The Honorable Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court. Justice McMORROW, specially concurring. Justice Freeman joins in this special concurrence. Justice Harrison, dissenting.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Miller
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant, Leonard Kidd, was convicted of four counts of murder, one count of armed robbery, one count of aggravated arson, and four counts of concealment of a homicidal death. At a separate sentencing hearing, the same jury found the defendant eligible for the death penalty and further determined that there were no mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of that sentence. The defendant was accordingly sentenced to death for the murder convictions, and he received sentences of imprisonment for the remaining convictions. The defendant's execution has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, as modified.
The defendant previously pleaded guilty to these charges and was sentenced to death at that time. In an earlier appeal, this court found the defendant's plea to be defective because of improper admonitions given to the defendant at the plea hearing, and accordingly vacated his convictions and death sentence. People v. Kidd, 129 Ill. 2d 432, 136 Ill. Dec. 18, 544 N.E.2d 704 (1989). The case then proceeded to trial on remand.
The present offenses were discovered on January 12, 1983, when investigators responding to the report of a fire found the bodies of three adults, Renee Coleman, Michelle Jointer, and Ricardo Pedro, and one child, Renee's son Anthony, in an apartment at 1553 West 91st Street in Chicago, where Coleman lived with her son and Jointer. The victims were bound and gagged, and they had been stabbed repeatedly. Two separate fires had been set inside the apartment. Following an investigation, the defendant and his half-brother, Leroy Orange, were taken into custody and charged with these offenses. Their trials were severed at an early stage in the proceedings.
In the proceedings below, the State presented extensive evidence of the defendant's involvement in these crimes. Because the defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the State's proof of his guilt, only a brief recitation of the trial evidence is necessary here; additional evidence will be summarized as it becomes relevant to the discussion of specific issues. The defendant made a series of statements to police after he was arrested, and these were introduced into evidence at trial. The defendant initially told officers that he and his brother, Leroy Orange, were at Coleman's apartment on the night of the murders. The defendant said, however, that he had left there around 4:30 in the morning, when Orange began arguing with Ricardo Pedro. The defendant explained that he decided to leave when the confrontation turned violent. The defendant said that before he could do so, however, "two dudes" entered the apartment; both of them had knives. The defendant remained outside the building, and he said that he later saw the two men leave; one was wearing a jacket covered with blood. At that time, the defendant gave inconsistent accounts of the identities of the two men he had seen; at one point, the defendant said that one was named "Slick Rick." After the defendant made that statement, police brought Leroy Orange into the room where the defendant was being interrogated. Orange told the defendant that he had already admitted committing the murders and, further, had told authorities that there was no "Slick Rick."
The defendant gave police a second statement later that evening. In the second statement, the defendant said that he was the Sportsman's Lounge at 79th and Halsted Streets during the evening of January 11, 1983. Around 10:30 Orange and Renee Coleman arrived, and they later took the defendant to the defendant's residence, where the defendant gave them a combination TV/radio "box." The defendant then returned alone to the Sportsman's Lounge. He went back home some time later, where he received a telephone call from Orange around 12:30 a.m. Orange said that he was having "a problem with a stud," and the defendant then went to Coleman's apartment. The defendant said that Orange and Pedro later began fighting, and Orange stabbed Pedro. The defendant attempted to help Pedro in one of the bedrooms in the apartment. Sometime later, according to the defendant, Orange stabbed Pedro again. Orange also forced Coleman to tie up her son, and Orange bound and gagged Coleman and Jointer and stabbed the victims.
The defendant repeated many of the preceding details in a formal statement he gave several hours later in the presence of a court reporter. While in custody, the defendant also led police to various garbage cans near Coleman's apartment where the knives used in the attack had been discarded. The defendant also showed the officers where other evidence, including drug paraphernalia, clothing, and burnt debris, had been left.
At trial, the State also presented testimony given by the defendant at Leroy Orange's trial on these charges, and at the defendant's own sentencing hearing, conducted following the defendant's earlier guilty plea. At Orange's trial, the defendant claimed that he alone committed the murders and maintained that he stabbed the victims when Orange was not present. The defendant, in the testimony he gave at his sentencing hearing, again said that he alone committed the crimes. On that occasion, however, the defendant also mentioned that he saw red things coming at him when he stabbed the victims.
Defense counsel introduced into evidence Orange's own inculpatory statement to authorities. In that statement, Orange claimed sole responsibility for the crimes. The defendant also presented the testimony of Dr. Linda Wetzel, a clinical psychologist, who had interviewed the defendant and given him various tests. Dr. Wetzel concluded, among other things, that the defendant was mentally retarded, had brain damage, and possessed a compliant nature.
