as to be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 902.
Count VII alleges that Sadilek made comments about the personal lives of plaintiff and her husband to "at least one prospective client and in the presence of Diehl." Disclosure to Diehl, plaintiff's supervisor, may meet the publication requirement for this tort because Diehl and plaintiff have the type of "special relationship" that is described in Miller. 560 N.E.2d at 903. Still, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient because they do not plead that the facts disclosed were "private." Comments about the "personal lives" of a couple could mean comments about the number of children the couple has or the restaurtants that they go to on weekends. Such comments would not be considered "private" facts for purposes of an invasion of privacy tort. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, (7th Cir. 1993) (book revealing plaintiff's heavy drinking, unstable employment, and his irresponsible behavior towards his wife and children did not constitute tort of public disclosure of private facts because book did not reveal intimate details of plaintiff's life). This court respects plaintiff's decision not to recite the exact language used or the details of Sadilek's comments. Nevertheless, in order for the defendants to form a responsive pleading, plaintiff must plead more than she does in her complaint. Thus, this court grants defendants' motion to dismiss Count VII against Foothill and Sadilek without prejudice.
X. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
To set forth a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of such conduct; and (3) the defendant intended that his conduct to inflict severe emotional distress, or knew that there was at least a high probability that it conduct would cause severe emotional distress. McGrath v. Fahey, 126 Ill. 2d 78, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809, 127 Ill. Dec. 724 (Ill. 1988). Extreme and outrageous conduct is defined as conduct that is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency." Public Finance Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 360 N.E.2d 765, 765-67, 4 Ill. Dec. 652 (Ill. 1976). It must be more than "mere insults [and] indignities." Id.
Allegations that a plaintiff was "a victim of sexual harassment . . . [or] retaliatory discharge [do] not necessarily mean that she has a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress." Miller v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 537 N.E.2d 887, 889, 130 Ill. Dec. 558 (Ill. App. 1989). In Harriston v. Chicago Tribune Co., 992 F.2d 697, 702-03 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress for being subjected to a series of discriminatory acts. The plaintiff complained of: "not being allowed to supervise two white subordinates; being reprimanded for no reason; . . . having a major account taken away from her and being given one of the least lucrative sales territories; being excluded from office activities; . . . [and] being falsely accused of having poor sales." Id. at 703.
Plaintiff's allegations in this case are similar to those of the plaintiff in Harriston. Plaintiff claims that she was denied various business and advance opportunities, that she was subjected to derogatory comments, and that she was retaliated against for complaining about acts of gender discrimination. This court finds that these acts do not rise to the level of "outrageous conduct" necessary for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, this court grants defendants' motion to dismiss Count VIII against Foothill, Norwest, Diehl, and Sadilek.
For the reasons set forth above, this court grants defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice on the following counts: Counts I through V and VII against Norwest, and Count VII against Foothill and Sadilek. This court grants defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice the following counts: Count IV against Sadilek; Count VI against Foothill, Norwest, and Sadilek; and Count VIII against all defendants. This court denies defendants' motion to dismiss the following counts: Counts I through V against Foothill; Count IV against Diehl; and Count V against Sadilek. Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint conforming to this opinion on or before the next status report on October 10, 1996. At that time, the parties shall present to the court a definitive discovery plan.
ENTER: September 27, 1996
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge