flyer as a murder suspect, Bell called for assistance, stopped the van, and arrested Kyle. Id. at 23-26.
This account establishes that the flyer provided Bell with probable cause to arrest Kyle, and the information Patterson received from Alexander, Hynes and Cross justified Patterson's distributing the flyer. Kyle offers no argument to the contrary, and summary ...