At the close of evidence, the jury found the defendant guilty of the charges of murder, aggravated arson, armed robbery, and concealment of homicidal death. The matter then proceeded to a capital sentencing hearing. At the first stage of the sentencing hearing, the jury found the existence of three separate aggravating circumstances rendering the defendant eligible for the death penalty: the commission of multiple murders, murder in the course of a felony-armed robbery in this case-and murder of a child under 12 years of age in a brutal or heinous manner. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(7).
At the second stage of the sentencing hearing, the State presented testimony of the defendant's lengthy record of misconduct, occurring inside and outside prison. The defendant had incurred a substantial number of disciplinary tickets for his infractions while incarcerated. On a number of occasions the defendant threatened prison personnel and other inmates. In one incident, the defendant struck a handcuffed inmate on the head three times with an unopened can of food that was concealed inside a sock. In mitigation, the defendant presented the testimony of Dr. George Savarese, a licensed social worker, who had complied a comprehensive social history of the defendant. In preparing that report, Dr. Savarese interviewed the defendant's family members and friends, and also reviewed a number of records and reports concerning the defendant. Dr. Savarese described the defendant's troubled childhood and history of drug use, as well as other aspects of the defendant's life. Following the consideration of evidence in aggravation and mitigation, the jury determined that there was no mitigating circumstance sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. Accordingly, the defendant was sentenced to death for the murder convictions.
The judge sentenced the defendant to consecutive terms of 30 years' imprisonment for the convictions for aggravated arson and armed robbery. The judge imposed terms of five years' imprisonment for each of the four convictions for concealment of a homicidal death. Those sentences were to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the prison terms for aggravated arson and armed robbery.
The defendant first argues that he was entitled to a fitness hearing under the rule announced in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450, 205 Ill. Dec. 421, 643 N.E.2d 712 (1994), because he was taking "psychotropic drugs or other medications under medical direction" (725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1992)) at the time of the trial and sentencing hearing in this case. Specifically, the defendant asserts that he was then taking Dilantin, for treatment of epilepsy, and he further states that he had previously taken two others drugs, Tegretol, also for epilepsy, and Elavil, an antidepressant.
We note that the record discloses only that the defendant was receiving Dilantin at the time relevant here; evidence of his treatment may be found in the testimony of Dr. Wetzel, who related that the defendant was receiving the drug when she interviewed him shortly before trial. It appears that the defendant had epilepsy and that he took Dilantin as treatment for that condition. The State argues, however, that the special protection afforded by section 104-21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 must be limited to psychotropic drugs, and that Dilantin is not a psychotropic drug. Our recent opinion in People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163, 1996 Ill. LEXIS 112, 220 Ill. Dec. 388, 673 N.E.2d 300 (1996), resolves a number of the issues here. In Britz, this court construed the reference in section 104-21(a) to "psychotropic drugs or other medications" as being limited to psychotropic drugs; accordingly, treatment with a nonpsychotropic medication is not sufficient to trigger the statute. Slip op. at 24-25. The question remains whether Dilantin is properly classified as a psychotropic drug, and therefore whether the defendant's use of that medication during trial would have entitled the defendant to a fitness hearing under the provisions of section 104-21(a).
Britz further clarified what drugs are psychotropic by adopting the definition found in the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1-100 through 6-107 (West 1994)). Slip op. at 25-26. Section 1-121.1 of the Code defines the term "psychotropic medication" as a "medication whose use for antipsychotic, antidepressant, antimanic, antianxiety, behavioral modification or behavioral management purposes is listed in AMA Drug Evaluations, latest edition, or Physician's Desk Reference, latest edition, or which are administered for any of these purposes." 405 ILCS 5/1-121.1 (West Supp. 1995). Applying this definition, we conclude that Dilantin is not a psychotropic drug for purposes of the fitness provision of section 104-21(a). Dilantin is prescribed for the treatment of epilepsy, not for any of the purposes specified in the definition found in section 1-121.1 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. Moreover, neither of the references cited in the preceding definition indicate that Dilantin is used for psychotropic purposes. According to the Physician's Desk Reference, Dilantin (phenytoin) is an anticonvulsant drug used to treat epilepsy and to prevent and treat seizures occurring during or following neurosurgery. Physician's Desk Reference 1906-13 (50th ed. 1996); see also AMA Drug Evaluations 371 (AMA 1994) (phenytoin is a drug used to control epileptic seizures).
Because the defendant was not entitled to a fitness hearing under section 104-21(a), defense counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to seek one pursuant to that provision. Accordingly, we do not address the defendant's additional argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial attorneys failed to invoke section 104-21(a).
