this claim is not related to Ms. Thomas' First Amendment claim, the only federal claim that survives this motion to dismiss, I do not have supplemental jurisdiction to hear it under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). It is, accordingly, dismissed. See Hale, supra, 642 F. Supp. at 1109 (finding no subject matter jurisdiction over suit against the CHA alleging unsanitary apartments).
Ms. Thomas also claims that she was attacked by another CHA resident. As noted above, this claim presents two possible causes of action. To the extent that plaintiff has brought this claim to demand that the CHA evict her attacker, it is dismissed because she lacks standing to assert this claim, as stated above. If Ms. Thomas wishes to bring a claim for negligent security, that claim would also arise under state law. Like her claim of an unsanitary apartment, this claim is not related to Ms. Thomas' First Amendment claim. I therefore may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
As her final claim in count I, Ms. Thomas asserts that the CHA has denied her and members of her "group" the use of common public CHA meeting rooms. I interpret her to claim that the CHA has violated her First Amendment right to freedom of association and speech.
The First Amendment protects, inter alia, the right of all persons to speak freely and to associate together in groups to further their lawful interests. Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-66, 60 L. Ed. 2d 360, 99 S. Ct. 1826 (1979). This right is not absolute; the state may enforce some content-neutral restrictions on time, place, and manner. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983). If the restrictions on the use of the Cabrini-Green rooms are unreasonable, Ms. Thomas may be entitled to relief. Id. at 46. Moreover, if the restrictions were applied in such a fashion as to discriminate against Ms. Thomas, she would also be entitled to relief. It therefore does not "appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim that would entitle [her] to relief." Hughes, supra, 449 U.S. at 10. This claim is therefore not dismissed.
B. Count Two
In count II, Ms. Thomas alleges that the CHA filed a "fraudulent" eviction action against her. I see two potential claims that she is raising: a violation of the Housing Act and her due process rights, or malicious prosecution.
According to her complaint, the CHA instituted an eviction proceeding against Ms. Thomas without first providing her a grievance hearing. HUD regulations require a grievance procedure before residents of HUD-assisted housing projects may be evicted. See 24 C.F.R. § 966. Although, according to plaintiff's complaint, CHA did not follow this regulation by giving her this hearing before filing the state court action, Ms. Thomas was never evicted. She therefore may not assert a violation of the HUD regulations, which only require a hearing before a resident is evicted.
The court in Herring v. Chicago Housing Authority, 850 F. Supp. 694 (N.D. Ill. 1994) recently addressed this issue. In Herring, the CHA had filed a state action to evict the plaintiff, a public housing project tenant. Id. at 697. The CHA subsequently dismissed the action without prejudice to reinstate. Id. Ms. Herring remained in her apartment throughout the litigation. Id. The court noted that plaintiff was never evicted, she did not lose any of her leasehold rights, and her lease was never terminated. Id. Because Plaintiff's lease never terminated, the court ruled that "no deprivation has occurred and Plaintiff's Due Process, United States Housing Act, and lease claims must fail." Id. at 698.
Ms. Thomas, like the plaintiff in Herring, was not evicted from her apartment. She does not allege that her lease ever terminated or that she lost leasehold rights in her apartment. She continues to live in the same apartment. Under the analysis in Herring, Ms. Thomas does not allege a claim under Due Process, United States Housing Act, or her lease. Accordingly, to the extent Ms. Thomas asserts a Due Process claim, it is dismissed.
Ms. Thomas may also be pursuing a claim of malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution is a state law claim. Because this claim is not related to Ms. Thomas' First Amendment claim, I will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it. It is therefore dismissed against the CHA.
Finally, plaintiff's illegal demolition claim is dismissed because she lacks standing to raise it. See supra.
For the reasons stated above, the complaint against the federal defendants is dismissed. To the extent Ms. Thomas asserts a First Amendment claim against the CHA, it remains.
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: March 15, 1996