enjoin. If Jones seeks to enjoin defendants from keeping him incarcerated for a year longer than he would have been incarcerated had his good-time credits not been revoked, Jones' claim is precluded by Preiser, which holds that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy of a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 488-90, 93 S. Ct. at 1835-37. Jones has not filed a habeas corpus petition. Moreover, as the court discussed above, Jones cannot yet file a habeas corpus petition, since he has not yet exhausted or even pursued his remedies in state court. Thus, Jones has no claim for injunctive relief based on the fact or duration of his confinement.
If, on the other hand, Jones seeks to enjoin defendants from again conducting prison disciplinary proceedings against him, or from conducting such proceedings in a way that violates Jones' constitutional rights, or from again placing Jones in segregation or reducing his grade his claim is moot. To be entitled to injunctive relief, a plaintiff must establish that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1665, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983). "Federal courts do not, as a rule, enjoin conduct which has been discontinued with no real prospect that it will be repeated." Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1988).
In the present case, each defendant's allegedly unconstitutional conduct towards Jones ended with the disciplinary proceedings against or punishment of Jones. Jones does not allege that defendants' illegal conduct towards him still is occurring. Nor does he allege that he is likely to go through disciplinary proceedings involving the same defendants again. Further, the punishment was imposed August 1, 1994, more than a year before Jones filed his complaint. Jones' year in segregation and year's reduction in grade presumably were over by the time he filed his complaint, and Jones does not allege that he still is being punished for the events that occurred more than two years ago or is likely to be punished again for those events.
Therefore, Jones has not stated a claim for injunctive relief. Cf. Houston v. Sheahan, 62 F.3d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 1995) (request for injunctive relief by former jail inmate complaining of jail conditions was moot, where former inmate did not allege that he was likely to return to jail). Moreover, even if Jones had alleged that defendants' allegedly unconstitutional acts were capable of repetition, which he did not, his request for injunctive relief still would fail. See Ragsdale, 841 F.2d at 1365 (citations omitted) (plaintiff's conclusory assertions that the challenged actions were capable of repetition were not sufficient to avoid mootness).
Accordingly, because nothing remains for the court to enjoin with respect to defendants' acts, conduct, or omissions that allegedly violated Jones' constitutional rights, the court finds that Jones has no claim for injunctive relief.
2. Injunction against retaliation by defendants against Jones for bringing his action
The only point in his complaint at which Jones mentions retaliation by defendants is in his claim for injunctive relief. Jones alleges no specific acts of retaliation and no facts that indicate that defendants likely will retaliate against Jones for bringing his action. Thus, Jones has not shown that he "has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of" retaliation by defendants, or that "the injury or threat of injury [from retaliation is] real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101-02, 103 S. Ct. at 1665. Accordingly, no basis exists for the court to grant Jones injunctive relief against some hypothetical retaliation that may never occur.
E. Claim for declaratory judgment
Jones asks the court to declare that defendants' acts, conduct, or omissions violated Jones' constitutional rights. As with Jones' claims for damages, principles of federal jurisdiction and federal-state comity also apply to Jones' claim for declaratory judgment. If the court makes the declaration requested by Jones, the declaration will have the effect of invalidating Jones' punishment, including the revocation of good-time credits, and thus will have the concomitant effect of attacking the duration of Jones' confinement. Jones cannot seek to accomplish by a section 1983 declaratory judgment what he must accomplish solely through a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487-90, 93 S. Ct. at 1835-37.
Moreover, if the court makes the declaration requested by Jones, the court necessarily will be deciding issues cognizable in a section 2254 claim. Such a decision "create[s] [a] situation in which a federal court would make an initial, and perhaps a preclusive, ruling on an issue that should first be addressed by state courts." Clayton-EL, 96 F.3d at 242. That is, if Jones brings state court proceedings and a subsequent habeas petition to challenge his loss of good-time credits, whether defendants unconstitutionally deprived Jones of a year's worth of good-time credits will be a crucial issue in the state court and habeas proceedings. If the court decides that issue now, the court will deprive the state courts of first addressing the issue.
Accordingly, the court finds that Jones' claim for declaratory relief is not yet cognizable in federal court.
F. Jones' motion for summary judgment
Instead of a response to defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, Jones filed his own motion for summary judgment, which included a section responding to defendants' motion. In light of the court's opinion that Jones has not stated a section 1983 claim upon which this court can grant relief, Jones' motion for summary judgment is denied as moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the court construes as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismisses plaintiff's cause of action without prejudice. The court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as moot.
Date: NOV 19 1996
JAMES H. ALESIA
United States District Judge
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
Decision by Court. This action came to a hearing before the Court. The issues have been heard and a decision has been rendered.
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that on March 4, 1996, the court granted plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss the following defendants from this action: David C. Watkins, Major Johnson, Charles McVey and the Illinois Department of Corrections. The clerk was directed to administratively terminate these defendants. The court further granted plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss any claims of conspiracy brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1986 alleged in the complaint.
The court grants defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the court construes as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and dismisses plaintiff's cause of action without prejudice. The court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as moot. This case is closed.
November 19, 1996