those same rights by not properly training Foley to make any inquiry into the validity of that warrant when there was sufficient reason to believe that the warrant was invalid.
Foley asserts, however, that his arrest of plaintiff was proper because the warrant was facially valid, relying on Mitchell v. Aluisi, 872 F.2d 577, 578-79 (4th Cir. 1989) and United States v. McDonald, 606 F.2d 552, 553-54 (5th Cir. 1979). These cases held that an officer did not violate an arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights in executing a warrant which, although facially valid, had been quashed, despite the arrestee's protest that such warrant had been quashed. Id. Once again, however, defendant's reliance is misguided. In both Mitchell and McDonald, the officers had reason to believe that the process by which they were informed of outstanding warrants was reliable. In the instant case, however, plaintiff has alleged that all defendants including Foley know that the system is an utter failure and cannot be relied upon. As Justice O'Connor stated in her concurring opinion of Arizona v. Evans, U.S. , 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995), "surely it would not be reasonable for the police to rely, say, on a recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency's, that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to false arrests." Here, plaintiff alleges that Foley should have known that his computer check was unreliable.
Nor is Foley entitled to qualified immunity. As previously stated, Foley's actions in relying on a inaccurate computer system were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law. Qualified Immunity shields state actors from liability for constitutional violations if their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Williams v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411, 1414 (7th Cir. 1992). Here, Foley's conduct was unreasonable because he knew or should have known that each year hundreds of people are arrested on previously quashed or recalled warrants, that the warrant at issue was approximately two years old, that plaintiff made repeated statements to Foley that the warrant had been quashed and that he had proof thereof. Additionally, the fact that the arrest was made on an invalid warrant is sufficient to state a cause of action for a violation of a clearly established law. Foley is not entitled to the defense of qualified Immunity.
The City asserts that plaintiff fails to state a federal civil rights claim against them because he fails to allege either a constitutional violation or a policy, practice, or custom. Because plaintiff has sufficiently stated a constitutional deprivation of his Fourth Amendment rights, plaintiff can contest the City's policy and/or practice regarding supervision and training of officers in post-arrest investigation to verify the validity of a warrant. The City's failure to train its officers to check for such errors would make the City liable to plaintiff for this violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The City has had actual knowledge since 1980 that the warrant computer systems at issue are not reliable. See Murray, 634 F.2d at 365; Hvorcik, 847 F. Supp. at 1414; Palos Park, 1992 WL 170565 at *3 Additionally, in June of 1981, the Chicago Police Department conducted an internal review of the procedures it followed regarding recalled warrants, which indicated that improvements to the system were "imperative." Yet the City has taken no steps to remedy its procedures for investigating the validity of warrants shown by its computer to be outstanding. Knowing that the warrant computer system is completely inadequate to facilitate proper arrests, the City failed to train its officers to compensate properly for this inadequacy. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against the City and Foley, and their motions to dismiss these claims are denied.
Fairman, Foley, the City, Sheahan and Pucinski for False Arrest/Imprisonment
Counts X, XI, XIII, and XIV are state law claims alleging both wrongful arrest and incarceration. A person who has been falsely arrested is at the same time falsely imprisoned, and an unlawful arrest may support a cause of action for either false arrest or false imprisonment. Dutton v. Roo-mac, Inc., 100 Ill. App. 3d 116, 119, 426 N.E.2d 604, 55 Ill. Dec. 458 (2nd Dist, 1981). As with plaintiff's similar Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff in a false imprisonment action must show that the restraint was either unreasonable or without probable cause. Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 475, 151 Ill. Dec. 560, 564 N.E.2d 1222 (1990).
Sheahan, Fairman, Foley, and the City assert that the false arrest/imprisonment claims are barred by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-101 et. seq. ("the Act"). Under the Act, a public employee is "not liable for his act or omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such an act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct." Hvorcik, 847 F. Supp. at 1424. Willful and wanton conduct is defined as conduct which is "intentional or committed under circumstances exhibiting a reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. It is apparent, however, that the inquiry into what conduct will constitute willful and wanton is "no different then what is required to show 'deliberate indifference'" in the context of the previously discussed section 1983 claims. Id. Therefore, the conclusions stated as to plaintiff's § 1983 claims in the preceding sections apply with equal force to the state law claims for false imprisonment/arrest.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Sheahan's motion to dismiss any and all counts is denied. Pucinski's motion to dismiss is granted as to Counts III, IV, and the official capacity claims within Counts IX and XII, and denied as to Counts V, X, XI, XIII, XIV, and the individual capacity claims within Counts IX and XII. Fairman's motion to dismiss is denied as to Counts VI, X, XI, XIII, XIV, and the official capacity claims within Counts IX and XII, and granted at to Count VII and the individual capacity claims within Counts IX and XII. Foley's motion to dismiss all claims against him in his official capacity is granted, but denied as to those claims charged against him in his individual capacity. The City's motion is denied as to all Counts directed against it.
Plaintiff is directed to file an amended complaint on or before June 3, 1996, consistent with this opinion, setting forth the remaining claims against each defendant, and labeling each count corresponding to the statutory, constitutional or legal theory asserted. Defendants shall file their answers on or before June 24, 1996. The status report currently set for May 21, 1996, shall remain in effect.
ENTER: May 15, 1996
Robert W. Gettleman
United States District Judge