In the alternative, the defendant asks that we now remand the cause to the circuit court so that additional information may be presented about other medications the defendant might have been receiving at the time of trial. The defendant has found references in various portions of the record in this case to his prior treatment with two other drugs: Tegretol, another epilepsy medication, and Elavil, an antidepressant. The defendant notes that a similar procedure was followed in People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394, 214 Ill. Dec. 145, 660 N.E.2d 852 (1995).
We believe that Kinkead is readily distinguishable from the present case. In Kinkead, the defendant's presentence report related the defendant's statement that he had been taking Thorazine, a psychotropic drug, while in jail awaiting trial on the charges in that case; the report also noted other drugs the defendant had previously received for treatment of depression. In addition, the report referred to suicide attempts by the defendant, and to his treatment at Menard Psychiatric Center. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d at 403. The details of the defendant's treatment with Thorazine could not be ascertained from the record, however, and therefore the court believed that a remand was necessary to clarify the schedule of treatment. The court noted further that there was no indication in the record regarding the possible effects of that drug.
We do not agree with the defendant that Kinkead is controlling here. In contrast to Kinkead, in the present case, there is no indication in the record that the defendant was actually receiving a psychotropic drug at any point near the time of trial or sentencing in this case. The references to his earlier treatment all predate, by substantial periods, the beginning of the defendant's trial, in May 1993. Moreover, the defendant had been examined by two psychiatrists in November and December 1991 and had been found fit at that time. To adopt the defendant's argument in this case and order a remand for development of a further evidentiary record would mean that a remand must be available in every case in which the record contains some reference to the defendant's long-ago treatment with a psychotropic drug. We decline to extend Kinkead in that manner.
The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in failing to grant a defense motion to quash the defendant's arrest and to suppress evidence stemming from the arrest. The police did not have an arrest warrant, and the defendant contends that they lacked probable cause to make the arrest.
The offenses charged here were discovered by authorities sometime after 6 a.m. on January 12, 1983. In the apartment police found an address book containing Leroy Orange's name and providing two addresses for him, 702 E. 75th Street, and 7915 S. Emerald; Leroy's mother and half-brother, the defendant in this case, also resided at the latter address. Investigating officers learned from Enitowec Durr that Leroy Orange had been with Renee and others in the apartment around 9 o'clock the preceding night; Durr had spoken to Renee on the telephone around that time and had learned in the course of the conversation that Orange was at the apartment. Durr told police that Leroy was Renee's former boyfriend and that the two had not been getting along well. Three persons who had been at Renee's apartment the preceding night reported that Leroy was there when they left, around midnight.
Detectives McNally and McCabe went to the 75th Street address between 2 and 3 p.m. on January 12, where they talked to Mildred Orange, Leroy's wife. Mrs. Orange told the officers that Leroy had left the residence around 7 o'clock the preceding night and had not returned that night. When Mrs. Orange learned that the police were trying to locate Leroy, she called the South Emerald Street address and discovered that he was there. McNally and McCabe remained with Mrs. Orange, while other officers went to South Emerald Street to arrest Leroy. Mrs. Orange also told the officers that when she had arrived home from work that afternoon, she had discovered a pair of shoes, pants, a shirt, and a jacket that had not been there in the morning. Mrs. Orange was able to identify the pants as belonging to the defendant.
Around 3:45 that afternoon, Mrs. Orange received a telephone call from the defendant. Officers McNally and McCabe were still with her. In the telephone call, the contents of which Mrs. Orange later related to the officers, the defendant said that Leroy had been arrested, and the defendant asked Mrs. Orange to call the police and find out what the charges were. The defendant also said that he needed to talk to Mrs. Orange, and he made arrangements to meet her at a McDonald's restaurant. The defendant told Mrs. Orange " 'that he and Leroy were involved in something that could put him in jail for the rest of their lives.' " Later that afternoon, the defendant was arrested at the McDonald's restaurant where Mrs. Orange had gone to meet him.
To effect a warrantless arrest, a police officer must have probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 13 L. Ed. 2d 142, 145, 85 S. Ct. 223, 225 (1964); People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill. 2d 517, 525, 98 Ill. Dec. 353, 494 N.E.2d 475 (1986); see also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 107-2(1)(c). Under the probable cause standard, "evidence that will sustain a conviction is not required, but more than mere suspicion is necessary. [Citation.]" In re D.G., 144 Ill. 2d 404, 412-13, 163 Ill. Dec. 494, 581 N.E.2d 648 (1991) (Miller, C.J., dissenting). The burden is on the defendant to show the illegality of the challenged search or seizure. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, par. 114-12(b). A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be reversed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173, 209, 167 Ill. Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983 (1991). There was no doubt in the present case that crimes had been committed; the only relevant question before the police officers was whether the defendant was one of the persons involved in their commission.
