that the supposed knockout punch, "if contact was made at all, was nothing more than a glancing blow." Id. P 23. Houk "jumped backwards in reaction to the 'knockout' punch and thereafter sat on the ring in the corner until the fight was over." Id.
In addition to the allegations regarding the Chavez-Houk fight, the plaintiff charges that King, King Productions, and Braverman used Houk twice before to throw fights. On January 29, 1994, Houk intentionally lost a match against Meldrick Taylor, a boxer under contract to King Productions, after Houk received a bribe; Taylor "'needed a win'" because of an upcoming fight between Taylor and Chavez. Id. P 12(a). Also, on September 4, 1994, Houk purposefully lost a fight against Gary Murray, another King Productions boxer. Id. P 12(b).
Based on these allegations, the complaint asserts seven counts: (1) King Productions, King, and Braverman violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a), by receiving income from a pattern of racketeering activity and investing or using that income in the establishment or operation of an enterprise, King Productions; (2) King, King Productions, Braverman, Chavez, and Houk violated § 1962(b) by acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; (3) King, Chavez, Braverman, and Houk violated § 1962(c) by conducting or participating in the conduct of King Productions' affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; (4) the defendants violated § 1962(d) by conspiring to violate § 1962(a), (b), and (c); (5) King and King Productions committed promissory fraud by misrepresenting that Houk would be a serious and competitive opponent; (6) Chavez breached an agreement to promote the fight; and (7) the defendants violated the Illinois Professional Boxing and Wrestling Act, 225 ILCS 105/1-26. The defendants move to dismiss, and we now turn to their arguments.
II. Standard for Reviewing Motions to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss should not be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); see also Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995); Ellsworth v. City of Racine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 89 L. Ed. 2d 574, 106 S. Ct. 1265 (1986). We take as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and view them, as well as reasonable inferences drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Ellsworth, 774 F.2d at 184). In addition, we consider exhibits incorporated into the complaint, Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 1990), as allegations in the complaint.
A. Particularity of Fraud Allegations
Initially, the defendants argue that the allegations of fraud fail to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that "the circumstances constituting fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity." This particularity requirement attempts to serve three purposes: "(1) protecting a defendant's reputation from harm; (2) minimizing 'strike suits' and 'fishing expeditions'; and (3) providing notice of the claim to the adverse party." Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, allegations of fraud should report "the who, what, when, where, and how" of the misrepresentation. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 941, 112 L. Ed. 2d 312, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
Although the complaint does not always distinguish between defendants as precisely as it could have, e.g., Compl. P 24 (referring broadly to "one or more Defendants"), we think that the allegations sufficiently spell out the fraud. Principally, the fraudulent scheme comprised inducing Venzor to drop the state court lawsuit against Chavez and to pay King Productions, Chavez, and Houk in exchange for Chavez's release to fight a phony match. The scheme to defraud began with the February 1995 fax from King Productions, in which King represented that he would release Chavez for one fight if Venzor dropped the suit. Compl. PP 10, 24(a). King then furthered the scheme by insisting that Houk serve as the opponent and by misrepresenting that Houk would put up a good fight, id. PP 11, 16, 18, when in fact King and Braverman (acting on King Productions' behalf) paid Houk to lose. And by the time Houk accepted the bribe, all of the defendants agreed that Houk would throw the fight, id. P 17, including Chavez, who trained apathetically for the fight because victory was predetermined, id. P 19. The fight itself provided the final touch, as Houk and Chavez feigned a serious match. Id. PP 21, 23. In sum, the defendants' respective roles and misrepresentations in the fraudulent scheme are sufficiently alleged to satisfy Rule 9(b).
B. Pattern of Racketeering Activity
Next, the defendants challenge the complaint's assertion, Compl. P 24(a)-(j), that the following acts constitute a "pattern" of racketeering activity under RICO:
(a) On February 21, 1995, sending the fax transmission referenced in paragraph 10 supra in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.