and witnesses at his preliminary interview or hearing, and may be represented by counsel, including an appointed one; and described the action that the Parole Commission might take if McClain was found to have violated the conditions of his release. (See id. at 2.)
Thus, as a matter of fact, McClain's argument is meritless, since McClain received adequate notice of the possible revocation of his parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4213.
5. Whether the government improperly attempted to collect a special assessment to which it was not due
McClain includes in his petition a section on the special assessment that the trial court imposed. He does not make an intelligible argument in that section, but very vaguely alleges that the government attempted to collect an excessive special assessment of $ 550 per count.
It appears that McClain misunderstands the special assessment. The sentencing court imposes a special assessment of $ 50 on each felony count of conviction. 18 U.S.C. § 3013. When McClain was initially sentenced, he had been convicted on 11 counts, resulting in a mandatory special assessment of $ 550 -- $ 50 per count of conviction. Thus, the $ 550 special assessment was not merely authorized but was statutorily mandated.
On remand from McClain's first appeal, the sentencing court lowered McClain's special assessment to $ 300 to reflect the fact that the Seventh Circuit had overturned McClain's conviction on five counts but affirmed his conviction on six counts.
Consequently, the government was justified in trying to collect the special assessment of $ 550 until five of McClain's convictions were overturned.
6. Whether the prosecutor's actions warrant habeas relief
McClain argues that the government engaged in misconduct and violated McClain's due process rights by attempting to cover up an obvious double jeopardy sentence; collecting inapplicable restitution; communicating to prison and parole authorities to further punish McClain based on inapplicable restitution; failing to notify the Parole Commission of the sentencing court's directives; and failing to quash the inapplicable warrant.
The court has rejected McClain's arguments that his parole was revoked for his failure to pay inapplicable restitution and that he was subjected to double jeopardy by being fined as well as imprisoned, on which his prosecutorial misconduct argument is based. Consequently, the court finds that the government did not engage in misconduct as alleged by McClain and therefore did not violate McClain's due process rights.
7. Whether McClain's counsel were ineffective
McClain contends that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise his double jeopardy argument. Because McClain was not subjected to double jeopardy, he had no valid double jeopardy argument. Consequently, his counsel were not ineffective for failing to raise the double jeopardy issue.
8. Whether the cumulative effects of the violations of McClain's constitutional rights warrant habeas corpus relief
Finally, McClain argues that the cumulative effects of the constitutional violations set forth in all of his arguments warrant habeas corpus relief. Because the court has found that McClain's constitutional rights were not violated by his parole revocation, the court finds this argument without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies McClain's amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion for reconsideration of the court's January 26, 1996, order.
Date: AUG 19 1996
JAMES H. ALESIA
United States District Judge