The opinion of the court was delivered by: Richard Mills, District Judge:
The Illinois Structural Work Act.
The Illinois General Assembly giveth.
The Illinois General Assembly taketh away.
As alleged in the Amended Complaint, Gunther-Nash Mining
Construction Company and Exxon Coal USA, Inc. hired Timmons
Electric Company to perform some electrical work on a new
structure at the Monterey Coal Company's plant in Carlinville,
Illinois. William H. Hendrickson worked for Timmons Electric
Company. On January 23, 1993, Hendrickson, while working for
Timmons Electric Company on the new structure at Monterey Coal's
plant, was injured when he tried to climb out of the "elevator."*fn1
Hendrickson claims that his injuries were directly and
proximately caused by Gunther-Nash's and Exxon Coal's failure to
comply with the Illinois Structural Work Act ("Act").
Furthermore, the wife, Rita Hendrickson, claims a loss of
services and a loss of consortium as a result of the injuries
sustained by her husband due to Gunther-Nash's and Exxon Coal's
failure to comply with the Act.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS TO DISMISS
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept well
pleaded allegations of the complaint as true. In addition, the
Court must view these allegations in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff." Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ.,
811 F.2d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987). Although a complaint is not required
to contain a detailed outline of the claim's basis, it
nevertheless "must contain either direct or inferential
allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to
sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Car Carriers,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984). Mere
conclusions, without supporting factual allegations, are
insufficient to support a claim for relief. Cohen v. Illinois
Inst. of Tech., 581 F.2d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 1978). Dismissal
should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that
would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45,
78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
In Counts I, III, VII, and IX of their Amended Complaint,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Illinois
Structural Work Act. Repealed, formerly 740 ILCS 150/.01 et seq.
The Illinois General Assembly, however, repealed the Act
effective February 14, 1995. See Illinois P.A. 89-2 § 5.
Defendants, therefore, argue that because the Act has been
repealed, Plaintiffs no longer have a cause of action pursuant to
the Act. On the other hand, Plaintiffs argue that the repeal only
bars actions which accrued on or subsequent to February 14, 1995.
Because Plaintiffs' cause of action accrued prior to February 14,
1995, Plaintiffs assert that the repeal of the Act is
inapplicable to the case at bar.
For the reasons set forth below and for those contained
within Scott v. Midwest, Ltd., 933 F. Supp. 735 (C.D.Ill. 1996),
the Court finds that the repeal of the Illinois Structural Work
Act is applicable to both prospective and pending causes of
action. Accordingly, Counts I, III, VII, and IX of Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint are dismissed.
All of the parties agree that the Illinois General Assembly
repealed the Act without including an express savings clause in
the statutory language. The amendment merely states that "The
Structural Work Act is repealed." P.A. 89-2 § 5. In Illinois,
The unconditional repeal of a special remedial
statute without a saving clause stops all pending
actions where the repeal finds them. If final
relief has not been granted before the repeal goes
into effect it cannot be granted afterwards, even
if a judgment has been entered and the cause is
pending on appeal. The reviewing court must dispose
of the case under the law in force when its
decision is rendered.
People ex rel. Eitel v. Lindheimer, 371 Ill. 367, 373,
21 N.E.2d 318, 321 (Ill. 1939); see also Isenstein v. Rosewell,
106 Ill.2d 301, 310-11, 478 N.E.2d ...