128 L. Ed. 2d 811, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), held that prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment in conditions of confinement cases where (1) the alleged deprivation is, under an objective standard, "sufficiently serious" and (2) the officials act with "deliberate indifference." 114 S. Ct. at 1977. In defining deliberate indifference, the Court held that "a prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 1979.
Assuming the veracity of Young's allegations, on the record before us it appears that the conditions the plaintiff allegedly endured in the strip cell for approximately twenty days were sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment. See Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (leaving a prisoner in a cell for three days without running water, dry clothing, bedding, or cleaning supplies, and in which feces were smeared on the walls, may fall below the threshold of decency set by Eighth Amendment). After discovery it may be apparent that the actual conditions of the hospital unit's detention cell were adequate under the Eighth Amendment, at which time the defendants could move for summary judgment. Nonetheless, based on the plaintiff's allegations we must conclude that the conditions in the strip cell were sufficiently serious to implicate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
In addition, Young's allegations adequately outline the requisite subjective intent for defendants Dang and Cooper. As for Dang, Young claims that the defendant visited him in his cell and treated him during his stay. Thus, at least after their first meeting, Dang must have known of the conditions in Young's cell. Young also claims that he wrote letters to Cooper "trying to explain all that had happened," but Cooper never responded. Compl. at 7. The reasonable inference from this allegation is that Young communicated to Cooper about the conditions of his confinement in the hospital unit. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to establish that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to Young's serious needs. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss these claims against Cooper and Dang is denied.
F. Forced Administration of Medication
Young alleges that Dang forcibly medicated him against his will each time he requested to be released from the strip cell. We are guided in our review of this claim by Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 108 L. Ed. 2d 178, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990), in which a prisoner alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was given antipsychotic drugs against his will. The Court held that although an inmate has an interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in avoiding the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs, id. at 221-22, such medication could still be administered to a prisoner against his will "if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest." id. at 227. Prior to receiving such medication, however, the inmate must be afforded certain procedural protections: notice, the right to be present for an adversary hearing before a neutral adjudicator, and, in most instances, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 235; Sullivan v. Flannigan, 8 F.3d 591, 596-99 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 128 L. Ed. 2d 52, 114 S. Ct. 1376 (1994).
Here, it is unclear whether the medication Young received--which we assume to be some sort of antipsychotic drug--was in his medical interest and essential for his safety or the safety of others. Moreover, there is no indication in the complaint that Young received a prior hearing of any kind. Because we cannot conclude that Young's rights under the Due Process Clause were adequately protected, we must deny Dang's motion to dismiss this claim.
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. It is so ordered.
MARVIN E. ASPEN
United States District Judge