In making a warrantless arrest of the defendant, the police relied on information provided to them by Mildred Orange and on other information they had acquired in the course of their investigation of these offenses. We conclude that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for these offenses. Following their conversations with Mrs. Orange and their investigation of the crime scene and of evidence found there, the police knew that the defendant had implicated himself in an unspecified offense with his brother, Leroy Orange. The police also knew that Leroy Orange had been present at the crime scene the preceding night, several hours before the murders. Also, the police knew from Mrs. Orange that a change of clothes had been left in her apartment that day, and that at least one of those garments belonged to the defendant.
From the circumstances of the offenses, the police also would have realized that it was likely that more than one offender was involved. The number of victims and the condition in which they were found strongly suggested that the crimes in this case were the work of multiple offenders; that three adults and one child had been tied up and repeatedly stabbed suggested the actions of more than one person. Thus, when the defendant implicated himself to Mrs. Orange in an offense in which he said Leroy was also involved, the police would have had probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the crimes in this case.
The defendant argues, however, that Mrs. Orange must be considered an informant, and the defendant maintains that she was of untested and unestablished reliability. Mrs. Orange does not fit easily into either of the two major categories by which informants have traditionally been classified. Although Mrs. Orange was not a witness or victim of the crime, she was not a paid informant, either. Still, the importance of those classifications are less significant than they once were. "It matters not by what name the informant is labelled; we look rather to the informant's reliability as only one of the factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances approach. [Citations.]" People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 397, 137 Ill. Dec. 616, 546 N.E.2d 561 (1989). As this court has explained:
"The rationale of protecting against unreasonable search and seizures by demanding reliable information from informants is still relevant under the totality of the circumstances test adopted by this court in People v. Tisler (1984), 103 Ill. 2d 226, 82 Ill. Dec. 613, 469 N.E.2d 147. Thus, the basis of the informant's knowledge is indeed relevant (i.e., whether it is based on being a victim or witness or whether he is a reliable paid informant); however, the rigidity embodied in the presumptions concerning the classifications is no longer applicable." Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 398.
"Thus, based on an evaluation of all of the information available, including the source of the information, the question is one of whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual in question is involved in criminality." Adams, 131 Ill. 2d at 398.
We believe that the circumstances here satisfy the standards relating to arrests based on informants' tips. The totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers fully supported their reliance on the information provided by Mrs. Orange. Immediately after the conversation with the defendant, Mrs. Orange told the officers who were present in her apartment what the defendant had just said; she had no time to fabricate. In People v. Wright, 111 Ill. 2d 128, 146, 95 Ill. Dec. 787, 490 N.E.2d 640 (1985), this court noted:
"Decisions analyzing the probable cause standard reveal that it is a 'practical, nontechnical conception.' [Citation.] 'In dealing with probable cause, *** we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.' [Citations.]"
Given the circumstances of the police officers' visit with Mrs. Orange, and the information she provided to them, the arresting officers were justified in crediting her report of her telephone conversation with the defendant. The defendant's contention that Mrs. Orange's conduct should be viewed as an attempt to deflect attention away from her husband is without merit, for she helped the police locate Leroy, and she told the officers about the defendant's statement implicating Leroy.
The defendant notes that the testimony at the suppression hearing showed that he told Mrs. Orange that he and Leroy had done something that could put "him" in jail. Emphasizing the singular "him," the defendant argues that the statement must be construed as implicating only Leroy. We do not agree. First, the remainder of the statement contains a number of plural elements: the comment that "he and Leroy were involved" in something, and the reference to "their lives." In addition, Mrs. Orange's testimony at trial below, and the defendant's testimony at Leroy Orange's trial, also introduced into evidence in this case, related a slightly different version of the statement, in which the defendant quite clearly implicated himself in Leroy's offenses. Thus, at the defendant's trial, Mrs. Orange testified that the defendant told her, " 'Mildred, I've got something to tell you that could put me and Poky [ i.e., Leroy] away for the rest of our lives." In testimony at his brother's trial, also introduced into evidence here, the defendant recounted, "I said we done something bad that could put us in jail for the rest of our life [ sic ]." We may consider these additional pieces of testimony even though they were not introduced at the suppression hearing; in reviewing a pretrial suppression ruling, a court may rely on evidence introduced at the ensuing trial. People v. Sims, 167 Ill. 2d 483, 500, 212 Ill. Dec. 931, 658 N.E.2d 413 (1995); People v. Caballero, 102 Ill. 2d 23, 33-36, 79 Ill. Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223 (1984); People v. La Bostrie, 14 Ill. 2d 617, 620-21, 153 N.E.2d 570 (1958). It thus seems clear that the defendant implicated both himself and Leroy in the unspecified offenses.
