The opinion of the court was delivered by: KOCORAS
CHARLES P. KOCORAS, District Judge:
This case comes before us on defendant Medical Management Sciences, Inc.'s motion to dismiss certain counts pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
The plaintiff, Central Diversey M.R.I. Center, Inc. ("Plaintiff"), brought this three-count complaint against the defendant, Medical Management Sciences, Inc. ("Defendant"). Jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff's allegations are quite simple. Plaintiff is a medical service provider. Defendant sent Plaintiff a document entitled "Scope of Services," in which it offered to provide assistance with billing and account collection. On August 1, 1994, the parties entered into a contract ("the Agreement"), pursuant to which Plaintiff would compensate Defendant for its collection services. In April, 1995, the parties terminated the agreement, apparently because Plaintiff was unhappy with the services performed by Defendant.
Plaintiff then filed this complaint. Count I ("Breach of Contract") alleges that Defendant breached the contract by failing to fulfill its duties under the Agreement. Count II ("Promissory Estoppel") alleges that Plaintiff relied to its detriment on Defendant's representations, and that Defendant is thus liable for its breach of those representations. Count III ("Consumer Fraud") alleges a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS 505 et seq. Defendant has filed this motion to dismiss Counts II and III.
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits of the case. Defendants must meet a high standard in order to have a complaint dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted since, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint's allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true. The allegations of a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim "unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957). See also Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 125 L. Ed. 2d 612, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993); Sherwin Manor Nursing Center, Inc. v. McAuliffe, 37 F.3d 1216, 1219 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, U.S. , 133 L. Ed. 2d 113, 116 S. Ct. 172 (1995). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege facts sufficiently setting forth the essential elements of the cause of action. Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 893, 121 L. Ed. 2d 196, 113 S. Ct. 267 (1992). We turn to the motion before us with these principles in mind.
The only issue in dispute between the parties is the validity of Count III. Count III alleges a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 ILCS § 505 et seq. ("the Act"). The Act states in relevant part:
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including but not limited to the use or employment of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation of the concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact, with intent that others rely upon the concealment, suppression or omission of such material fact . . . in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby."
815 ILCS 505/2. Despite the broad language of the Act, however, the courts have limited the application of the Act. Not surprisingly, these courts require simply that the conduct complained of under the "Consumer Fraud Act" have some impact on consumers.
While the courts agree that there is a requirement of a "consumer nexus," they have offered various formulations of this nexus. These formulations have included significant discussion as to whether the nexus is different if the plaintiff is a "consumer" or a business. See Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 524, 546 N.E.2d 33, 41, 137 Ill. Dec. 409 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1989); Century Universal Enterprises, Inc. v. Triana Development Corp., 158 Ill. App. 3d 182, 510 N.E.2d 1260, 1270, 110 Ill. Dec. 229 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1987). It is now clear that businesses, at least in certain situations, may sue under the Act. Downers Grove, 546 N.E.2d at 41. However, it is equally clear that every breach of contract does not constitute a cause of action under the Act. "Courts have consistently resisted attempts by litigants to portray otherwise ...