Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

03/12/96 MARRIAGE L. THOMAS LAKIN

March 12, 1996

IN RE MARRIAGE OF L. THOMAS LAKIN, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, AND PHYLLIS JEAN LAKIN, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.


Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County. No. 92-D-384. Honorable Robert Hennessey, Judge, presiding.

As Corrected April 1, 1996.

The Honorable Justice Goldenhersh delivered the opinion of the court: Kuehn, J., concurs. Davis, J., dissenting:

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Goldenhersh

The Honorable Justice GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, L. Thomas Lakin, appeals from entry of a property settlement by the circuit court of Madison County. On appeal, petitioner raises for our consideration the following issues: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion when it entered a judgment order based on earlier oral property settlement agreement when both parties contested certain provisions of that agreement at the hearing on entry of the judgment order; and (2) whether petitioner was deprived of due process because notice of the June 17, 1994, hearing on entry of the judgment order was given June 16, 1994, when both petitioner and his lead attorney were out of state and unable to attend the hearing. We reverse and remand.

I

Petitioner and respondent, Phyllis Jean Lakin, were married in October of 1982 and separated in March of 1992. Two children were born to the parties, Kris, born July 8, 1983, and Karey, born November 15, 1985. Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on April 8, 1992. Respondent filed a response and counterpetition for dissolution on May 8, 1992.

The issues of property division, maintenance, and custody all were disputed. Petitioner and respondent were able to arrive at a joint custody agreement, which was entered on May 9, 1994. On May 16, 1994, the parties appeared for a scheduled hearing on the dissolution petitions. Prior to hearing any evidence, the parties reached an oral agreement resolving all remaining issues. At the hearing, petitioner's attorney read into the record the terms of the settlement agreement reached by the parties. Under the terms of the agreement, petitioner was to pay child support and the children's education expenses through a master's degree and cover medical and dental expenses. Respondent, pursuant to the terms of the agreement, would receive certain sums of money over a five-year period plus 6% interest on the unpaid balance of the settlement, the residence in Wood River, the profit-sharing plan at petitioner's law firm, a Jeep, an individual retirement account (IRA), various furniture, and personal property. Additionally, petitioner would pay respondent's current charge card expenses. Respondent waived maintenance. The parties agreed to pay their own attorney fees.

Petitioner was to receive the balance of the property including all funds in certain brokerage accounts except for respondent's IRA, all interest in his law firm stock and loans, all interest in Argosy Gaming Company (stock and notes), and all interest in other business enterprises, plus various notes. Petitioner also received the former family home in East Alton and other residential and commercial real estate properties.

At the hearing, the court asked the parties whether they understood the settlement and agreed to all its provisions. The parties stated they agreed with the terms and provisions. Then the trial court found the settlement agreement to be fair and reasonable and adopted the settlement "as the order of the court." The court ordered petitioner's counsel to draft a written judgment order reflecting the agreement, within seven days, and to submit it to court and counsel. Respondent's counsel would have four days in which to present any objections.

On May 24, 1994, petitioner's counsel sent copies of the proposed judgment order to the trial court and respondent's attorney. Respondent's attorney made no objections to the proposed judgment order during the four-day time limit set by the court. In the interim between May 24, 1994, and June 16, 1994, petitioner had conversations with his attorneys and accountants regarding the tax implications of the wording in the agreement.

Because the judgment order had not been entered as of June 13, 1994, respondent's counsel attempted to reach petitioner's attorney regarding the matter. During a telephone conference with one of petitioner's attorneys, respondent's counsel, and Judge Hennessey on June 16, 1994, the judge said he would be available on June 17, 1994, to enter the judgment order if the judgment conformed with the terms orally agreed to at the May 16, 1994, hearing. The parties were aware that petitioner's counsel, William Lucco, would not be available on June 17, 1994, due to a previously scheduled vacation. Further, petitioner was in Seattle, Washington, and would not be present at the June 17, 1994, hearing.

At the June 17, 1994, hearing both parties were represented by counsel. Joseph Brown, an attorney with Lucco's law firm, was present at the hearing but was not personally familiar with petitioner's case. Brown objected to the hearing because the short notice did not permit petitioner the opportunity to make arrangements to attend and because Lucco was not present due to a scheduled vacation. Additionally, Brown objected to entry of the judgment order on the grounds that petitioner wanted language suggested by his accountant included in the agreement concerning his business interests. Respondent expressed concern about the provisions involving petitioner's payment of credit charge accounts and respondent's cooperation in preparation of the couple's 1993 income tax returns. Respondent's position at the hearing was that the judgment order should be entered so that respondent could begin to receive the moneys owing to her and that any dispute concerning specific provisions could be addressed through posttrial proceedings.

No testimony was taken during the hearing, and the trial court concluded there was no reason to delay entry of the judgment if, upon its review, the judgment comported with the agreement entered into the record on May 16, 1994. The court stated that any clarification concerning one or more aspects of the judgment could be addressed at a ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.