In conclusion, we believe that the trial judge's decision to deny the defendant's motion to quash the arrest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The testimony showed that the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant was involved in the present offenses. The defendant's inculpatory statement to Mrs. Orange, the circumstances of the offenses, and Leroy's presence at Renee's apartment hours before the crimes provided the police with probable cause to arrest the defendant. We note that our conclusion that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant is not altered even if we use a de novo standard of review for this mixed question of law and fact. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. , 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996) (applying de novo standard of review to issues involving reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle and probable cause to conduct search). We believe that probable cause for the defendant's arrest was established by the circumstances in this case, summarized above, including the defendant's statement to Mrs. Orange, Leroy's presence at the apartment the preceding night, and the likely involvement of more than one offender.
The defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements. The defendant contends that the statements were the products of physical coercion inflicted by the police officers who interrogated him. The defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress his statements because the State failed to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that his injuries were not the result of police misconduct. See People v. Wilson, 116 Ill. 2d 29, 106 Ill. Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571 (1987); People v. La Frana, 4 Ill. 2d 261, 122 N.E.2d 583 (1954).
Unlike the cases cited by the defendant, there was no showing here that the defendant sustained an injury while in police custody. At the suppression hearing, the police officers who interrogated the defendant denied the defendant's allegations of mistreatment. Dennis Dernbach, the assistant State's Attorney who had taken the defendant's formal statement, and who is now a judge, testified that the defendant had no complaints about his treatment while in custody. Dernbach had noticed a mark on the defendant's forehead, and the defendant explained that he had incurred it a week or two earlier, when he was the victim of a robbery. This injury is depicted in a photograph taken at the conclusion of the defendant's formal statement, as well as in a photograph taken at the Cook County jail the next day. The defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing.
The State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant made the statement voluntarily. People v. R.D., 155 Ill. 2d 122, 134, 184 Ill. Dec. 389, 613 N.E.2d 706 (1993); People v. King, 109 Ill. 2d 514, 525, 94 Ill. Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949 (1986); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 114-11(d); see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 627, 92 S. Ct. 619, 627 (1972). Voluntariness will be determined by considering the totality of the circumstances. People v. Smith, 152 Ill. 2d 229, 253, 178 Ill. Dec. 335, 604 N.E.2d 858 (1992); People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 447, 174 Ill. Dec. 857, 599 N.E.2d 941 (1992); People v. Clark, 114 Ill. 2d 450, 457, 103 Ill. Dec. 102, 501 N.E.2d 123 (1986). A reviewing court will reverse the trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress a statement only if the ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225, 242-43, 189 Ill. Dec. 357, 620 N.E.2d 325 (1993); People v. Evans, 125 Ill. 2d 50, 77, 125 Ill. Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (1988); People v. Kincaid, 87 Ill. 2d 107, 120, 57 Ill. Dec. 610, 429 N.E.2d 508 (1981).
We find no reason to disturb the trial judge's ruling in the present case. The testimony at the suppression hearing established that the defendant's statements were not the products of coercion. Although there is photographic evidence that a mark was present on the defendant's forehead after he made his statement, there was no testimony that the defendant received that injury while he was in police custody, or that he did not have that injury before being taken into custody. In fact, the evidence in this case suggests otherwise. Dernbach's testimony showed that the defendant had sustained his one visible injury sometime before he was taken into custody, when he was the victim of a robbery. The defendant told Dernbach that the officers had treated him all right and did not have any complaints about his treatment. In addition, all the officers who took part in the interrogation of the defendant denied any mistreatment of him. It was the trial judge's responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses, and he was entitled to credit the testimony introduced by the prosecution. On this record, we cannot say that the decision to deny the defendant's suppression motion was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
The defendant next argues that the trial judge erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence in this case the defendant's testimony at Leroy Orange's trial on these charges and the defendant's testimony at his own earlier sentencing hearing. The defendant raises three arguments in support of the exclusion of these statements. The defendant contends that in introducing the earlier testimony the State was presenting false evidence. In addition, the defendant argues that the testimony he gave at Orange's trial resulted from a conflict of interests on the part of his former trial attorney and must now be excluded on that ground. Finally, the defendant maintains that the testimony at the earlier sentencing hearing was tainted by the defective guilty plea that preceded it. The defendant moved before and during trial to exclude the two statements, but the ...