The opinion of the court was delivered by: DENLOW
Plaintiff Betty Dumas ("Dumas") filed a two-count amended complaint (hereinafter "Comp.") alleging in count I that Defendant Chicago Housing Authority (hereinafter "CHA") deprived her of due process in the administration of a Section 8 program in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In count II, Dumas brought a claim against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), which was previously dismissed by the District Court on June 9, 1995. There are three motions currently before the court. The CHA has filed a motion to strike Dumas' prayer for punitive damages and a motion for summary judgment. Dumas has also filed a motion for summary judgment against the CHA. For the reasons set forth below, the CHA's motion to strike all prayers for punitive damages is granted, and Dumas' and the CHA's cross motions for summary judgment are denied.
This lawsuit arises out of the claim by Dumas that the CHA refused her request to find suitable alternative subsidized housing. The U.S. Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437, authorizes HUD to contribute financially to public housing agencies ("PHAs") such as the CHA. In exchange for these contributions, the PHAs manage the Section 8 Existing Housing Program ("Section 8"). A family becomes a participant in Section 8 housing when a PHA executes a contract with a landlord to subsidize the family rent. 24 C.F.R. § 882.209. Defendant CHA is a PHA and manages the Section 8 program in Chicago for HUD.
Dumas was a participant in the Section 8 program during January 1989. On January 12, 1989, the CHA sent Dumas and her landlord a notice indicating that CHA would terminate her Section 8 participation if her landlord did not make repairs to her dwelling by February 28, 1989. (Pl. Resp., Ex. G).
Dumas alleges that the CHA continued to issue subsidy payments to her landlord after February 28 (Comp. at P 9), whereas, the CHA asserts that it terminated its payments when the deficiencies were not corrected. (CHA Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1).
On April 13 and 28, 1989, Dumas asked HUD for relocation assistance and information on her status with the Section 8 program. (Comp. at P 11 and Ex. A and B). On May 1, 1989, HUD informed Dumas that she was a participant in the Section 8 program and that the CHA had been informed of her request, and CHA would provide further details on her status. (Pl. Resp., Ex. D). Dumas alleges that CHA violated her constitutional rights by refusing to adequately inform her of her housing status and by failing to accord her a hearing or to issue a new certificate for continued participation in the Section 8 program. (Comp. at PP 11 and 17).
Dumas received a Re-examination of Family Income form in April, 1989 from the CHA. (Pl. Resp., Ex. C). She completed the form and returned the form within the seven days allotted. Id. She alleges that she was forced to defend herself in eviction proceedings without proper notice from the CHA of her housing status. (Comp. at P14). Dumas asserts that pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(m), she was entitled to notice of the CHA's decision to deny the certificate. Also, if the certificate was denied, Dumas asserts she was entitled to an informal hearing on the denial. The CHA claims that her certificate expired because she never actually requested a new certificate, nor did she complete the required paperwork as required by HUD regulations. (CHA Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2).
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
When reviewing the record on summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1995). To avert summary judgment, however, Plaintiffs must do more than raise "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A summary judgment proceeding is not a vehicle for the resolution of factual disputes; it is designed to determine whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Id.
III. MOTION TO STRIKE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Dumas filed an action against the CHA seeking actual and punitive damages. The CHA has filed a motion to strike Dumas' claim for punitive damages relying upon the Supreme Court decision in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981).
In City of Newport, an organization licensed by the City of Newport to present musical concerts sued the city and city officials alleging that cancellation of a license amounted to a violation of their constitutional rights under color of state law. The court in denying punitive damages stated that "punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct." City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 69 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1981). "It remains true that an award of punitive damages against a municipality 'punishes' only the taxpayers, who took no part in the commission of the tort." Id. "Neither reason nor justice suggests that such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing taxpayers." Id. Accordingly the Court held that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. Similarly, this court in Hammond v. Cicero, 822 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Ill. 1993) held that as a municipality, the CHA is not liable for punitive damages under § 1983.
Plaintiff asserts that the CHA should be liable for punitive damages based on this court's decision in Hamrick v. Lewis, 515 F. Supp. 983 (N.D. Ill. 1981). However, Hamrick has been effectively overruled by City of Newport. Therefore, Plaintiff's arguments are not applicable to the present case. Accordingly, the CHA's motion ...