Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable James G. Donegan, Judge Presiding.
Released for Publication August 29, 1996. Petition for Rehearing Denied September 11, 1996.
Presiding Justice Hartman delivered the opinion of the court: Scariano and Burke, JJ., concur.
The opinion of the court was delivered by: Hartman
PRESIDING JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a judgment of dissolution of marriage and affirmance of that judgment on direct appeal (see In re Marriage of Goldberg, 113 Ill. Dec. 907, 152 Ill. App. 3d 1162, 515 N.E.2d 1066 (1987)), Fred Goldberg, respondent, filed a petition for termination of maintenance due to substantial changes in his financial status. Elise Goldberg, petitioner, unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the petition and then filed a petition for rule to show cause, asserting that Fred had withheld $10,000 in maintenance payments. After several cross-motions, Elise was denied her motion for summary judgment.
Under the terms of the original order of dissolution, Elise was awarded a lump sum of $100,000 and permanent maintenance in the amount of $2,000 per month, until death or remarriage. On September 21, 1992, an agreed order of settlement was entered between the parties, resolving all issues of maintenance under which Elise was entitled to 36 monthly installments of $1,250 with a lump sum of $15,000 in the 37th month. Under the agreement the foregoing amounts were "non-modifiable and shall terminate only upon death or 24 months after the anniversary of wife's remarriage or the 37th monthly anniversary of this order, which ever occurs first, or cohabitation with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis."
One month later, on October 20, 1992, Elise remarried. Fred thereafter filed a petition to vacate the agreed order of settlement, alleging Elise had fraudulently misrepresented her intention to remarry, which led Fred to enter into the settlement, and requesting a termination of maintenance. Elise filed a second petition for rule to show cause, alleging that Fred had withheld $3,125 in maintenance, and a petition to enforce the agreed order of settlement.
At the hearing on Fred's petition to vacate the agreed settlement order, Fred's counsel testified that he told Elise's counsel that "there should be no reason for [Fred] *** to continue to pay maintenance if she gets married," to which Elise's counsel responded, "she should have the right to get married in the future." Fred's counsel then asked whether Elise had any present intention to get married. Elise's counsel responded that he was not aware of any intention by Elise to remarry. Fred's counsel believed that Elise's remarriage "is a remote possibility because of her age, her condition and her disability, so, [he] *** agreed to the 24 months because it appeared to [him] *** that it would never happen." Fred's attorney suggested they "put some time limit on it, if she does get married in the future then it should terminate without him having to continue to pay all of the money." The two attorneys then "agreed upon the language which was written in that it would terminate 24 months from the anniversary of her remarriage or the 37th month of the order, which ever came first, because this was an order payable in 37 months because there was a lump sum, paid in installments for 3 years and a balloon at the end of the third year." This conversation was conveyed to Fred before he signed the agreed order.
Following the hearing, the circuit court vacated the agreed order of settlement, finding fraud by Elise because the "future remarriage of Elise Goldberg was a [sic] integral part of the agreement ***." The court set the parties' cross-petitions for further hearings. On June 13, 1994, after a court hearing, Fred's petition to terminate maintenance was granted, Elise's two petitions for rule to show cause were denied, and Elise was ordered to pay Fred a refund of $1,875.
Elise's counsel thereafter filed a petition for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/508(a), (b) (West 1994). The circuit court initially found that section 508(a) was the only section applicable to Elise's request for attorneys' fees and costs. Following a hearing on the petition for attorneys' fees, Fred's counsel moved to dismiss the fee petition which the court granted, reasoning that Elise's counsel failed to present evidence of the novelty and difficulty of the question at issue, the reasonableness of the fees, customary charges, the amount and importance of the subject matter, and the benefit to the client. The court noted that it was "not satisfied that [Elise] *** has been straightforward with the Court, in her candor as to what her present holdings are," and there was insufficient evidence demonstrating her inability to pay her attorneys' fees. See 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1994). Elise appeals.
Fred initially asserts Elise failed to appeal the circuit court's order granting his motion to vacate the agreed order of settlement and this court has jurisdiction only over the circuit court's order denying Elise's petition for attorneys' fees and costs.
A notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court to consider only the judgments or parts thereof specified in the notice of appeal. Mimica v. Area Interstate Trucking, Inc., 250 Ill. App. 3d 423, 425, 620 N.E.2d 1328, 190 Ill. Dec. 67 (1993). A notice of appeal is to be liberally construed and an appeal from a subsequent final judgment will draw in question all prior nonfinal rulings and final but nonappealable orders which produced the judgment. First National Bank of Elgin v. St. Charles National Bank, 152 Ill. App. 3d 923, 930, 504 N.E.2d 1257, 105 Ill. Dec. 739 (1987). "A notice of appeal need not designate a particular order to confer jurisdiction, as long as the order which is specified directly relates back to the judgment or order from which review is sought." Taylor v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 656 N.E.2d 134, 211 Ill. Dec. 942 (1995). "An unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a 'step in the procedural progression leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.'" Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 659, citing Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435, 394 N.E.2d 380, 31 Ill. Dec. 178 (1979).
In the present case, the circuit court's order of January 27, 1994, vacating the agreed order of settlement, was a final but nonappealable order which produced the judgment. See First National Bank of Elgin v. St. Charles National Bank, 152 Ill. App. 3d 923, 930, 504 N.E.2d 1257, 105 Ill. Dec. 739 (1987). The petition for attorneys' fees and costs was directly related to the January 27, 1994, order and Elise's notice of appeal did not need to designate this earlier ruling in order to confer jurisdiction. See Taylor v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 275 Ill. App. 3d 655, 659, 656 N.E.2d 134, 211 Ill. Dec. 942 (1995). This court has jurisdiction over the January 27, 1994, order.
Elise initially contends the circuit court erred in vacating the agreed order of settlement because Fred failed to adduce any evidence that she had induced him to accede to the settlement fraudulently. Fred counters the court's order was supported by ...