behalf, as a "nation of Black people within the territorial boundaries of the United States." Republic of New Afrika v. F.B.I., 656 F. Supp. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 1985) aff'd, 261 U.S. App. D.C. 333, 821 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The members of the alleged provisional government of the Republic of New Afrika have advocated the overthrow of the United States by force and violence in those sections of the United States asserted to be the "national territory" of the Republic of New Afrika. In re the Pro Hac Vice of Chokwe Lumumba, 526 F. Supp. 163, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The government first moves to deny the motion on procedural grounds. Because Mayes is represented by counsel, argues the government, he may not file motions pro se. The rule is that a defendant who accepts representation by counsel forfeits the right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Cain v. Peters, 972 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may, however, choose to have counsel act in only a "standby" capacity. Counsel for Mayes has not raised the issue and is aware of the motion. Nevertheless, rather than step into the gyttja of pleadings filed pro se, as opposed to "standby counsel" or by court appointed counsel, the court addresses the merits of the motion. See generally United States v. Seybold, 979 F.2d 582 (7th Cir. 1992).
As a general proposition, individuals do not have standing to assert private rights in domestic courts on the basis of international treaties. For at least 167 years, the law of this country has been that a treaty does not create enforceable private rights unless it expressly or impliedly creates a private claim for relief. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 311, 7 L. Ed. 415 (1829) (Chief Justice Marshall); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 761 F.2d 370, 373-76 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1532-33 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 546-47 (D.D.C. 1981). The courts have consistently held that the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I are not self-executing and, thus, provide no basis for the enforcement of private rights in domestic courts. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Accordingly, Mayes does not have standing by those treaties.
Furthermore, the Republic of New Afrika is not a party to the Geneva Convention, the United States has never recognized the alleged republic, and the United States has never ratified Protocol I. United States v. Lumumba, 741 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1984) (no recognition of the Republic of New Afrika by the United States); Linder v. Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1462 (Protocol I not ratified by the United States); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1533 (Protocol I not ratified by USA); United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Republic of New Afrika not a party to Geneva Convention). Therefore, even if Mayes had standing, he would have nothing, proverbially speaking, to stand upon.
In addition, federal courts universally have rejected claims based upon political prisoner status under the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I. Claims based specifically upon alleged citizenship in the Republic of New Afrika have been rejected as frivolous. E.g., United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 192, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding frivolous defendant's demand that he be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention as a "captured Freedom Fighter of the New Afrikan Nation" and a "Prisoner-of-War"); Buck, 690 F. Supp. at 1296-1303.
Accordingly, for each of the foregoing reasons, the motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, SR., Judge
United States District Court
DATED: April 3, 1996